




Adjustment processes for exchange economies and noncooperative games
Elzen, Antonius Henricus van den
Publication date:
1991
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Elzen, A. H. V. D. (1991). Adjustment processes for exchange economies and noncooperative games. [s.n.].
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. May. 2021
711, 3   AUgg  JW 7 6944 y J 4   i70, .    ... 
adratkieug Ar#grop)8 8 m
WER:·-iii2it:R ;69«*62it, UPE.%. ..4:6 22-.·.401 t *9757*T·,,   -h    -
<PE 7-(9 --4:ti,2995Ja'       -   -  '. 9:#'2 ;6:21-., 45,:-l:f **
.-   '        1.,    'a, - z _ -4,5-     , . /.ty:*Ill-.












IAYIfiI t Bt€[11 3.iti' 1.P'129jj '
I
= 1-2 -,-r  .-  -- ,-.ar- ,-..N:.1 T "- #1     ':  -, 41• i,   : ='-i-_. 'AL   ,-.
.
-  .     5,  .."·   ---6·-,      7:.-:-'·). .5 } :-72-·32'.,SJ.'.  -j k.... ,.....:;.1.''  .:1'..  "i..  . .1 ..::,-
--  -3   . i
. 31.-----.  -.-,-' E: +B-,,11-:i'..R '. :L='.13..1- ··.I:' ':81 . -..
9-2----P,-'  . '..;---«·2:2-  -  -_ ·  •if.-4 42..45.t-» -1, -•·IT.    f       . 'If.2..1 -»_ -_  .». 3-lri-_Its._, 2/aa/JUIRLY; fil *·._=2.11
Adjustment Processes for Exchange
Economies and Noncooperative Games
Adjustment Processes for Exchange
Economies and Noncooperative Games
Proefschrift
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de
Katholieke Universiteit Brabant, op gezag van
de rector magnificus, prof. dr. L.F.W. de Klerk,
in het openbaar te verdedigen ten overstaan van
een door het college van dekanen aangewezen
commissie in de aula van de Universiteit op
vrijdag 5 juli 1991 te 14.15 uur
door
Antonius Henricus van den Elzen
geboren te Cuijk c.a.
druk: wibro dissertatiedrukkerij, helmond.
PROMOTOR:  Prof. dr. A.J.J. Talman
ASSISTENT-PROMOTOR:  Dr. J.H. van Geldrop
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This monograph is the result of research carried out over a period of seven years. The
first two years the research was financially supported by Tilburg University. The other
years by the cooperation center of Eindhoven University and Tilburg University.
This work would never have been completed without the help of several people. First
of all, I mention Dolf Talman who introduced me to the field of simplicial algorithms and
related topics. His enthusiasm and guidance encouraged and stimulated me very much.
Next, I would like to thank Pieter Ruys who always supported me, also on times when
things went not so well. Further. I am indebted to Gerard van der Laan with whom I did
part of this research. Jan van Geldrop introduced me to the field of differential topology,
and Tim Doup made me overcome my initial fear for computers.
I thank Petra Ligtenberg for her excellent typewriting, and I am indebted to Yvonne
van Delft and Jan Pijnenburg for drawing the nice figures. More generally, I would like to
thank all my roommates and the colleagues at the Department of Econometrics of Tilburg
University for the excellent environment they created for doing scientific research.
Antoon van den Elzen
April 1991
Contents
1. Introduction                                                          1
1.1. Adjustment processes in economies                                2
1.2. Some examples of the processes and algorithms                    8
1.3· Outline of the monograph and main results                       11
2. Preliminaries                                                        13
2.1. Notation                                                         13
2.2. The stationary point problem                                    16
2.3. Notions related to simplicial algorithms 20
2.4. Concepts from differential topology                             24
3. Existence of adjustment processes                                    33
3.1. Two price adjustment processes for a pure exchange economy      34
3.2. The proportional process                                        37
3.3. Direct approach towards the sign process                        41
3.4. Homotopy approach towards the sign process                      45
4. An adjustment process for an international trade model               53
4.1. The model                                                        54
4.2. An example                                                       58
4.3. The process 64
4.4. Economic interpretation of the adjustments                      71
4.5. Numerical illustration                                          74
5. An adjustment process for an exchange economy with linear
production technologies                                              79
5.1. The model                                                        79
5.2. Existence of the path                                           82
5.3. The adjustment process                                          86
5.4. Examples                                                         91
6. Finding Nash equilibria in noncooperative games                      97
6.1. Solving the bi-matrix game as a stationary point problem        99
6.2. The procedure 104
6.3. Game-theoretic interpretation 112
6.4. How to find more equilibria 115
6.5. Interpretation and generalization of the Lemke-Howson
algorithm 120






This monograph is a treatise on adjustment processes. We  consider
price  adjustment  processes in exchange economies and strategy adjustment
processes in noncooperative games.
In  the  most  simple  version of an exchange economy, i.e. a pure
exchange economy, there exist markets on which prices  are  determined  by
the  demand  and supply created by a finite number of consumers willing to
exchange their initial endowments in order to  maximize  their  utilities.
An  equilibrium  situation  is  attained if, for some price vector, demand
equals supply in all markets. Starting from a situation not being an equi-
librium  an  adjustment  process reaches an equilibrium via adaptations of
prices. The advantage of the adjustment processes we present here is  that
they exist and converge under far weaker assumptions than existing proces-
ses. This is mainly due to the fact that the processes keep track  of  the
starting situation.
The second subject concerns the problem of finding Nash equilibria
in  noncooperative  games. A Nash equilibrium is a situation from which no
player can improve his position by unilaterally changing his strategy.  We
present a new algorithm for finding such equilibria. The sequence of stra-
tegy vectors generated by the algorithm can be  interpreted  as  the  path
followed by a strategy adjustment process.
This introductory chapter consists of three sections. In Section
1.1  we  give  an  overview of the existing literature on price adjustment
processes in exchange economies, discuss the  meaning  and  value  of  the
concept, and  consider  the  contribution  of this monograph against this
background. Next, in Section 1.2 we illustrate  both  our  type  of  price
adjustment  processes  and  the  algorithm for finding Nash equilibria, by
giving two simple examples. Finally, Section 1.3 gives an outline of  this
monograph and sketches the main results.
2
1.1. Adjustment processes in economies
In  this section we want to introduce the concept of an adjustment
process and discuss its significance. We do this by considering  the  main
processes that have been defined in the literature. Also, we indicate our
contribution to the field. For a comprehensive overview of the  literature
we  refer  to the articles of Hahn [1982] and Hurwicz [1986]. These papers
also contain an almost exhaustive list of references. The ideas expressed
here are partly based on Hahn [1982] and van der Laan [1988].
Roughly speaking, an adjustment process is a process operating  in
an  economy to bring about an equilibrium. We can categorize the processes
defined in the literature according to  different  criteria.  In  economic
theory, the  most  important  categorization distinguishes three types of
adjustment processes, namely price adjustment processes, resource  alloca-
tion mechanisms, and  decentralistic processes based on pairwise bargai-
ning. Let us discuss them in somewhat more detail.
The price adjustment processes are based on the idea that an equi-
librium is reached by adaptations of prices.  The  basic  idea  for  these
processes  is the well-known 'law of demand and supply' for a single good.
That law states that on a market the price of  a  good  increases  if  the
demand  for  that good is larger than its supply. Similarly, its price de-
creases in the reverse case. By adaptations of this kind an equilibrium on
a  single  market  is reached. Walras [1874] generalized this concept to a
situation with more goods. First, the law of demand and supply is  applied
to  the  first  good,  next to the second good, and so on. From this it is
only a small step to define a similar process by which  the  same  adapta-
tions  simultaneously  take  place on a number of individual markets. This
formulation is known as the Walrasian  adjustment  process  and  has  been
introduced  by  Samuelson  [1947]. Later on several generalizations of the
latter process have been introduced. The most important one is the Newton-
like  method  of  Smale [1976], in which there are also dependencies among
the markets, i.e. the price adaptation on one market is also determined by
the situation on the other markets. The economic interpretation of Smale's
method is that the price adaptations are such that both the excess demands
and  the  excess supplies are simultaneously diminished. This might not be
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the case for the Walrasian process. Consider for example the market for  a
Giffen  good. If such a market reveals an excess demand then the resulting
I price increase by the Walrasian process will increase this excess.
The  price  adjustment processes mentioned thusfar are tdtonnement
processes. The crucial feature of such processes is that trades  are  only
based  on  final values. Prices are adjusted till their equilibrium values
are attained. Then trade takes place at these equilibrium prices. On the
other hand we have the nont&tonnement price adjustment processes. In those
processes trade also takes place  during  the  adjustment  procedure.  The
difficulty  is  of  course to model the trade at these 'false' prices. For
this trade the assumption of orderly markets is usually made. A market  is
orderly  if the short side of the market is always satisfied. For example,
when a consumer reveals a demand, that demand is satisfied if  the  market
has an excess supply.
The price adjustment processes as defined above  are  centralistic
in  the sense that they all assume the existence of an auctioneer to adapt
the prices. Consider for example the Walrasian process. Its  performance
can  be  thought  of  as  follows. At a certain price vector all consumers
reveal their wishes to the auctioneer. The auctioneer collects the wishes
and after comparing the total demand for and the total supply of all goods
he prescribes a new vector of prices, and so on. Similarly,  Smale's  pro-
cess  can  be  seen in this way. Also the nont&tonnement processes need an
auctioneer. Before at a price vector trade can take  place  an  auctioneer
must consider the totals of demand and supply on each market.
Finally, we remark that in general, price adjustment processes can
be  formulated  both  as continuous procedures and as discrete procedures.
Note that these two possible ways relate to different treatments of  time.
At  first  sight  this distinction may seem to be academic, but it appears
that things like convergence may heavily depend on this. We return to this
point later on.
In the sixties, Hurwicz [1960] and others designed the concept  of
of resource allocation mechanisms. This is a much broader concept and
includes price adjustment processes. Crucial notions here are messages and
response functions. Every agent in the economy sends a message. Based on
these messages agents send in new messages till nobody wants to change. At
4
these  equilibrium  messages trade takes place. This is a general descrip-
tion of a tatonnement mechanism. But here we  can  also  distinguish  non-
tAtonnement mechanisms. An  important  class  of such mechanisms are the
strategic market games as studied for example by Shubik [1984, ch. 15]. As
already  indicated the mechanism concept is very broad. It not only encom-
passes competition, but it is also suited for other market  and  nonmarket
conditions.  Examples of exchange processes without prices that fit in the
mechanism concept are the Edgeworth process (see  Uzawa  [1962])  and  the
bidding  process of Hurwicz, Radner, and Reiter [1975]. Again, most of the
mechanisms given here are centralistic in the sense as  discussed  before.
Important questions in this research area are for example 'Which mechanism
utilizes the least information to establish certain features', or  'Design
a  mechanism  to  perform a specified social goal'. A drawback of resource
allocation mechanisms is that their message space is usually  much  larger
than  the  prices needed for the price adjustment processes. The costs for
implementation are therefore also larger.
Finally,  we briefly discuss the decentralistic processes based on
pairwise bargaining. This type of processes  has  been  initiated  by  the
article  of  Rubenstein  [1982]. Here the trade and price formation occurs
via pairwise bargaining. More concrete, assume an  economy  with  a  large
number  of  agents.  Two  agents  meet and bargain about a transaction. If
there is agreement they trade, else they search for another trader. Even-
tually  the  economy  reaches  a  stationary state, the equilibrium. Under
certain conditions this equilibrium state  appears  to be the Walrasian
equilibrium (see for example Gale [1986]).
What can be said about the usefulness of the concept of adjustment
processes  and  the contributions given above? This is strongly related to
the importance of equilibrium analysis. The  latter  has  appeared  to  be
fruitful  for example to study policy implications by comparative statics.
There, the result of a given policy is measured as the difference  between
two  equilibrium  states.  The existence of adjustment processes revealing
natural intrinsic forces in the economy which drive that  economy  towards
an  equilibrium gives an extra argument for that approach. In this context
we also should mention the occurence of  multiple equilibria (see  Kehoe
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[1985]).  It  is plausible that the existence of an adjustment process may
decide upon the question which equilibrium is most likely to  occur.  This
because  the convergence of the process to that specific equilibrium indi-
cates that the equilibrium is stable.
Another  question concerns the problem whether the processes de-
fined thusfar correspond to what happens in reality. In fact, the ultimate
goal  of  the study of adjustment processes is to elucidate the mechanisms
and forces that tend to bring an economy towards an equilibrium. We  think
that  in  this respect the state of the art is just in the beginning. Most
of the processes in the literature are centralistic and  need  an  auctio-
neer.  This  is  not  very  convincing. The same holds for the tdtonnement
processes. In practice we do see exchanges against non-clearing prices. We
think  that an adjustment process which resembles reality should be decen-
tralistic. In that sense the research along the lines of Rubenstein  seems
to  be the most promising. On the other hand, Rubenstein requires rational
agents willing to bargain with  everyone  for  every  commodity.  Economic
agents,  however, are making use of institutions, such as markets, and for
good reasons. Thus, also the practical worth of these processes is  rather
limited.
Concluding we may say that the theory concerning  adjustment  pro-
cesses  developed  thusfar has not so much value as a description of real-
ity. But the theory is very important for  general  equilibrium  analysis,
both  emperically  and theoretically. For such analysis the convergence of
an adjustment process is of crucial importance. This monograph might yield
a  contribution to this field. We consider a new type of tatonnement price
adjustment processes. The advantage of our processes above the other  ones
developed  until  now  is  that they converge under far weaker conditions.
Besides, they are rather easy to adapt for application to a broader  range
of models. For example, in this monograph we consider applications to an
international trade model and to an exchange economy with  linear  produc-
tion.
Let us consider now the convergence issue in more detail. Here  we
follow the lines of Saari and Simon [1978] and Saari [1985]. They consider
the convergence of tatonnement price adjustment processes in  the  context
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of  a  pure  exchange  economy. From Debreu [1974] we know that every con-
tinuous function z: R  1-4  Rn•1  from the price space    into the commodity
space,  satisfying Iipizi(P) = 0, can be thought of as a representation of
a specific exchange economy with n+1 goods, indexed from 1  to  n+1.  Here
  =  Pl""'pn+1)7 in R :l represents  a strictly positive price vector
whereas z(p) is the (n+1)-vector of excess demands at price vector p.  The
i-th component of z(p), denoted zi(P), is positive (negative) whenever the
market for good i is in excess demand (supply) at p. Market i is  said  to
be in equilibrium at p if zi(P) = 0· At an equilibrium price vector p* all
markets are in equilibrium, i.e. z(p*) = Q. Now, Saari and Simon  call  an
adjustment  process effective if there exists an open set of prices, D, in
n+1
R    such that for almost all economies this process converges from almost+
all price vectors in D towards an equilibrium price vector. Furthermore, a
price mechanism is called locally effective if for almost  all  economies,
all  equilibria  in  such  an economy have an open neighbourhood such that
whenever the process starts from a price vector in this  neighbourhood  it
converges towards that equilibrium.
Saari and Simon [1978] considered the existence of  (locally)  ef-
fective adjustment processes defined as a differential equation, and Saari
[1985] did the same for iterative procedures. Their conclusions were  that
any  continuous price mechanism in order to be effective or locally effec-
tive requires at every price vector p information concerning z(p) and  the
jacobian  matrix  of  derivatives of z at p, Dz(p). The same holds for any
locally effective iterative procedure. This does not say that there indeed
exist  locally effective procedures. The required amount of information is
a necessary condition, not a sufficient one. On the other hand, it can  be
shown  that there exists no effective iterative price adjustment procedure
based on a finite amount of information. These results are very disappoin-
ting.  First  of all, because (locally) effective mechanisms need a lot of
information. Secondly, the non-existence of an effective iterative  proce-
dure  is  very  troublesome  because also the price paths generated by the
continuous procedures have in practice to be followed by a discrete proce-
dure.  However. the processes we consider in this monograph are continuous
procedures in which the adaptations of a given price vector  are  governed
not  only  by  the related vector of excess demands, but also by the price
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vector from which the whole procedure started. The latter feature is  cru-
cial in this context and allows for different information requirements,
but still guaranteeing the processes to reach an equilibrium  from  almost
any  price vector in the price space. Thus, our processes are effective in
a strong sense. That we call globally effective.
We  conclude this section by considering some of the price adjust-
ment processes for a pure exchange economy in somewhat more detail against
the  background  given  above.  First of all we have the law of demand and
supply applied to a single market. Formulated as a  differential  equation
its  convergence  is  guaranteed.  In general this is not the case for its
iterative counterpart. When successively applied to more markets  the  law
of  supply and demand might also not be converging since an equilibrium on
one market can be disturbed by adaptations of a price on  another  market.
The  most  well-known adjustment process is the Walrasian price adjustment
process. It follows the curve of solutions to  the  differential  equation
# = z(p).  However,  strong assumptions on the preference relations of the
agents are needed to guarantee convergence. For the Walrasian procedure to
be  effective  all goods need to be gross substitutes or a strong revealed
preference assumption must hold. To guarantee  local  effectiveness  these
assumptions  can be weakened somewhat to for example diagonal dominance of
the jacobian matrix at the equilibrium, i.e. at an equilibrium the abso-
lute  value  of the own price effect exceeds the sum of the absolute cross
effects. Scarf [1960] gives some examples of excess demand  functions  for
which  the  Walrasian tAtonnement process fails to converge from any star-
ting point other than the equilibrium. The reason why this is the case for
Scarf's famous three-goods-example has been clarified by Keenan and Rader
[1985]. They discovered a necessary and sufficient condition on an  excess
demand function for a three-goods-economy, such that the Walrasian process
is globally effective. This condition, stating that the sum of the  diago-
nal  elements of Dz(p) must be negative for all p, is not fulfilled in the
Scarf example.
The  global Newton method of Smale [1976] (see also Keenan [1981])
follows the solution curve to the differential equation Dz(p)* =
- A(p)z(p), where A(p) is related to the sign of the determinant of Dz(p)
This procedure is both effective and locally effective, and  as  indicated
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by Saari and Simon [1978] it indeed only needs information on p and Dz(p).
The set D corresponding to  the  effectiveness  is  an  open  set  of  the
boundary  of  the  price  space,  where  additionally  an  extra condition
concerning Dz has to be fulfilled.
The  processes to be introduced in this monograph adapt the prices
according to the sign pattern of the excess demand vector and the location
of  the starting price vector. In Section 1.2 we give a somewhat more ela-
borate treatment. Van der Laan and Talman [1987a] state that these proces-
ses  can  be  written  as  sequences of differential equations. As already
indicated the process is globally efficient. This is due to the fact  that
during  the  process the starting price vector is kept in mind. This makes
that the process makes use of global information. This is  different  from
the other procedures which only work with local information related to the
ongoing price vector.
1.2. Some examples of the processes and algorithms
In this section we want to give a first  idea  of  the  adjustment
processes and algorithms discussed in this monograph. In the first part we
present a price adjustment process for an exchange economy which has  been
presented  by  van der Laan and Talman [1987a]. But it is of the same type
as the processes to be presented in this monograph and  can  serve  as  an
introduction. Next, we discuss a process for finding a Nash equilibrium in
a bi-matrix game and show that it can be interpreted as a strategy adjust-
ment  process.  Here  we  want to circumvent the use of many formulas. The
set-up will therefore be rather intuitive.
To introduce the price adjustment process consider Figure 1.2.1 in
which the excess demand pattern for an exchange economy with  three  goods
is  given. Again, a price vector is denoted by p whereas the excess demand
vector at p is denoted by z(p). Price vectors are normalized to sum up  to
one. The three curves indicate the price vectors at which one of the goods
is in equilibrium (its excess demand is zero). These curves  intersect  at
p*,  the  equilibrium price vector in this economy. Now, let us consider a
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price adjustment process starting from a price vector v that lies close to





a           z 3(P) = 0
V
(1,0,0) (0,1,0)
Figure 1.2 .1.  The  price  space  of an exchange economy with three goods
consists of price vectors p = (pl'P2'P3) in R  such that pl+P2+P3 = 1.
and  3  are relatively low, whereas the price of commodity 2 is relatively
high. For such a price vector, it seems reasonable that the commodities  1
and 3 are in excess demand, whereas good 2 is in excess supply.
The process increases the prices of goods 1 and  3  proportionally
equally  while  the  price of commodity 2 is decreased, keeping the sum of
the prices equal to one. In the figure this means that the process  leaves
v  into  the  direction opposite to (0,1,0). The process continues in this
way till it reaches the price vector a. At that price vector  commodity  3
becomes in equilibrium, while commodity 1 is still in excess demand and
commodity 2 in excess supply. From a on, commodity 3 is kept  in  equilib-
rium  by allowing its relative price to become below the relative price of
good 1. Here the relative price of a good is its  price  relative  to  its
starting  price. Recall, that these relative prices of the goods 1 and 3
were equal along the line segment between v and a. Now. the process  moves
from  a  along  the  curve  at which good 3 is in equilibrium, towards p*,
because in that direction the relative price of  good  3  becomes  smaller
than the relative price of good 1.
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In general the process starts from a price vector v by  increasing
the  prices  of  the  goods  in excess demand relatively equally while the
prices of the commodities in excess supply are decreased relatively equal-
ly. The  process  follows  a  path of price vectors at which the relative
prices of goods in excess demand (supply) are maximal  (minimal),  whereas
the relative prices of goods in equilibrium may vary in order to keep them
in equilibrium.
Next,  we want to give an idea of the algorithm for finding a Nash
equilibrium in a bi-matrix game. The strategy space of a bi-matrix game in
which each of the two players has two actions is depicted in Figure 1.2.2.





1                                .-/0 VL/-
a.-
((1,0),(1,0)) 1 ((0,1),(1,0))
Figure 1.2.2. The strategy space of a  bi-matrix  game  with  each  player
having  two  actions.  The  space  consists  of the points x = ((xll'x12)'
(x21'x22))' where xjk is the probability with which  player  j  plays  his
k-th action, j.k E {1,2}. For j € {1,2}, xjl 2 0, xj2 2 0, and xjl + *j2 =
1.
The thick piecewise linear curve in the figure represents the best
reply set of player 2. Player 2 is  indifferent  between  his  actions  if
player  1 plays his actions each with probability 1/2. Furthermore, action
2 is optimal for player 2 if player 1 plays his first action with a larger
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probability  than his second action. In the reverse case action 1 is opti-
mal for player 2. Similarly, we can introduce the best reply set of player
1  being the dashed piecewise linear curve. At the Nash equilibrium x* the
two curves intersect and both players play optimal against the mixed stra-
tegy of their opponent.
Let us now consider the algorithm starting from the strategy  vec-
tor  v.  The path followed by the algorithm is indicated in the figure and
consists of two parts; the segment between v and a. and the segment from a
to  x*.  In  practice  this  is  done  by complementary pivoting and x* is
reached in two steps. However, the path can be interpreted as being  gene-
rated  by a strategy adjustment procedure. Consider the strategy vector v.
From the best reply curves we deduce that at v  it  is  optimal  for  both
players to play their first action. Then the algorithm increases the prob-
abilities with which these actions are played whereas the  probabilities
related  to  the  second, nonoptimal, action of both players are decreased
proportionally. Thus, in  the  figure the procedure moves towards
((1,0),(1,0))  where both players play their first action with probability
1. But at the vector a, player 2 becomes indifferent between his  actions.
Both  his  actions are optimal and we say that the player 2 is in equilib-
rium. Now, from the strategy vector a onwards player 2 is kept in equilib-
rium, i.e. the algorithm stays on his best reply set and allows the proba-
bility related to his second action to become larger than that one related
to  action  2  of player 1. This because the latter action is now the only
nonoptimal action. In this way the algorithm reaches the Nash  equilibrium
x*. So, the main idea of the algorithm is to drive down to zero the proba-
bilities with which nonoptimal actions are played. If they are zero a Nash
equilibrium has been reached.
1.3. Outline of the monograph and main results
In  Chapter  2  we  give the mathematical background needed in the
remainder of this monograph. Besides, we introduce some notational conven-
tions. All  the  other  chapters  can  be studied independently from each
12
other. The manuscript in fact consists of two parts. The first part (Chap-
ters  3,  4  and 5) deals with price adjustment processes. The second part
(Chapter 6) deals with algorithms for solving noncooperative games.
Chapter  3  is  rather  fundamental and studies conditions for the
existence and convergence of our price  adjustment  processes.  The  tech-
niques  used  are  the homotopy method and transversality theory. Besides,
this chapter contains a new and very appealing price  adjustment  process.
Along  the  path of that process the excess demands are a nonnegative mul-
tiple of the difference between the related price and starting price.
In the Chapters 4 and 5 we generalize the price adjustment process
for a pure exchange economy for application to  other  models.  Chapter  4
deals  with a process for an international trade model, whereas in Chapter
5 we present an adjustment process for an  exchange  economy  with  linear
production.  Thusfar  only  algorithms  for finding an equilibrium in such
economies have been developed, but  never  an  adjustment  procedure.  The
adjustment procedure in Chapter 4 adapts prices and exchange rates whereas
the process in Chapter 5 adapts prices and activity levels.
In  Chapter  6  we focus on game theory. In the first half of that
chapter we consider an algorithm for finding a Nash equilibrium in  a  bi-
matrix game. Next, we give a game-theoretic interpretation of the Lemke-
Howson method, which is the standard method for finding such  an  equilib-
rium, and compare the two methods. Our algorithm is superior in the sense
that it can find Nash equilibria which cannot be found by the Lemke-Howson
method. Interesting is its game-theoretic interpretation and the fact that
it always finds a perfect equilibrium whenever it starts from a completely
mixed  strategy vector. Finally, we give a generalization of our algorithm
for application to noncooperative games with more  than  two players. We
approach  a  Nash equilibrium for such a game by a repeated application of
the algorithm for the bi-matrix game generalized for the linearized  more-
person  game. For each linearized game we find an exact solution which can




In this chapter we review some  mathematical  concepts  which  are
needed  in  the sequel. The chapter is divided into four parts. In Section
2.1 we introduce some notational conventions and present the definitions
of  a  unit simplex and a simplotope. The latter two are the sets on which
almost all problems considered later on are defined. Section 2.2 deals
with the stationary point problem. In fact, all the problems considered in
this monograph can be viewed upon in this manner. In Section 2.3  we  con-
sider some notions being related to simplicial algorithms. Such algorithms
serve to find a stationary point of an arbitrary continuous function. In
later chapters we will see how these algorithms are related to the proces-
ses considered in this monograph. Finally, in Section 2.4 we discuss  some
concepts  from differential topology. These notions are of importance when
we consider the existence of the adjustment processes.
2.1. Notation
The set of real numbers is denoted by R, whereas R  indicates  the
+
set  of  all  nonnegative real numbers. Let k be a given positive integer.
k
Then the set R  denotes the k-dimensional Euclidean space. An element  x E
k
R , also called a vector or point, is a k-tuple of real numbers and can be
written as x = (xl'x2'...,xk)T, with xi E R,  i E  {1,...,k},  called  the
i-th  component of x. Here the symbol T is used to indicate the transpose.
k
Given two vectors x,y in R,w e write x>y i f x i s larger than y  in  all
components. By  x 2  y w e mean that at least one component of x i s larger
than the corresponding component of y, whereas the other components  of  x
are  at  least  equal to those of y. If x is at least as large as y in all
components we write x 2 y. Accordingly we define <, 5, and S.  Related  to
E                                           -
two  vectors  x,y in R , [x,y] denotes the line segment connecting x and y
including x and y. When the vectors x and y are excluded we denote  (x,y).
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Similarly,  we  get  [x.y)  and  (x,y] with obvious meaning. We frequently
indicate certain subsets of Rlt  by  a  specific symbol. The  nonnegative
orthant of  R   is  denoted  by  R .  Thus,  R  :=  {x E R Ixi £  0, i €
{1,...,k}}. Similarly, we have Rt := {x E R Ixi S O.  i E  {1.....k}}  and
R++ :=  {x €  Rk'xi >  0,  i E  {1.....k}}. The set Rk is endowed with the
k
standard metric derived from the Euclidean  norm  |.1,  defined  by  Ix| =
(Ik=lx2)i, x € R . The inner product of two vectors x,y € R  is denoted by
x•y. The i-th unit vector of R  is denoted by e (i). i € {1....,k}, where-
as  the  vector of ones in R  is denoted by e C. The vector of zeroes in R 
k
is denoted by   . When the dimension of a vector is clear from the context
we  often  delete  the  superscript. The expression 'k-dimensional set (or
vector)' is often abbreviated to k-set  (k-vector).  The  unit  matrix  is
denoted  by  E and by |A| we denote the number of elements in a finite set
A, whereas Ik := {1,...,k}. Finally, given a  set  ACR,  max A  (min  A)
denotes the maximum (minimum) element of A (if it exists).
A notion frequently used in the sequel is that of a convex hull of a set.
Definition  2.1.1. The convex huZZ of a set C in R , denoted conv(C), con-
sists of all the points which are convex combinations of points in C, i.e.
conv
(C) - {x E R' Ix - I .lkixi. with I .1Ai = 1, and for all
iE  Ih'  A   E R   and x i E C} .i+
The     affine     hull  of  a  set  C  in  R ,   aff(C), is defined  in  the  same  way  ex-
cept that the condition Ai E R  is weakened into Xi E R for all i.  It  is
important  to note that in this monograph the boundary, closure, and inte-
rior of a set C -notation: bd(C), cl(C), and int(C)-  are  always  defined
relative to aff(C).
Two kinds of sets in the Euclidean space are of extreme importance
in  this  monograph. These are a unit simplex and a simplotope. Let n be a
given positive integer. The n-dimensional unit simplex  is  the  set  {x E
Rn•liEn+lxi   =     1}     and is denoted  by  Sn.   Clearly,   Sn  is   the  convex  hull  of
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the n+1 unit vectors in R +1. Further,  aff(Sn)  is  the  set  {x E  Rn+1 
r + xi    =    1} . In
Figure 2.3.1, aff(S2) is the plane. Henceforth, int(Sn) is
equal to {x € Snlxi > 0, i € In+1 ' whereas bd(Sn) equals {x E  Snlxi =  0
for  some i € In+1 . A simplotope is the Cartesian product of several unit
simplices and is denoted by S. More precisely, for given positive integers
n. n.
n  ....n ,  S: =  In  S J= {x= (xl•...•xn)Ixi €S l,i E {1.....n}}. The1'     n          j=1
set Sn, n . 2, is illustrated in Figure 2.3.1, whereas in Figure 2. 3.2 the
set  S =  Slxsl is drawn. Observe that both S2 and Slxsl are 2-dimensional
sets although S2 is a subset of R3 while Slxsl lies in R4. We remark  that
both Sn and S are convex and compact.
Related to Sn and S w e introduce some notation. Sn(T),  T C  In+1'
denotes  the  set  {x €  Snlxi = 0· i < T}. Thus, in particular, Sn({i}) =
{e(i)},i€I   .T o denote  Sn(In+1 {i}),  i E I
we often use the
n+1- n+1'
notation  S .  Concerning S we call an element x = (xl'...,x ) in S also an
vector or point in S. The number x denotes the k-th component of x. and
jk                               J
is  also  called  the (j,k)-th component of x, k E {1,...,n +1}. The indexn.
set {(j,1),(j,2)....,(j,n +1)} related to S J is denoted by I(j),  whereas
I := u<=lI(j). By S(T), T C I with T(j) := T n I(j) 0 0 for all j E In' we
denote the set {x € S|xih = 0, (i,h) < T}.  In  particular,  S(T ),  with
T  n  I(j)| = 1 for all j € In, is equal to {e(T )}, with e(T ) being the
vector in S for which eih(T ) = 1, (i,h) E T , and eih(T ) = 0  elsewhere.
Observe  that  the  simplotope  S  is the convex hull of all these vectors
e(T ). Furthermore, int(S) equals {x E S|xih   0, (i,h) E I}  and  bd(S) =
{x E  Slxih =  0 for some (i,h) € I}. In general, e(T), TC I, denotes the
n.+1
vector in 1 = R J   for which eih(T) = 1, (i,h) E T. and eih(T) = 0  else-
where. Finally, for (i,h) E I we denote the set S(I\{(i.h)}) by Sih.
We conclude this section by introducing the notion of a sign  vec-
tor  and  some  related notation. The sign vector related to a vector y in
k                                          k
R , notation sgn(y), is a vector s in R with  components  in  {-1,0,+1},
where  for  i  E Ik' si = +1 (-1) if yi > 0 (< 0), while si = 0 if Yi = 0·
n.+1 n.+1
Similarly, sgn(y), y E N = R J 'i s a vector s i n il =:tR 1    with for  all
(i,h)  € I, sih " +1 (-1) if yi  > 0 (< 0), while sih = 0 if yih
= 0. More
generally, a sign vector s in R  is a vector whose components si, i €  Ik'
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lie in {-1,0,+1}. Related to a sign vector s in R C we define the following
subsets of Ik:
IO(s) = {j E Iklsj = 0}
I+(s) = {j E Iklsj = +1}
I-(s) = {j E Iklsj = -1}.
n +1
Similarly,   a sign vector  s in
TT = R is a vector whose components  s
j
ih'
(i,h)  E  I, lie in {-1,0,+1}. Related to such a vector s, for each h€In
we define
I (s) = {(h,k) E I(h)|shlc = 0 
I (s) = {(h,k) € I(h)|shk = +1}
Ih(s) = {(h,k) € I(h)|shk = -1}
+
By I (s), I (s), and I-(s) we denote the union of the  corresponding  sub-
sets over all h.
2.2. The stationary point problem
This  section  is mainly devoted to the theorem stating that every
continuous function defined on a nonempty, convex, and compact set  has  a
stationary point. It  turns out that this very general existence theorem
underlies the existence proofs for equilibria in games and exchange  econ-
omies. Furthermore, we treat some properties of the function involved. In
fact we give here a mathematical framework which returns in  all  applica-
tions.  The  precise  meaning  and interpretation of the properties become
clear in the context of the application involved.
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Definition  2.2.1.   Let     C     be a subset  of  R   and  let   f   :   D  -*  R   bea  func-
k
tion, with D a subset of R  containing C. A point x* in C is  a stationary
point of f on C if
x.f(x*) S x*•f(x*) for all x in C. (2.2.1)
Lemma 2.2.2. Let f:D -+ R C, D S R , be a continuous function and let C b e
a nonempty, convex, and compact subset of D. Then f has at least one  sta-
tionary point on C.
The proof of the theorem can be found in  Doup  [1988, p. 24]  and
goes  via  a fixed-point argument. In fact, the theorem is equivalent with
Brouwer's fixed point theorem stating that every continuous function  f :
C +  C,  with C in Rk nonempty, compact, and convex, has a fixed point x*,
i.e. f(x*) = x* (see Brouwer [1912]). In the sequel,  for  the  set  C  we
mostly  take the unit simplex Sn or a simplotope S and we also impose some
specific conditions on f. Under these conditions on f and C we can  derive
additional properties to  hold at a stationary point. Let us first treat
n. n.+1
the case in which C equals S= Hj=ls J  and   f:S+ ir<=lk J  .  In  that
case for xES, x.f(x) equals I;=lxj•fj(x).
n +1
Definition 2.2.3. Let f be a function from S to I =lR    . The function  f
satisfies the complementarity condition if for all x E S
xj•fj(x) = 0 for all j E In. (2.2.2)
The function f satisfies the boundary condition if for all x E S
fih(x) £ 0 when xih = 0, (i,h) E I. (2.2.3)
n.+1
Theorem  2.2.4.   Let  f:S- *  TT<=1R   J be continuous   and  let  x*  be a statio-
nary point of f on S. Then the following statements hold:
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A.      f.- (x*) . maxlfjl(x.) if x* >0JK                               jk
(2.2.4)
fjk(xe) S maxlfj,t(xe) if x k = 0.
B. If f satisfies the complementarity condition (2.2.2) then
f..   (x* )    = 0 if x* >0JE                               jk
(2.2.5)
f  (x*) 5 0 if x k = 0jk     -
C. If (2.2.2) and the boundary condition (2.2.3) hold then
f(x*) = 0. (2.2.6)
D. If (2.2.2) holds and (2.2.3) holds with strict inequality then
f(x*) = 0 and x* € int(S). (2.2.7)
Proof. Statement A follows for indices in I(j) from substituting for x  in
( .2.1)  respectively  the  n +1  vectors x  in S with x  = x;, i 0 j, and
x  = e(1), L E {1,...,n +1}. The other statements follow directly by  com-
bining (2.2.4) and Definition 2.2.3.
0
Observe that statement A is equivalent with the  definition  of  a
stationary point. The corresponding definition and theorem for the special
case that S equals Sn follow straightforward. For  convenience  and  later
reference we present the analogues of Definition 2.2.3 and Theorem 2.2.4.
Definition 2.2.5. Let f be a function from Sn  to  R +1.  The  function  f
satisfies the compZementarity condition if
x.f(x) = 0 for all x € Sn. (2.2.8)
The function f satisfies the boundary condition if
f (x) >Owhen x. =0,i€I (2.2.9)i   /=         1           n.1'
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Theorem 2.2.6. Let  f : Sn + R +1 be continuous and let x* be a stationary
point of f on Sn. Then the following statements hold:
A.      fi(x*) = maxkfk(x.) if x;>0
(2.2.10)
fi(x.) S maxkfk(x.) if xi= 0
B. If f satisfies the complementarity condition (2.2.8) then
fi(X*) =




0 if x# = 0.
1
C. If (2.2.8) and the boundary condition (2.2.9) hold then
f(x*) = 0. (2.2.12)
D. If (2.2.8) holds and (2.2.9) holds with strict inequality then
f(x*) = 0 and x* € int(Sn). (2.2.13)
We conclude this section with some terminology and show that well-
known  problems fit in the framework given above. The problem of finding a
stationary point of a function f on a set C is called the stationary point
problem (SPP) of f on C. The nonlinear complementarity problem (NLCP) of f
on S is equivalent to the SPP of f on S when f satisfies the complementar-
ity  condition (2.2.2). The linear complementarity problem (LCP) of f on S
is equivalent to the SPP of f on S with f satisfying (2.2.2)  and  linear-
ity.  The  zero  point problem (ZPP) of f on S is the problem of finding a
zero point of f on S. Under certain conditions on f, the SPP  of  f  on  S
boils  down  to a ZPP (see Theorem 2.2.4). From Definition 2.2.1 it is ob-
vious that zero points are stationary points.




Observe that f is continuous and satisfies the  complementarity  condition
but  not  the  boundary condition. Because of the latter. for a stationary
point x* must hold f(x*) S 0. From this it is easy to derive that the only
stationary point is x* = (1/3,1/3.1/3)7 with f(x*) = 0.
2.3. Notions related to simplicial algorithms
The  central  concept in this section is that of a subdivision. At
the end of this section we briefly illustrate the relation between a  sub-
division and a simplicial algorithm. But before giving the definition of a
subdivision we need to define some other concepts.
Definition 2.3.1. A polytope a in R  is the convex hull of a finite number
k
of points in R.A subset t o f a i s called a face of a if T is a  polytope
and  for  any  p E T and any pair {x,y} C d such that p=A x+ (1-A)y with
A E (0,1), holds that {x,y} C r. A facet r  of  a  is  a  face  such  that
dim(T) = dim(a) - 1. A face of dimension 0 is a vertex of a.
Observe that Sn and S are both polytopes. Concerning  Sn  we  have
that  Sn(T)  is a (t-1)-face, with t = |T|. The n+1 vertices of Sn are the
n+1
unit vectors in R    whereas the set S  is the facet of Sn opposite vertex
e(i),  i € In+1. In the sequel we often use the term cell instead of poly-
tope, although the first concept is more general. In fact,  polytopes  are
bounded cells. Furthermore, note that proper faces of polytopes are also
polytopes but of lower dimension.
Definition 2.3.2. A subdivision of  a  k-dimensional  convex  and  compact
subset C of Rn is a collection G of k-dimensional polytopes,  k-polytopes,
such that
i)   C is the union of all polytopes in G
ii) the intersection of two polytopes is either empty or a common face
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iii) each facet of a k-polytope 6€G either lies in bd(C) and is  only  a
facet of 6, or it does not lie in bd(C) and is also a facet of exact-
ly one other polytope a' E G.









Figure 2.3.1. Subdivision of S2.
For later reference we state one important property of a subdivision.
Lemma 2.3.3. Let G be a subdivision of  a  k-dimensional convex. compact
subset  C of Rn. Furthermore, let D be a (k-1)-dimensional subset in bd(C)
such that D = C n aff(D). Then D is subdivided into (k-1)-polytopes  which
are contained in D and are facets of polytopes in G.
To illustrate the lemma, again consider Figure 2.3.1. When we take
D  equal  to  S2  we  see  that  D is subdivided  into  rl  and 72' Observe  that  the
boundary segment [a,e(3)] is not subdivided. Indeed,  this  set  does  not
satisfy the conditions given in the lemma.
Specific examples of polytopes and subdivisions are simplices  and
triangulations, respectively. Because  we frequently refer to the latter
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two concepts we give a formal definition. But for that we need to give the
notion  of  affine independentness. We say that the points xl.....21 in R C
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1   1Figure 2.3.2. Simplicial subdivision of S=S X S.
I =lkixi = 0 and I =lki = 0 imply Ai = 0· i € {1.....h}.
Note that this implies that h S k+1.
kDefinition 2.3.4. A simpler in R  is the convex hull of a finite number of
k
affinely independent points in R.A triangulation or simpZiciaZ  subdivi-
sion of a convex, compact set is a subdivision of this set into simplices.
kA t-dimensional simplex or t-simplex a in  R ,  being  the  convex
1      t+1     k  .                 1      t+1hull  of  the  points x ,...,x in R . is denoted by 6(x ....,x ). The
1      t+1                              1      t+1points x ,...,x are the t+1 vertices of 6(x ....,x ). Observe that Sn
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n+1
is  an  n-simplex in R whereas S is not a simplex. The subdivision of S
in Figure 2.3.2 is also a triangulation, but the one of Sn in Figure 2.3.1
is not.
Of importance for later reference is also the notion  of  the  mesh  of  a
subdivision.
Definition 2.3.5. Let G be a subdivision of a nonempty, convex, and com-
pact subset of R . The mesh of G, mesh(G), is given by
mesh(G) = max max (IX-Yl).aEG x,yEa
We  conclude  this section by discussing the concept of a piecewise linear
approximation of a continuous function with respect to a triangulation.
Definition 2.3.6. Let  G be a triangulation of a convex, compact, t-dimen-
sional subset C o f R   and let f:C+R't bea continuous function.  Fur-
thermore, let  x  be an arbitrarily chosen point in C. Then the pieceloise
Zinear approximation 2 of f at x with respect to  G  is  given  by  2(x) =
It:lxif(xi).  with  x =  It:lkixi, Xi € R , It lxi = 1. and 6(xl.....xt+1)
any simplex containing x.
Observe  that  f(x) is well defined because the positive Xi's are uniquely
1
determined. It is easily verified that f:C- >R i s continuous and linear
on each simplex in G. We illustrate the concept with an example.
Example 2.3.1. Consider  the  function  f :  S2 + R3  defined  by   f(x) =
-1                                   2
(2x1+x2+x3)  (2x1'x2'x3)T.  Furthermore,  let  S  be triangulated into the
three simplices  61(e(1),e(2),e),  62(e(1),e(3).e),  and  63(e(2).e(3),e).
where e denotes the barycentre (1/3,1/3,1/3)T. Following the definition, P
is defined by f(x) = (Al+X3/2.AZ+A3/4.A3/4)T  if  x =  Ale(1)+A2e(2)+A3J E
al.  Similarly.  we  g t  f(x) =  (Al+A3/2,A3/4.A2+A3/4)T  if x = A*e(1) +
X2e(3) +    X38 E    G.    and    f(x)
= (A /2.A +A /4.A +A /4)     if3 1 3  2 3
X=
Ale(2) + X2e(3) + AJe E  63.
Note that f is indeed linear on each
simplex.
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When we apply a simplicial algorithm to find a stationary point of
a continuous function on some set such a method searches first for a  sta-
tionary  point for the piecewise linear approximation of the function with
respect to a certain simplicial subdivision of  that set. By  definition
this  stationary  point  is  an approximation of a stationary point of the
original function. By repeated application of the algorithm to  simplicial
subdivisions  with  decreasing mesh, i.e. smaller simplices, we can find a
stationary point with any given accuracy. The latter is due  to  the  fact
that  the  piecewise  linear  function uniformly converges to the original
function when the mesh tends to zero. The main feature of simplicial algo-
rithms  is that they converge under very weak conditions. For more details
about these algorithms and triangulations we refer to Doup [1988]. van der
Laan [1980], Talman [1980], and Todd [1976].
2.4. Concepts from differential topology
In  this section we gather some notions stemming from the field of
differential topology. Here we confine  ourselves  to  those  notions  and
theorems  that  are  most  important for us. For a general introduction on
these matters we refer to Guillemin  and  Pollack  [1974]  and  to  Milnor
[1965]. Because we only consider subsets of a Euclidean space this section
is mainly based on van Geldrop [1981, ch. 2] who also confines himself  to
the  Euclidean  space. The topology we use will always be the metric topo-
logy induced by |.|. We try to illustrate the definitions below by  giving
some intuition. But  first  we  introduce  some notation. Given a map or
+
function f:M-D N and a set A C N  we  denote  by  f (A)  the  set  {x E
M|f(x) E  A}.  If  f has an inverse, at least restricted to A, we may also
denote f-1(A). Furthermore,  by  Df(x)  we  denote  the  matrix  of  first
derivatives of f a t x E M (if they exist).
Definition  2.4.1.   Let  X  C  R   and  Y  CR't  be  open  sets.   The  map  f : X + Y is
smooth if all  of  the partial derivatives of f up to any order exist and
are continuous.
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More  generally,  one  speaks  about Cl-maps, i 2 0, if all of the
partial derivatives up to order i exist and are continuous. Smooth then
corresponds to Ce. In this monograph we only consider smooth maps. This is
not a great restriction because for example in the Whitney  topology  (see
van  Geldrop  [1981, p. 20]), the set of smooth maps lies dense in the set
of (2-maps. We call a set dense in some topological space I if  it  inter-
sects every nonempty open subset of I.
Note that Definition 2.4.1 only holds for  maps  defined  on  open
sets.  This  because the standard derivative is only defined on open sets.
However, we will also deal with maps that are defined on more general sets
called  manifolds.  Hence,  we  need a counterpart of Definition 2.4.1 for
maps defined on manifolds. The notion of a manifold is crucial  throughout
this monograph. Informally, a manifold locally looks like an open subset
of the Euclidean space of corresponding dimension. For example, the sur-
face of a ball in R3 is a 2-dimensional submanifold of R3.
k
Definition 2.4.2. A subset M C R  is a smooth submanitold of R  of  dimen-
sion  m i f for every point x E M there exists an open neighbourhood U o f x
kand a smooth function p  :U- *R   such that p(x)  = 0, rank(Dp(y) )  =   k   for
0
all  y€U, and 9-1(V) =U n M, where V: = {(rl•...•rk)T E Rk'rm+1 = ... =
rk = 0 . Moreover, the pair (U,p) is called a submanitold chart for  M  at
k
x. If M and N are both submanifolds of R  whereas N C M then N i s called a
submanifold of M.
k
For example, each open subset of R  is a k-dimensional submanifold
k                                             k
of R , whereas a 0-dimensional submanifold of R  is  a  discrete  set.  In
this  monograph we frequently consider smooth 1-manifolds. A 1-manifold is
a collection of disjoint smooth paths and loops. Let  us  consider  paths
with  two endpoints. They can be smoothly deformed into a closed interval.
A loop is connected and bounded  without  boundary  and  can  be  smoothly
kdeformed  into  a  circle.  The topology on a submanifold of R  is the one
kinduced by the topology of R .
Le=a  2.4.3. A subset M C Rk is a submanifold of Rk of dimension m if and
only if for every point x E M there exists an open neighbourhood  W  of  x
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and   a   smooth   map T  :W-D R -m such  that rank(DY(y))  =  k-m for all y E W
and T (0) =M n W.
Thus, the manifold M is locally defined as the solution set of the
system 1(y) = 0, constituting k-m equations in k unknowns.
Example 2.4.1. The unit sphere Sn-1 := {x € R 1|x| = 1} is an (n-1)-dimen-
sional submanifold of R . This is easily seen with Lemma 2.4.3  by  taking
for an arbitrary point y o n the sphere the map T:W-D R , W being an open
1
neighbourhood of y, defined by 1(x) = Ix| -1,xEW. In Figure  2.4.1  we
2
illustrate Definition 2.4.2 for the unit sphere in R .
X 2
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Figure 2.4.1. The set {x € R21|x| = 1} is a 1-submanifold in R2.
Next,  for  each x in a submanifold M we define T M to be the tan-
X
gent space to M at x. Loosely speaking, TxM is  the  linear  vector  space
that best approximates M at x.
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Definition 2.4.4. Let M C R  be an m-dimensional submanifold. Further, let
x  be  a  point in M and (U,p) a submanifold chart for M at x. Then T M isX
the set of pairs (x,6y), where 6y € Dp-1(0)(V), with V  as  in  Definition
2.4.2. The set TxM is called the
tangent space to M at x.
From definition 2.4.4 we derive that T M has the structure  of  an
x1
m-dimensional  vector  space  isomorphic to Dp (0)(V). An illustration is
given in Figure 2.4.1. Observe that in case M is an open subset of Rk, TxM
coincides  with  R .  In  general, when taking an element (x,6y) of TxM we
konly give the component 6y E R.
Very useful is the next lemma.
Lemma 2.4.5. The Cartesian product MlxM2 of two  submanifolds  is  a  sub-
manifold and dim(MlxM2) = dim(Ml) + dim(M2). Furthermore,
T      .(Ml*M2) = {(xl.x2,6xl,6x2)16xl E Tx-Ml, 6x2 E Tx M2}·(xl,x2)                                                 2
Now  we are ready to define the derivative of a map f : Ml + M2
k
i
where M. is a smooth submanifold of R  ,i E {1.2}. The derivative Df   is1 X
a linear map from TxM1 to Tf(x)M2' and henceforth the best linear approxi-
mation to f at x. More formally we get the following definition.
Definition  2.4.6. Let  Mi C  Rki  be  smooth  mi-submanifolds, i E {1,2}.
Further, f : Ml + M2 is a map. Let x E Ml and let (Ul'91) be the  submani-
fold  chart for Ml at x whereas (U2'92) is the submanifold chart for M2 at
f(x). The sets Vl and V2 are defined as in Definition 2.4.2.
i)         The     map      f   :   Ml   -D  M2 is smooth if the map 92 o f o 911 :V l+V Z i s
smooth at 0€V.
1
ii)  Similarly,  f  is a Ci-map, i & l,i f 9 2 o f o P 1 :V l- 'V 2 i s a Ci-
map at 0 E Vl.
iii) Given  that  f  is  Cl,  the  map  Txf : TxM1 + Tf(x)M2 is defined by
Txf(x,6x) = (f(x),Df(x).6x), with
Df(x) = 0921(0) 0 D(92 o f o pil)(0) 0 Dpl(x).
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In fact, T f is the derivative of f at x. In general we only  giveX
its second component or shortly Df(x). At first sight the definition above
seems rather complex. Some clarification may be given by the  illustration
in  Figure  2.4.2.  From Figure 2.4.2.a we derive that the map f coincides
with the map P21 0 (P2 o f o P 1) 0 Pl considered o  Ul restricted to  Ml.
However, unlike      f, the functions  p2   '9 2 0   f o p l      and  Pl are defined   on
open sets and their derivatives can be calculated using the standard defi-
nition. Using the chain rule we get Definition 2.4.6 (see Figure 2.4.2.b).
-1
In fact, Dfx is the derivative of 92  0 (92 o f o P 1) o p l restricted  to
k
an m-dimensional subspace  of  R  1  In  case  Ml'  M2  are  open sets Definition
2.4.6 is equivalent to the standard derivative.
f                               Dfk                   x               k
Ml C Ul , U2 1 MZ   TxMl C
R )R J T   M1                       2
f(x) 2
91                92 Dp                    Dp1                               2
- - - Vm m
2V )V R )R12
-1
920 f opl D(F2 o f o P11)
Figure 2.4.2.a Figure 2.4.2.b
A  further  illustration  is  given  in Figure 2.4.1. Consider the
function f:S l- 'S l defined by f(x) = -x. Now the map T f:T S 1-4  T  S 1
X X -X
is defined by Txf(x,6x) = (-x,-6x). For short, Df(x) = -E for all x E Sl.
Of importance is the rank of the matrix Df(x). Related to the rank
are the concepts of regular value and regular point.
Definition 2.4.7. Consider the smooth map f:M-D N, with M and  N  an  m-
and n-submanifold, respectively.  A  point  x€M a t which rank(Df(x)) <
min{m,n} (= min{m,n}) is called a criticaZ (regutar) point of f.  A  point
YEN is a reguZar value of f if all points x E f (y) are regular.
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It is well-known from Sard's  theorem  that  the  set  of  regular
values  of  f  is  dense in N. The importance of regularity stems from the
next lemma.
Lemma 2.4.8. If f:M- +N i s a smooth map between submanifolds M C R   and
1N C R  of dimension m and n,m z n, and if Y E N i s a regular value of  f,
*-
then the set f (y) C M is a smooth submanifold of dimension m-n.
m   2 8Example 2.4.2. Consider f : R  + R defined by f(x) = (Ii=lxi) · Any value
y 0  0  is  regular. The set f (y), y 0 0, is the smooth (m-1)-submanifold
{x € Rm'Ixl = y}.
Till thusfar we only considered submanifolds without boundary. The
definition of a submanifold with boundary is a  straightforward  extension
of Definition 2.4.2.
k
Definition 2.4.9. A subset M C R  is a smooth submanifold with boundary of
kR   of  dimension  m  if for every point x E M there exists an open neigh-
k
bourhood U o f x and a smooth function p:U+R such  that  p(x)  =  0,
rank(Dp(y)) =   k   for  all  y E  U.  and  p-1(9) =  U n  M,  where  9: =
 (rl,     ,rk) E Rk'rm   0, rm+1=  ''.  = rk = 0}· The boundary of  M.   bd(M),
is  the  set  of  points in M which corresponds to bd(9) = {r € 9|r  = 0 .
The interior of M is the set M\bd(M).
Example 2.4.3. Consider  the  disk  Dm :=  {x E Rm'Ix' 5 1}. This set is a
smooth m-submanifold with boundary. The boundary of Dm  is  the  set  {x E
Rm11xl = 1}.
It is easy to verify that the boundary of  an  m-submanifold  with
boundary  has dimension m-1 whereas the interior is of dimension m. We now
extend Lemma 2.4.8 to submanifolds with boundary.
Lemma 2.4.1 0. Consider the smooth  map   f   :   M  -D  N   from an m-submanifold  of
Rlc with boundary to an n-submanifold of Rl, m 2 n.I f y€N i s  a  regular
+
value  both  for  f  and  for the restriction f| then f (y) C M is a
Ibd(M)'
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smooth (m-n)-submanifold with boundary. Furthermore,  bd(f (y)) =  f (y) n
bd(M).
Example 2.4.4. Take the map of Example 2.4.2  but  now  defined  on  V  :=
<(xl,...,xm)T E  RTIxi >  0,  i E  {2.....m}}.  Then  f (y), y 0 0, is the
smooth (m-1)-submanifold {x € <1|x| = y}, with boundary {x E  <||x| =  y
and xl = 0} of dimension m-2.
The Lemmas 2.4.8 and 2.4.10 deal with the preimage of a point. But
what  about the preimage of a submanifold? For this generalization we need
the notion of transversality.
Definition 2.4.11. Let  f:  M + N b e a smooth map with M C R   and N C R  
smooth submanifolds of dimension m and n. The map  f  is transversa Z to  a
submanifold Z of N, denoted f li Z, if for all x E f (Z)
Df(x)(TxM) + T Z = T,N. where y = f(x).
Thus,  f *  Z  if  for  all  x E f (Z) we have that for every Sy E
T    N there are 6z ET Z and 6x E TxM such that 6y = 6z + Df(x).6x. If£(x) f(x)
f (Z) =  0  then  this  condition always holds. Furthermore, the notion of
transversality is indeed a generalization of regularity. The two  coincide
if  Z  consists  of one single point. In case Z = {y}, Tf(x)Z = 0, and f *{y} means that for all x E f (y) we have that for every 6y € T N  there
f(x)
are  6x €  T M  such  that 6y = Df(x).6x. In other words, Df(x) must be ofX
full rank.
12
Exam le 2.4.5. We  consider  the  maps  f  :  R  +  R   defined by fa(x) =
(x,x -a),aER. Let Z b e the x-axis in R. Then f *Z  if  and  only  ifa
(iff) a 0 0. For illustration see Figure 2.4.3.
Lemma 2.4.12. Let MC R  be a submanifold with boundary and let N CR't be
a boundaryless submanifold.      If the smooth  maps   f:M-D N   and   f|
Ibd(M) :
bd(M)   -*  N are transversal   to a boundaryless submanifold   Z C N, then the
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preimage  f (Z)  is  a  submanifold  with boundary of M. Moreover, dim(M)-
dim(f (Z)) = dim(N)-dim(Z)  and  bd(f (Z)) = f (Z) n  bd(M).  Furthermore,
+given  x E f (Z)  the  tangent  space  to  f (Z)  consists of all 6x €T M
X
satisfying Df(x).6x € Tf(x)Z.
6-
The  expression for dim(f (Z)) is often formulated in terms of its
codimension. The codimension of a submanifold X in a surrounding  manifold
Y  is  defined  as  codim(X) = dim(Y)-dim(X).  In Lemma 2.4.12 we then get
6-
codim(f (Z)) = codim(Z).
-   a=-1
 r« a=0
- a=l
-2            -1                 0             1              2
-1
Figure 2.4.3. For a 4 0, the map fa is transversal to the x-axis in R2.
The last notion we consider here is that of a homotopy.
Definition 2.4.13. Let  N C Rt  and M C Rk be submanifolds and let Mx[O,1]
k+1
denote the submanifold of R consisting of all (x,t) with x E M and  t€
[0,1].  Two  mappings  f,g :  M 4 N are called smoothly homotopic if there
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exists a smooth map F : Mx[0,1] -A N with F(x,0) = f(x) and  F(x,1) = g(x),
x € M. The map F is called a smooth homotopy between f and g.
Example 2.4.6. Consider the mappings f,g : R + R defined by f(x) = x2  and
g(x) =  x.  These mappings are smoothly homotopic. As a homotopy can serve




Existence of adjustment processes
In this chapter we investigate under what conditions the processes
to  be  considered  in this monograph exist and converge. For that we con-
sider one specific process. All processes treated in this  monograph,  ex-
cept the ones in Chapter 6, are similar and their existence can be studied
along the same lines.
The  process  we consider here is a price adjustment process for a
pure exchange economy and has been introduced by van der Laan  and  Talman
[1987a].  Starting  from an arbitrarily chosen price vector it leads to an
equilibrium price vector via a sequence of price adaptations. These  price
adaptations are induced by the starting vector and the sign pattern of the
excess demand vector. First, we derive conditions for existence  and  con-
vergence directly from its definition. Next, we put the process in a homo-
topy framework and derive convergence  conditions  in  that  setting.  The
latter  approach is done because it is more convenient. Besides, the homo-
topy approach enables us to state conditions for monotonic convergence.
Solving  the  equilibrium  problem via the homotopy approach means
that we start in a solution to a trivial problem on an artificial set. The
trivial problem on the artificial set is then continuously deformed to the
real problem on the set of interest. By following a path of solutions for
these intermediate problems, which starts with the trivial solution, even-
tually an equilibrium is reached. We show that the path traced by the
price  adjustment  process  can  be viewed upon as being the projection of
such a homotopy path on the price space.
But  first we deal with another price adjustment process developed
more recently. Not only because of its  own  value  but  also  because  of
reasons  of exposition. It turns out that this process fits very well in a
very simple and transparant homotopy. The treatment of this  process  thus
also serves as an  introduction  to the other process more difficult to
analyse.
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The set-up of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.1 is introduc-
tory. There we briefly sketch an exchange economy model and introduce  the
two adjustment processes. We also give some economic intuition. In Section
3.2 we treat the more recent process. The Sections 3.3 and 3.4  deal  with
the process of van der Laan and Talman [1987a]. In Section 3.3 we consider
its existence right from the definition, whereas in Section 3.4 we use the
homotopy approach. This  chapter is partly based on Doup, van den Elzen,
and Talman [1989].
3.1. Two price adjustment processes for a pure exchange economy
Before discussing the processes we first briefly review the  stan-
dard  model of a pure exchange economy. In such an economy there are, say,
n+1 commodities and a finite number of consumers, each having a vector  of
initial endowments. Exchanges of goods are based on relative prices. All
consumers in this economy exchange goods in order to maximize their  util-
ity  under  the constraint imposed by their initial wealth. An equilibrium
price vector is a vector of prices at which for all  goods  demand  equals
supply  while  no  consumer  can  improve upon his situation. All relevant
information of such an economy can be captured in an excess  demand  func-
tion which relates to each price vector the corresponding vector of excess
demands. Thus, an excess demand function, denoted by z, can be seen  as  a
function from the set R  1  to R +1.
For p E R +1, if z (p), j E In+1, is positive then the market  for
good  j is in excess demand at the price vector p = (pl'...'pn+1)T with Ph
denoting the price of commodity h€I whereas this market is in excessn+1'
supply  at  p  in case z.(p) < 0. Market j is said to be in equilibrium at
n+1p €Rv  ifzj(p) =0. An equilibrium price vector is a vector  p" E R  l
at which z(p*) = g. Standard conditions on z are
i)   z(Ap) = z(p) , vA>Oand vp ER (homogeneity)
n+1
++
ii)  p.z(p) =O, vp € R +1 (complementarity) (3.1.1)
iii) vp E bd(R +1)\{9} 36 > 0 [p' E {x € R Ill'p-xi < 6} and
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P. =0] * Z.(P') >0.33
-Il+1
Furthermore, we assume that z is smooth on K . To guarantee the latter++
certain  convexity and monotonicity conditions on the preference relations
of the consumers are needed.
The  economic interpretation of (3.1.1) is straightforward. Condi-
tion i) indicates that only relative prices matter. Condition ii) is  also
known as Walras' law and says that all consumers spend their total income.
Condition iii) is a desirability condition, roughly stating  that  if  the
price  of a good is (relatively) small, the demand for it exceeds its sup-
ply. In Kamiya [1984] it is proved that these  conditions  are  sufficient
for  the  existence of an equilibrium price vector. In fact he uses weaker
conditions. We need more to prove the existence of  the  price  adjustment
process.
The first process we consider is defined on the set of prices given by
Bv := (P € R Illp.v = p.p}, (3.1.2)
where v €Rn denotes the starting price vector. By restricting ourselves
+1
++
to  B  no information about this economy is lost. This is due to ConditionV
i) on z which allows for normalizing the prices. The set B  can be seen as
V
a  specific  normalization dependent on v. When taking a price vector p in
n+1
K   , then, given v, p.v = ap •p for some number 0 € R . We normalize p  to
the  vector  q :=  op which lies in B while z(q) = z(p). In this way each
.n+1
V
price vector in K is related to a unique vector in  B   with  the  same++                                     V
excess demands. Now, the  process follows a path of price vectors in B
V
originating in v. For a price vector p *v o n the path it holds that
z(p) = B(p - v). for some 8 2 0. (3.1.3)
Thus, at each price vector p on the path it holds that the related  excess
demand  vector  is  a nonnegative multiple of the difference between p and
the starting prices. This implies that prices at markets revealing  excess
demand  (supply)  lie above (below) the starting prices, which is economi-
cally appealing. As soon as B becomes 0, an equilibrium  price  vector  is
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reached. Notice the similarity between (3.1.3) and the classical Walrasian
adjustment process if we replace the initial price vector by the (in time)
previous  price vector. In the sequel we refer to this process as the REQ-
portional process.
The  second process has also a strong resemblance with the Walras'
process. It operates on the inner of the n-dimensional  unit  simplex  S:
Thus,  here the price vectors are normalized by dividing each price by the
sum of the prices. The  process  follows  from  the  starting  vector  v E
int(Sn) a path of prices p satisfying for j€I
n+1'
pj/vj = maxhph/vh  if zj(p) > 0
minhph/vh S pj/vj S maxhph/vh  if zj(p) = 0 (3.1.4)
pj/vj = minhph/vh  if zj(p) < 0.
Because  this  process  focusses  on the sign pattern of the excess demand
vector it is also called the sign process. The similarity with the Walras'
process  occurs in particular at v. If we assume that at v no market is in
equilibrium,it follows from   (3.1.4)    that the process leaves      v b y     in-
creasing  the  prices  of  goods  in excess demand and decreasing those of
goods in excess supply. However, the increases and decreases are  relative
to  the  starting  price vector. As soon as a price vector is generated at
which a good previously being in excess supply (demand) becomes  in  equi-
librium then its price is relatively not further decreased (increased) but
adapted in order to keep the good in equilibrium. In general,  price  vec-
tors are generated such that the relative prices of goods in excess demand
(supply) are maximal (minimal), whereas the relative prices  of  goods  in
equilibrium  vary  between  these bounds. More details can be found in van
der Laan and Talman [1987a]. Finally, we remark  that  the  path  of  this
process  can  be  followed  arbitrarily  close by the simplicial algorithm
presented in Doup, van der Laan, and Talman [1987].
37
3.2. The proportional process
In this section we propose a homotopy related to the  proportional
adjustment  process as defined by (3.1.3). We show that the set of vectors
satisfying (3.1.3) can be seen as the projection on Bv of the set of  zero
points  of this homotopy. From this we derive that in general there exists
a path of vectors p E Bv satisfying (3.1.3) and leading from the vector  v
to a vector p with |z(p)| arbitrarily close to zero.
Let v again be the starting price vector. The homotopy function  h
related to the proportional process starting from v is defined by
h(p,6) = (1-6)(v - p) + 6z(p)
, (p.6) E R 01*[0.1]. (3.2,1)
The  function  h is smooth because of the smoothness of z. When going from
level zero to level one, the  function  h  smoothly  deforms  the  trivial
function,  h(p,0) =  v-p,  into the function of interest, h(p,1) = z(p).
Note that the domains on both levels are the same. That is why we call h a
homotopy  in  standard form. Furthermore, observe that (v,0) is the unique
zero point of h on level zero, whereas the set of zero points on level one
coincides with the set of equilibrium price vectors. In the sequel we show
n+1that the projection of the zero point set of h on R gives the set of++
price vectors defined by (3.1.3). Furthermore, we show that there exists a
smooth path in h (0) connecting (v,0)  and  a  point  (p,K),  with  |z(p)|
n+1arbitrarily  close to zero. The projection of this path on R then gives++
a path of price vectors from v to B satisfying (3.1.3).
.Il+1
First, we restrict h to the domain K *[O.K], with I € (O,1).++
Clearly, h is then a smooth function from an (n+2)-manifold with  boundary
into an (n+1)-manifold. The  boundary  of  the  domain of h is equal to
(Rn 1*<0j) u (R  lx{I}). So, if g € Rn+1 is a  regular  value  of  h  then+
h (Q)  is  a smooth 1-manifold, i.e. a collection of disjoint smooth paths
and loops. Moreover, an end point of  a  path  in  h (Q)  either  lies  in
R  lx{0}, i.e. equals (v,0). or lies in R +1*{I}, i.e. equals (i;,K) (cf.
Lemma 2.4.10).
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In  order to show that h (Q) contains a path from (v,0) to a point
in R  1*{I} first notice that h(p.6) =0.0 £6 S I, implies p•(v-p) =  0,
since  p•z(p) =  0 and 6 0 1. Hence, all zero points of h lie in B *[O,I].
To get a better insight in Bv observe that Bv is the part of the  ball  in
R +1  around *v and passing through v. which lies in the positive orthant.
i.e.
Bv  =  {P € R :11 (p  _  *v)•(P  -  *v)  =  tv•v}.
+1
Since the closure of B  is a compact subset of R   \{0} and because of the
smoothness and the desirability condition on z, there exists an € ,0<E<
min vh' such that z (p) > 0 whenever pj S € and p € Bv' Now, let Bv(6)  be
the compact subset of R  1 defined by
Bv(E) = {p € Bv'Pj £ E for all j € In+11.
The  next  lemma  shows  that  all  zero  points  of  h in Bvx[O,I] lie in
int(Bv(E))*[0.K].
Theorem 3.2.1. Let  (p,6) be a point in Bv*[0•I]. Then hi(P·6) > 0 if Pi S
E.
Proof. By definition we have for all (p,6) € B *[ •K],
hj(p,6) . (1-6)(vj-pj)+6zj(p)
, j E In+1'
If p    E, we obtain with v  > E that v -p  > 0 whereas from above we know
that z (p) > 0.j
Consequently,  if  Q  is  a  regular  value of h, then the path P,
having (v,0) as an end point cannot intersect the boundary  of  Bv(E)  be-
tween  the  levels  0. Thus, P must have another end point on Bv(E)x{0} or
Bv(E)x{I}. Since (v.0) is the only zero point of h on level  0  and  h  is
transversal on Bv(6)x{0}, the other end point is a point (p,I) on level I.
Moreover, all other paths in h (Q), if any, also lie  in  Bv(e)x[0,I]  and
+
connect two zero points of h on level I, whereas all loops in h (Q) lie in
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B (e)x(O,I). The latter follows from Lemma 2.4.10. There it is stated that
bd(h+(g) )  = h+(g)  n bd(R  1*[0.I]). Thus, h+(9) cannot touch
bd(R :1*[0.I]). An illustration of h (Q) is given in Figure 3.2.1 in  case
n = 1.  In that figure, the set h (0) consists of the path P and a path Q
connecting two vectors on level I. Notice that h (0) cannot contain  loops
when  n =  1.  This because (p,61) and (p,62) in h (0) imply 61 = 62' Fur-
thermore, from the figure it is obvious that Bv is indeed a  normalization
of the price space.
0
E l E
..11,       \1 2
v          Bv(E)x{O}
1                   
    1
Pl               v   ,                    P 2
„l,g/4,\/ /\   \\ \\
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Figure 3.2.1 . Illustration of h (Q) in Bv(e)*[0.I], n = 1.
For Q to be a regular value of h, it is required that the  deriva-
tive  of h is of full rank at all zero points of h. Given a point (p,6) in
h (Q) the derivative is denoted as the ((n+1)*(n+2))-matrix  Dh(p.6).  The
first n+1  columns,  D h,  contain the derivatives of h with respect to p
while the last column, D6h, is the derivative of h with respect to 6. More
precisely, the Jacobian matrix at (p,6) is equal to
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Dh(p.6) = [-(1-6)E + 6Dz(p) I p-v+ z(p)].
where  Dz(p)  is  the ((n+1)x(n+1))-matrix of derivatives of z at p. Thus,
the value Q is regular for h if the matrix Dh(p,6) is of rank n+1 for  all
(p,6) E Bv(E)*[O,I] for which h(p,6) = 0.
Thusfar we have given conditions guaranteeing the existence  of  a
smooth  path  P in h (g) connecting (v,0) and a point (B,K). We still have
-Il+1to show that the projection P' of P On K gives the path of the  propor-++
tional process. First observe that, assuming z(v) 0 Q. P' must be a smooth
curve in B (E) connecting v and a point B. This follows from the fact that
(P.61) E hx(9) and (p,62) € h (0) imply 61 = 62. More precisely, the deri-
vative D6h(p,6) =p-v+ z(p) has rank 1 along the path P.  Observe  that
this  only does not hold when at p=v w e have z(p) =9. But then P i s the
line segment {v}*[0.I] and P' = {v}. So, if v is not a zero  point  of  z,
the path P' is a smooth curve in Bv(E). From (3.2.1) it is obvious that at
any point p, p 0 v. along P', we have that z(p) = B(p - v) for some B   0.
Thus,  indeed P' coincides with the path of points followed by the propor-
tional adjustment process. An illustration for n=2 i s  given in Figure
3.2,2.
Note further that if h(p,6) = 0, (p,6) 0  (v,0),  and  so  z(p) =
B(p - v)  for some B 2 0, we must have B = (1-6)/6. Thus, B decreases if 6
increases and therefore 6 gives an indication for how close the components
of  z(p)  are  to  zero.  We  say that the process converges monotone if 6
increases monotone from 0 to K along the path P. The latter only holds  if
D h(p,6) =  -(1-6)E +  6Dz(p) always has rank n+1 along P. Furthermore. byP
chasing K arbitrarily close to 1, the norm of z(B), with  (B,&)  E  h*(0),
can  be  made  arbitrarily  close  to  zero.  The  latter  because  z(p) =
(1-K)(P - v)/I.
Instead of the natural normalization on Bv one could also a priori
normalize  the  price  vectors  to  lie  in  the  set  T  defined  by  T =
{B E R *'I =lpi < 1}. After deleting the last component of z. one can then
define a homotopy in standard form on Tx[0,1] with respect to z, where for
j C  I ,  5(B) ,  zj((BT,1-In  Q )7)  (see Kamiya [1990]). This homotopy,i=1 i
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however, does not take into account z (p) at all and therefore differsn+1
from the one introduced above.
P2
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Figure 3.2.2 . Illustration of P' for n = 2.
3.3. Direct approach towards the sign process
In  this  section we consider the convergence and existence of the
sign process. We give conditions under which certain  subsets  of  vectors
satisfying (3.1.4) form  smooth  paths. Further, transversality and non-
degeneracy assumptions are needed to guarantee that these subsets  can  be
linked to a piecewise smooth path.
First, we pick an arbitrary vector in int(Sn) to be  the  starting
vector, again  denoted by v. Furthermore, from the conditions on z we de-
rive the existence of an 9, 0<n<  (n+1)-1,  such  that  for  all  p  in
int(Sn)  and  all j E In+1' zj(p) > 0 if pj S n. Thus, equilibrium vectors
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cannot lie very near the boundary of Sn. Since  pj < Rvj  implies  pj/vj <
max Ph/vh  and zj(p) > 0. it follows from (3.1.4) that price vectors gene-
rated by the sign process always lie in the set Sn(n) defined by
Sn(n) = {P € Sn'pj 2 nvj. j E In+1 '
In fact, Sn(n) is also dependent on v. Throughout this section we surpress
this  dependency in the notation. Now, let us return to (3.1.4) and denote
by D the set of price vectors in Sn satisfying these conditions.  For  our
purposes we split up D into subsets related to a sign vector. Here, such a
sign vector corresponds to the sign pattern of an  excess  demand  vector.
Because  of the complementarity condition holding for z, only sign vectors
containing at least one +1 and one -1 are feasible. Related to each  feas-
ible sign vector s we define sets A(s) and Y(s) by
A(s) = {p E Sn(n)Iminhph/vh = Pj/vj if s  = -1
p /v  = maxhPh/vh if s. = +1},3
and
Y(s) . cl({p E Sn(n) Isgn(z(p)) = s}).
Observe that the definition of A(s) corresponds to the  left  part
of  (3.1.4), whereas the definition of Y(s) corresponds to the right part.
From this it is obvious that for each p in D there is a sign vector s such
that  p  lies in D(s) := A(s) n Y(s). In other words D = usD(s), where the
union is over all feasible sign vectors. The sets A(s) are such that  they
subdivide  Sn(n).  An  illustration of this subdivision is given in Figure
3.3.1. Here. the vertices of Sn(n) are denoted by en(j).  j E I Moren+1'
precisely. e*(j) = nvi if i t j and e4(j) = 1-(1-v.)n if i = j. The dimen-
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Figure 3.3.1. Subdivision of Sn(n)  into  subsets  A(s),  n = 2.  The  set
A((-1,+1,0)T) is denoted by A(-,+.0), etc.
Below, we give rather general conditions such that for given  sign
vector  s  the set D(s) is a smooth 1-manifold, i.e. it consists of a dis-
joint union of smooth paths and loops. The idea is the following. We  con-
sider  the  function  zs'  being the restriction of z to a smooth manifold
with boundary *(s), where A(s) is such that D(s)  =  A(s) n Ys).  We  take
A(s)  instead  of  A(s)  because the latter set is a manifold with corners
which prevents the applicability of the  transversality  lemma  2.4.12  we
want  to  use.  Later  on we show how to construct *(s), for the moment it
suffices to know that dim(K(s)) = dim(A(s)) = |I (s)|+1. Observe that D(s)
+                 n+1
equals  the  closure  of  the  set  zs(Ds)  with 0 C R defined by Os =S
n+1{x € R   | sgn(x) = s} . Now. if zs ;[ Os then codim(D(s)) = codim(Os)  =
|I (s)| and therefore D(s) is a smooth 1-manifold with boundary (see Lemma
2.4.12). Thus, the transversality condition mentioned  is  sufficient  for
the existence of D(s).
Let us now express this condition in  terms  of  the  function  z.
According to Definition 2.4.1 1 w e  have   that  z     *0     if  for all vectors  0  ES     S
n+1                                          -
R    there are vectors  y E  Os  and  p €  T A(s),  p E  D(s),  such  that
Dz(p)·p +  3=  a.  We note  that this is an open condition, i.e. when it
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holds for some function z it also holds for an open environment  around  z
in the Whitney topology.
How to construct *(s) from A(s)? Crucial  are  the  following  two
observations.  Firstly,  we  assume  that at v, sgn(z (v)) 0 0, vj E In+l.
This is a very weak restriction. From that it is obvious that there exists
an environment around  v  consisting  of  price  vectors  p  at  which
sgn(z (p)) = sgn(z (v)) 0 0, vj. Thus, no such vector  p  lies  in  a  set
D(s),  s 0 s  = sgn(z(v)). Secondly, no p € Sn\Sn(n) lies in any set D(s).
Because of all of this we can "smooth" the faces of a set A(s) and  obtain
a  smooth manifold with boundary, A(s), with the required conditions, i.e.
dim(*(s)) = dim(A(s)), A(s) C Sn, and D(s) = A{s) n Y(s).
What  about  the  existence of a path of prices satisfying (3.1.4)
from v to an equilibrium? Such a path exists of  a  sequence  of  adjacent
subsets D(s), for  different sign vectors s. When going from one D(s) to
another, say D(s), we want only one of the following two cases to  happen.
-                        -
For some unique index j, either, s  = 0, s  0 0, and si = si for i 4 j, or
s  0 0, s  = 0, and si = si for i 0 j. In these cases when going from D(s)
to  D(s)  the  dimension  of  the  set A(s) increases (decreases) with one
whereas the dimension of Y(s) decreases (increases) with one, making  that
the dimension of D(s) remains one. Let us consider the first case. Suppose
0                       0the process starts at v with s  = sgn(z(v)). Because s  does  not  contain
0
zeros.  D(s )  consists  of  (possibly more than one) closed line segments
lying in the 1-manifold A(s ). One end point of a line segment is  v,  the
other  end  point of that segment is a vector p at which z.(p) is zero for
3
some j. We assume that this occurs for  a  unique index. Concerning  the
other case, consider for example the set D((-1,0,+1)r). A path in this set
may contain an end point in the interior of A((-1,+1,+1)-r).  From  that
point  on  we  can  continue  with  a  path  in  the set D((-1,+1,+1)7) in
A((-1.+1,+1)T). What we need here is that D((-1,0,+1)7) intersects
A((-1,+1,+1)T) transversally in its interior. For example, in Figure 3.3.1
it is not allowed that D((-1,0,+1)T) touches A((-1.+1.+1)T) or  intersects
this set in its boundary.
Let us summarize the foregoing. We  have  given  conditions  on  z
guaranteeing that each nonempty D(s) is a smooth 1-manifold with boundary.
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At boundary points of D(s) lying in bd(A(s)) we need to assume  that  D(s)
intersects  that boundary transversally in the interior of a facet of A(s)
and that the sign pattern of z is still equal to  s.  At  boundary  points
with changing sign of the function z we need to assume a condition guaran-
teeing that just one sign component of z changes. Only at the  equilibrium
two  or  more  components of z may become zero at the same time. If all of
this holds then there exists a piecewise smooth path of  price  vectors  p
satisfying (3.1.4) connecting v and an equilibrium.
Finally, we briefly  mention  another  approach  for  proving  the
existence of processes. It uses the concept of primal-dual manifolds as
introduced by Kojima and Yamamoto [1982]. An application to our  processes
is  given  in van den Elzen, van der Laan, and Talman [1985]. However, es-
sentially that method is equivalent to the one presented here.
3.4. Homotopy approach towards the sign process
In this section we state conditions under which the  sign  process
converges  towards  an  equilibrium  by putting this process in a homotopy
framework. Here we will not derive explicit conditions as done in  Section
3.2.  This would only bring a lot of formulas. We rather confine ourselves
to stating the conditions in general terms such as regularity  of  certain
values. The conditions are more complicated than in Section 3.2 because we
here have to use a homotopy that is not in standard form. The latter means
that the domains on the two levels are different.
The homotopy function h suited for this process is defined on  the
convex hull V of Ux{0 } and Sn(n)*{l}, where U is given by
U = conv({v + e(i) - e(j)Ii,j € I i 0 j}).n+1'
Again h(x.6). (x,6) E  V,  will  be a convex combination of two function
values, defined on U and Sn(n) respectively. To get a proper definition of
h  we  relate  each  (x.6) in V t o a unique pair (u,p), with u€U and p€
S (n). To define (u,p) we first subdivide V in  an  appropriate  way  into
cells. This subdivision is determined by the subdivision of Sn(n) on level




i.e. C(0) is equal to the set  {(x.6) E  K   *[O.l]|I; lx  =  1.  -(1-6) S
x -vj S  1-6. j € In+1 . Furthermore, for a feasible sign vector s let the
face U(s) of U be given by
U(s) = conv({v + e(i) - e(j)Isi = +1. sj = -1, i,j € In+1 )*
It is easy to show that U(s) is equal to the set {u €  Rn+liu =  v +
n+1
Ih=1Khshe(h),  Ah & 0 for h € In+1, and Ish=+1Ah = Is =-lgh = 1}. Clearly,
h
U(s) is of dimension n-|I (s)|-1. The set V is now  subdivided  into  ((0)
and  cells  ((s), s being a feasible sign vector, where C(s) is the convex
hull of U(s)*{0} and A(s)*{1}.  Observe  that  the  cells  C(s)  all  have
dimension  n+1  and that also C(0) is a cell of dimension n+1. These cells
are illustrated in Figure 3.4.1.
In  Theorem  3.4.2  we  prove that C(0) together with all the sets
C(s) indeed form a subdivision of V. More precisely, we show that for  any
(x,6) E  V  with  0<  6<  1,  there either exists a unique feasible sign
vector s such that for unique vectors p in A(s) and u in int(U(s))
x - (1-6)u + 6p. (3.4.1)
or (3.4.1) holds with p=v and u€ int(U) uniquely defined by u= (1-6)-1
(x - 6v). We call p and u the projection of the point (x,6) on level 1 and
level 0, respectively.
Now, we are ready to define an appropriate homotopy function on V.
This function is given by
h(x,6) = (1-6)(v - u) + 62(p).
where 9 (p) = p z (p), j E In+1, and u and p are given by (3.4.1). Because
u  and  p are uniquely determined by (x,6), the function h is well-defined
,31+1on V. Moreover, h is a piecewise smooth function from V to K deforming
the trivial function f with f(u) =v-u o n level 0 into the function S o n
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Figure 3.4.1. Subdivision of V into the cells C(0) and C(s), n  =  2.  The
set U((-1,+1,+1)7) is denoted by U(-,+,+), etc.
level 1. In fact, h is smooth on each cell C(s) and also on  C(0).  Again,
we are interested in the set h (Q), i.e. the set of points (x,6) in V such
that for some feasible sign vector s, x = (1-6)u + 6p with  p €  A(s)  and
u=  v +  IhBhshe(h) E  int(U(s))  (or p.v and u€ int(U)). while z(p) =
(1-6)6-1Ihghshe(h). Hence, if p * v, we have z (p) = (1-6)6-1Ajsj/pj,  j E
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I      i.e. p satisfies (3.1.4). Observe that z(p) =Q when 6=1 and that
n+1'
x = v when 6 = 0.
We  would  like  to have that the set h (9) contains a path P in V
connecting the unique zero point (v,0) of h on level 0 with a  zero  point
p*  of  z  on level 1. The projection of the path P on Sn(n) then yields a
path P' of points connecting v and p* such that for all  points  p  on  P'
(3.1.4)  holds.  We  first prove that a path in h (Q) cannot intersect the
boundary of V between the levels 0 and 1.
Theorem  3.4.1.  Let  (x,6)  be  a  point  in bd(V)  with 6   {0,1}. Then
h.(x.6) >0 for at least some j€I
J                                 n+1'
Proof.  It  is  easy  to  see  that  the  boundary of V consists of Ux{0},
sn(n)*{l}, and us(conv(U(s)*{0}, {p € A(s)Ipj = uvj if sj p -l}*{l})). So,
let  (x,6),  0<6<l,b e a point in the boundary of V, i.e. x= (1-6)u +
6p with for some sign vector s, u in int(U(s)) and p. = nv. if s. = -1 and
J     J    njl
Pj    ev   if  s  0 -1. The point u can be written as u=v+ Ih=lghshe(h)
for some positive numbers
Ah such that Ish=+1Ah = Ish=-1Ah = 1. Let j  be
an  index  with  s  =  -1. Hence, u  = v -A  and therefore v -u  = Aj > 0.
Since p  = nvj, we also  have  that  zj(p) >  0.  Consequently,  hj(x,6) =
(1-6)(v.-u.) + 6p.z.(p) > 0.          =3 3 33
Next, we show under what conditions the set of zero  points  of  h
indeed consists of piecewise smooth paths and loops, one path, P, connect-
ing (v,0) and a (p*,1) with z(p*) = Q. Notice that h is linear on C(0) and
smooth  on  each  (n+1)-dimensional set C(s). Furthermore, h is a function
from the (n+1)-dimensional set V to the n-manifold On defined by
on = {q € Rn+l'I : qi = o 
*-
Hence, h (Q) n C(0) is a line segment connecting (v,0) with a point in the
boundary  of C(0). Furthermore, if Q is a regular value of h restricted to
*-
C(s), then h (g) n C(s) is a smooth 1-manifold, i.e. a collection of  dis-
joint  smooth paths and loops. Technically, the proof is somewhat more
complex. Because C(s) is a manifold with corners we have  to  construct  a
+                                +set  C(s)  such  that  h (g)  n 8(s) = h (g) n ((s) while ((s) is a smooth
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manifold with boundary. The reasons why this can be done and  the  way  in
which  5(s)  is constructed are similar as for the construction of *(s) in
Section 3.3. An end point of a path in C(s) lies in the boundary of  C(s).
We  have  to  assume  that  a path in h (g) n ((s) intersects the boundary
transversally in the interior of a facet of C(s).  The  latter  guarantees
that  an  end  point  of a path in h (g) n C(s) either lies in bd(V) or is
also an end point of a path in h (Q) n ((0) or in h (Q) n  ((s)  for  some
unique  s *  s.  More precisely, in the latter case, since a facet of C(s)
not  in  the  boundary  of  V  is  equal  to  either  C(0) n C(s) or to
conv (U(2)*{0},A(s)*{l}).  with  Si = 0 and si 0 0 for some unique i € In+l
while s  = s  for j 0 i, or to conv(U(s)*{0},A(s)*{l}), with si 0 0 and
s  =  0  for some unique i E In+1 while Sj = sJ for j * i, the vector s isi
-
equal to either s or s. Linking the paths in h (Q) n ((0) and  in  h (Q) n
C(s)  for  different s in this way, we obtain that if Q is a regular value
of h on each C(s) and transversality on the  boundaries  is  assumed  then
h (Q) consists of piecewise smooth loops and paths. One path, P, has (v,0)
as end point on level 0 in C(0). Since an end point of a path  cannot  lie
in  bd(V)  between  levels 0 and 1, the other end point of P lies on level
one and induces a zero point of z. The path P is linear on C(0) and smooth
on  each  C(s)  it  intersects. As argued above, the projection P' of P on
S (4)x{l} yields the path of points of the adjustment process  induced  by
(3.1.4). Note that in ((0). h (Q) is a line segment connecting (v,0) and a
0
point in bd(C(s )).
We already derived that a point (x,6) E h (g) n ((s) is related to
a price vector p E Sn(n) for which z (p) = (1-6)6-lA sj/pj,  with  K  > 0,
when  s  0 0. Thus, this process converges monotonically to an equilibrium
iff (1-6)6-1Kj/p  decreases monotonically for all j€ In+1 from 6=  0  to
6 = 1.
We conclude the description of the homotopy h on V by proving  the
following theorem.
Theorem 3.4.2. Given (x,6) €V,0<6<1, there  either  exist  a  unique
feasible  sign  vector  s and vectors p E A(s) and u € int(U(s)) such that
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x = (1-6)u + 6p, or there exists a unique u E int(U) such that x =  (1-6)u
+ 6v, i.e. (x,6) E int(C(0)).
Proof. First we verify when (x,6) € int(C(0)). This is clearly the case if
and only if -(1-6) < x -v  < (1-6) for all j E I The corresponding u €n+1'
int(U) and p are given by u = (1-6)-1(x - 6v) and p = v.
In  the remaining of the proof we show that when (x,6) < int(C(0))
we can find an s as stated in the theorem. First we rank the numbers  (x.-
3
(1-6)v )/6v.,j€I . in increasing order. Without loss of generality wej 3 n+1
may assume that
Cxl-(1-6)vl)/6vl S (x2-(1-6)v2)/6v2 S...1 (xn+1-(1-6)vn+1)/6vn+1'
In the sequel we often replace the expression (x -(1-6)v )/6v  by a ,  j E
I +l. From the definition of C(s) we derive that if (x,6) € C(s) then x. =3
(1-6)(v.+A.s.)+6p., j€I . with  p €  A(s)  and  the  K 's  defined  asJ  J J    J       n+1                              j
before. Thus.  aj =  pj/vj+(1-6)Kjsj/6vj,  j E  In+1.  Combined  with the
definition of A(s) we get that for all j E I
n+1'
a  < p /vj = minhph/vh if s. = -13
al . P1/vt i f s  =0j
a  > pj/vj - maxhph/vh if s = +1.j
Since al S...£ an+1' the sign vector s must be such  that  there  are  two
indices  k,  1€ In+1 with k<L such that s  = -l i f j s k,s j=O i f k<
j < 1. andsj = +1 if j   1.
After this first observation we determine the index k and the
value   f of minhph/vh The values   f  and  k  have   to  be  such  that     I    .A.   =     1
J=l J
and ak <f s ak+1. We find f b y gradually increasing minhph/vh from al and
therefore increasing I =lgj, subsequently   for  k=1,2, . . . ,   from 0. Suppose
that  we cannot find such an f. Then we must meet the situation that p./v.
3    3
= minhph/vh for j E {1.....n} and an+1 = minhph/vh = pn+1/v Thereforen+1'
p = v and a = 1. We argue that in this situation x.-v. < 1-6 for all
n+1 3    3
j C  In+1  because  xh-vh    1-6  for   some   h E   In+l   implies   ah -
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(xh-(1-6)vh)/6vh    1+  (1-6)/6vh >1.  But this is in contradiction with
1 = an+l   a , j € {1....,n}. Thus, we  obtain  that  we  cannot  find  an
appropriate  min ph/vh  if and only if x -v  < 1-6 for all
j€I Simi-
n+1'
larly, we can search for the value of max ph/vh by decreasing the  maximum
from a We then get that this procedure does not succeed if and only ifn+1'
xj-vj > -(1-6), j E In+1'
Since  we  consider  the  case  that (x,6) < int(C(0)), there must
exist an index j € In+1 such that xj-v  £ 1-6 or xj-vj S  -(1-6).  Let  us
consider  the first case. From above we obtain that we can find an index k
and a value f o f min ph/vh such that a  <f S a k
We now show that  we
+1'
can  always  find  an  appropriate  value g of maxhph/vh by increasing the
n+1
maximum from f. Indeed, g must be such that for some 1 > k, Ij=1Aj = 1 and
°£-1 S  g<  al.  Because  this sum decreases if we increase max ph/vh and
n+1
equals zero if maxhph/vh = an+l' it suffices to show that I = A    1  when
L = k+1 and maxhph/vh = f. Since Ij=lAj = 1, we obtain in case maxhph/vh =
f, and L = k+1,
I; 1 +l'ij = I:;I +1(aj-f)6vj/(1-6) - t; 1 +1(xj-(1-6)vj-6fvj)/(1-6)
= (1-(1-6)-6f)/(1-6) + I =1(-x +(1-6)v +6fv )/(1-6)




Now suppose L =k+lhj < 1. But then f > 1. Because f = minhph/vh this is in
contradiction with the fact that both p and v lie in Sn(n).
Along the same lines we can treat the case in which x -vj S -(1-6)
for  some j E I Then we know that there exists a suitable maximum andn+1'
from that we can show the existence of an appropriate minimum.
Thus,  in the foregoing we proved, given an (x,6) < int(C(0)), the
existence of a feasible sign vector s such that (x,6) € C(s). Besides,  we
found  a related p E A(s). From the construction above it follows that the
point u := (x - 6p)(1-6) lies in int(U(s)). Consequently,  x =  (1-6)u +
-1
6p with p E A(s) and u E int(U(s)) uniquely determined. 0
The theorem implies that the collection of cells C(s), s  a  feas-
n+1
ible  sign vector in R , together with C(0) form a subdivision of V into
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cells. The intersection of C(s) with Sn(n)*{l} is equal  to  A(s)*{l}  and
the intersection of C(s) with Ux{O} is equal to U(s)x{0}. The intersection
of C(0) with Sn(n)*{1} is equal to {(v,1)} and the  intersection  of  ((0)
with  Ux{0}  is equal to Ux{0}. These sets have been illustrated in Figure
3.4.1. More generally, we can  consider  on  level  6,  0 6  6 S  1,  sets
(6(s) := {x E R +1 (x,6) E C(s)} and (6(0) := {x € R +1 (x,6) € C(0)}. The
union of C6(0) and the cells C6(s), s a feasible sign vector,  equals  the
set V6 := {x € Rn+1 (x,6) E V}. In Figure 3.4.2 the subdivision of V6 into
(6(0) and (6(s)'s is illustrated for three different 6's.
(-,-,+)
G.0.+ty"          .1            ...-(0...+)
5·-·+)          (8(0)
.v Un                                 v
(-,+.01 r\ f> (+:.0,
(-'+I-)4, 1.1..»TA\/1
(0,+,-)/     c..1...,    fl(+,o,-,
a.   6  = 1/5 b.  6  =  1/2
v            C&(0)
c. 6 = 9/10
Figure  3.4.2.  Subdivision  of V6 into subsets C6(s) and C6(0) for n = 2,
v = (1/4,1/4,1/2)T, and 6  =  1/5.1/2,9/10.  The  set  (6((-1,-1,+1)T)  is
indicated by (-,-,+), etc.
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CHAFrER 4
An adjustment process for an international trade model
In this chapter  we  consider  price  adjustments  resulting  from
shocks in a two country model. For that purpose we present a price adjust-
ment process that reaches an equilibrium price vector when  starting  from
an  arbitrarily  chosen price vector. The latter vector can be interpreted
as the equilibrium price prevailing in the economy before the  shock  took
place.
The international trade model we consider in this paper is very
simple. It is a two country model in which both countries supply goods for
the domestic market as well as for the international markets (see  Mansur
and  Whalley  [1982]). In fact they consider a similar model with an arbi-
trary number of countries. We only consider two countries because all  the
features  of  our process can be clarified in this setting. An equilibrium
price vector is a vector of prices at which the demand for both the domes-
tic goods and the goods traded on the common market equal their respective
supplies. In other words. an equilibrium vector is  a  zero  point  of  an
appropriate excess demand function.
For applying our process we first have to rewrite the model.  Here
we  follow  the lines of van der Laan [1985] who reformulated the model by
making use of its specific structure. This  reformulation  introduces  ex-
change  rates between the domestic currencies and an international curren-
cy, and a balance of payments for each country. Thus, application  of  our
process to the model not only guarantees convergence, but it also makes it
possible to consider movements in balances of payments and exchange rates.
In  fact  this  makes  our process very interesting from an economic view-
point. Finally, we remark that the path of the  process  can  be  followed
arbitrarily close by the exponent-ray algorithm presented in Doup, van den
Elzen, and Talman [1987].
This  chapter consists of five sections. In Section 4.1 we present
the basic model and its reformulation. In Section 4.2 we treat a  somewhat
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artificial  example  to  get  more  insight  into the problem. Section 4.3
contains a formal description of the price adjustment process. In  Section
4.4  we  give an economic interpretation of that process. Finally, in Sec-
tion 4.5 we present a simple numerical example. This chapter is  based  on
van den Elzen and van der Laan [1986. 1989].
4.1. The model
As already mentioned, our model deals with two countries. Concern-
ing the goods there are domestic goods being produced and traded within  a
country, and internationally traded or common goods. The model describes a
pure exchange economy. Initially, each agent in the  economy  possesses  a
bundle  of  goods.  They maximize their utilities by exchanging goods. Ex-
changes take place at equilibrium prices, i.e. prices at which the  demand
for each good is equal to its supply.
Let us explain the model more formally. The number of domestic
goods  in  country h, h E {1,2}, equals n ' and these goods are indexed by
(h,k), where h denotes the country and k E {1....,n } the good. The number
of  common  goods  is  n +1  and they are indexed (O,k), k E {0,1,...,n }.
Thus, the total number of goods equals N+1, with  N := n +nl+n2.  A  price
vector p is an (N+1)-vector with nonnegative components and can be written
as P = (PO'pl,pZ)T with pO E R I+1 and ph E R h,  h € {1,2}. A component
Phk  of  p denotes the price of good k on market h, h E {0,1,2}, where the
common market is regarded as market 0. More precisely, the  price  space
-N+1,  where RN+1 -
N+1equals  R is  the  subset of K   \{0}, such that for all
P E R +1. (PO.ph)T has at least one positive element  for  h E {1,2}.  The
hexcess demand function z of  country  h,  h € {1,2},  is a continuous
function from RN+1 into RN+1. More precisely, z (p) =
h
n +1
(zh(p)T,zh(p)T.zh(p)T)T,   where  zO(p) € R denotes the total excess
0
demand of country h for common goods  whereas  z (p) E R lk  is  the  total
excess  demand  of the consumers in country h for the domestic commodities
of country k, with k,h E {1,2}. It is assumed that for both h - 1, and  2,
z (p) = 0  if  k <  {h,0}.  Because  the  excess demands in a country only
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depend on the domestic and the common goods prices we can write  zh(p)  as
z (P ,Ph). Concerning zh we make the following standard assumptions:
i)      zh(APO,kph) = zh(Po,Ph)• A>0 (homogeneity)
ii) P.zh(P) = POoz:(PO,Ph) + Ph'zh(PO'Ph) = 0 (Walras'
law) (4.1.1)
iii) positive excess demand for goods with price zero (desirability).
12
Let  z(p) :=  z (p) + z (p) be the aggregate excess demand at price vector
p. At an equilibrium price vector p = (p0,p ,B2).r € RN+1 all markets  have
to be in equilibrium, i.e.
i)      z (B) - z (po,pl) + 22(Po.B2) = 0
(4.1.2)
ii) zh(B) = z:(po.Ph) = 0• h E {1.2}.
It  is  well-known  that  (4.1.1)  ensures the existence of an equilibrium
price vector. This because the equilibrium problem is  equivalent  to  the
N
zero point problem of z on the normalized price space S .
To apply our process we first reformulate the equilibrium  problem
nO  nl  n2
into  a zero point problem on the simplotope S := S  XS XS (see van der
Laan [1985]). Related to each element q = (q ,qi,q2) in S  we  define  for
both   countries   a   price  vector  Nh(q) =  (Nt(q),ah(q)) E  Rn0+1*Rnh.
h € {1,2}, by
h
TTOk ( ) =  hO Ok , (O,k) E I(0)
(4.1.3)
TT k(q) =  hk , (h,k) € I(h)\{(h,0)}.
So q k 0 0, is the price of the k-th commodity of country h. The compo-hk'
nents of q  are all multiplied by qh  to get the prices of the internatio-
h
nal commodities for country h. The vectors n (q), h € {1,2},  are  defined
in such a way that there is a one-to-one correspondence between a vector q
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in S at which q and q are both positive, and a ray of price vectors  p10      20
-N+1
in R
with    0  0, in the sense that q yields the same excess demand
vector through I (q), h E {1,2}, as a price vector p on the  corresponding
ray.  Note  that  we do not consider vectors q in S at which qlo or q20 is
zero. This because our process does not reach  such  vectors.  Also  at  a
vector  q  related  to an equilibrium in AN+1, both ql  and q2  have to be
positive. This will become clear later on. We illustrate the relation
between S and RN+1 with an example.
Example 4.1.1. Suppose that (nQ,nl'n2) = (2,2,2),  i.e.  there  are  three
common goods and two domestic goods for each country. Now consider the ray
R := {y E #7 ly = Ax, x = (5,2,3,2,1,14,6)7, A > 0}. To derive the  related
q-vector  we  first  normalize  the sum of the common goods prices to one,
i.e. we take   x = (1/2,1/5,3/10,1/5,1/10,7/5,3/5)T. Hence,    q  =0
(1/2,1/5,3/10)T.  Next we find ql by solving the equations q  /q   =x   =
11  10    11
1/5,   12/q10 = x12 = 1/10  and  qio+qll+q12 = 1.  In  this  way  we  find
ql = (10/13.2/13.1/13)T  and  similar  92 = (1/3.7/15.1/5)7.  From this we
derive that "1(q) -  (5/13.2/13.3/13.2/13.1/13)r  and  "2(q) .  (1/6,1/15,
h  h1/10,7/15.1/5)T. Clearly. z (rl (q)) = zh(x ,x )• h € {1,2}.
Next, we define z(q)  =  ( (q).4-(q).S (q)).r € RN+1   as the total
excess demand vector at prices N (q), h E {1,2}, i.e.
zo(q) = z (1Tl(q)) + z (N2(q))
zh(q) = z:("h(q)). h E {1,2}.
2
Observe that q consists of Ih=0(nh+1) components while  z(q)  consists  of2                                                          -
1+Ih=onh  components.  We  now construct a function z relating to each q a
vector with the same number of components. For  q E S,  we  define  z(q) =
(z (q),zI(q),Z (q))T € RN+3 by
-           -
zok(q) = zok( ) , (O,k) € I(0)
zh0(q) = InO a   h (/h(q))
, h€ {1,2} (4.1.4)k=0=OkzOk
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mhkcq, . Rhkcq, , k € {1....,n }• h € {1,2}.
Observe that for h E {1,2}, and for all q € S, (4.1.1.ii) implies
n h h hqh•zh(q)  = Ilc Or'Ok(q)zok(n  (q) )  + I tlr' k(q)z:k('111(q))  = 0.
(4.1.5a)
However, this complementarity condition does not hold for h = 0.  Then  we
get
q •z (q) = z10(q) + 220( )'
(4.1.5b)
It  follows  straightforward from (4.1.1.i) and (4.1.1.iii) that z(q*) = 0
n   nl  n2iff (q .p;,p*2) E S  *R+ *R+ , with p k = q k/q   for  h E {1,2}  and  k E
{1....,n }' yields an equilibrium. (see also Example 4.1.1).
We remark that the problem of finding a q* in S with z(q*) = 0  is
equivalent with finding a stationary point of z on S. That a zero point is
a stationary point is  clear  from  (2.2.1).  The  opposite  follows  from
Theorem  2.2.4. Because zh satisfies the complementarity condition for h €
{1,2}, whereas also the boundary condition holds, it follows from  (2.2.6)
-             -
that  at  a  stationary point q* both zl(q*) and z2(q*) are equal to zero.
But then with (4.1.5b) we must have that q3.ZO(q*) = 0. Because of  the
boundary condition q3 > 0 and thus also z (q*) = 0.
What about the interpretation of z and q? From (4.1.3) we see that
qlk,  (O,k) € I(0),  can be interpreted as the common goods prices denoted
in an international currency, e.g. ECU's. The  qhk's  for  h E  {1,2}  and
k 0 0 denote the prices of the domestic goods in the domestic currency. As
we noted already, qh  can be viewed upon as the value of one unit  of  the
international  currency  in  terms  of the currency of country h. Thus, an
increase of q increases the common goods prices in terms of the domestich0
currency. Moreover,  because  Ik00 hk = 1- ho' an  increase  of q
also
h0
results in a decrease of the sum of the domestic goods prices. With  1-qh0
as  an index of the domestic price level, we can interprete qho/(1-qho) as
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the exchange rate. Thus, an increase (decrease) of q yields  a  devalua-h0
tion (revaluation) of the currency of country h.
Concerning the vector z(q), the components zok(q) are  the  excess
demands  for  the  common  goods,  whereas  the zhk(q)'s for h E {1,2} and
k 0 0, denote the excess demands for the domestic goods. From  (4.1.4)  we
see     that  zho (q)   is the value  of the excess demand of country  h for common
goods, expressed in the international currency. In other words, it reveals
the situation on the balance of payments. The component iho(q) being posi-
tive (negative) indicates that country h faces a deficit (surplus) on  its
balance.
Given vectors q and z(q) we say that zhk(q)  and  qhk'  (h,k) € I,
correspond  to  each  other.  Thus,  each  excess  demand  zhk(q)' (h,k) K
{(1,0),(2,0)}, corresponds to a price qhk'  whereas  the  balance  of  the
balance of payments of country h E {1,2}, zho(q). corresponds to qhO being
the component of qh determining the exchange rate for country h.
Thus, the  reformulation  of the model on the simplotope enriches
the economic content of the model by the introduction  of  exchange  rates
and  balances of payments. This enables us to pose a lot of questions that
could not be dealt with in the basic model. For example, consider the
situation  in  which a certain country has a fixed production capacity re-
presented by its initial endowments. The country  has  to  decide  how  to
divide these endowments between the common market and its home market. In
the reformulated model we could take the exchange rate as a  target  vari-
able  and  consider  the  problem how to divide the endowments in order to
reach the target. In the sequel of this chapter we discuss a  process  for
the model adjusting prices and exchange rates simultaneously. This process
describes how by adaptations of prices and exchange rates a shock  in  the
economy is restored towards a new equilibrium.
4.2. An example
In this section we want to consider an "international trade prob-
lem"   with   only one country, two common goods   and one domestic     good.      Of
course, the distinction between common and non-common goods makes no sense
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in this case and we can solve the  equilibrium  price  vector  problem  by
searching  for  such  a  vector  of prices on the 2-dimensional unit price
2
simplex S . However, here we formulate the problem on the  simplotope  S =
1   1S xS   with  the  two common goods indexed by (0,0) and (0,1) and the non-
common good indexed by (1,1). It will appear that this artificial  example
provides useful insight for attacking the general problem.
Our problem concerns the search for a vector q* in S at which  the
"excess  demand" 2(q*) is equal to zero. Recall from Section 4.1 that z is
a function from S to R4 with
zok(q) = zOk(rr( ) ) , k E {0,1}
210(q) =   ozoo Olzol
("(q)) + q („(q))
zll<q) = zll("(9))'
where I(q) is the vector of prices (Ill(q),noi(q)·Ili(q)) defined by
r'ok(q) = gioqok
, k E {0,1}
"11(q) = q11·
and where z(N(q)) = (zll(n(q)),zol(9(q))·zll("(q)))T is the excess demand
at price vector N(q).
In  this section we do not want to confuse the reasoning with many
definitions and formulas. For the moment it suffices to know that the
process considers vectors in the intersections of corresponding primal (P)
T
and dual (D) subsets of S. For certain sign vectors s = (s              )00'801's10'sll
we  define  a  primal set P(s) and a corresponding dual set D(s). Let v be
the starting point of the process. We assume that v lies in  the  interior
of  S and hence vhk ) 0 for all (h,k). Now, suppose that some point q lies
in the intersection of P(s) and D(s) for certain sign vector s.  Then  the
first  set  gives  information  about  the position of q with respect to v
while the fact that q E D(s) indicates  that  the  sign  pattern  of  z(q)
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equals  s. We can restrict our attention to those sign vectors s for which
there exists a q in S with sgn(z(q)) = s.
We now consider the particular example. For zl the complementarity
condition holds, since
-              -
q1.zi(q) = gioz10(q)+glizll( )
=  10q00z00(„C ))+q10qo1zo1("(q))+q ("(q))11z11
= „00(q)zoo(TT(q))+Trol(q)z01("(q))+"11(q)zll("Cq)) = 0
The last step follows from Walras' law. So, for any  q€S  we  have  that
-        -
zll(q).zll(q) S 0,  i.e. the two components of 21(q) are not both positive
or negative. With respect to z  the  complementarity  condition  does  not
hold  and hence all sign patterns are possible. On the other hand, it fol-
lows from the definition of zlo(q) that zlo(q)   0 (S 0)  if  both  z%(q)
and zol(q) are nonnegative (nonpositive). If q is in the interior of S and
z<q) 0 0 it follows that the collection of possible sign patterns is given
by    the   set   9  with
+            ++                   +            00+
+                                                              + + 00+  +9. 0  +  0.  0.  +  0 0
+                              +                             + -+-  A  -O -
where (+,+,+,-)T denotes the vector (+1,+1,+1,-1)T, etc.
We  now define for each s€Y a primal set P(s) such that the col-
1   1
lection of sets P(s) covers S=S x S. This covering is  given  in  Figure
4.2.1. The reasoning behind this figure is that prices induced by a vector
q € P(s) are a fraction higher (lower) than  in  v  if  the  corresponding
component  of  s is positive (negative). Prices corresponding to zero com-


















Figure 4.2.1. S = Sl x Sl. The primal sets P(s), s E Y.
For example consider the primal set P(s) induced  by  s =  (-1,-1,
-1,+1)T.  For  a  q  in  this set we have that ql   vl while qlo < v10 and
qll > vll' Hence NOk(q) < NOk(v), k € {0,1} and "11(q) > "11(v). Since  we
are  interested in points q in the intersection of corresponding sets P(s)
and D(s) this reflects the fact that zok(q) < 0• k E  {0,1},  zlo(q) <  0,
and 211(q) > 0 if q E D(s). Thus, the prices of the common goods (0,0) and
(0,1) should be decreased and the  price  of  the  non-common  good  (1,1)
should be increased. Furthermore, ql  should be decreased. This reflects a
revaluation of the domestic currency of country 1 in order to get  rid  of
the  surplus on its balance of payments. Observe that go S v  implies q  =
v  because the sum of the components of both qQ and v  is  equal  to  one.
Hence, the  price ratios between common goods cannot be adjusted when the
common goods are all in excess supply. The same holds when q    v  if  all
common goods are in excess demand.
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For q €  P(s)  with  s = (-1.+1.+1.-1)r  we  have  that  q 0/qol <
v  /vol,  while  qlo/qll >  v10/vll.  Thus.  a00(q)/n01(q)  is  lower than
 00(v)/r1O1(v). If also q € D(s) this reflects the fact that z%(q) < 0 and
zll(q)    0.  Furthermore,  qlo/qll > v10/vll implies that NOO(q)+1101(q) =
q10 > vlo = "00(v)+"01(v). while "11(q) = q11 < Vll = rr11(v), which
reflects  that  the value 210(q) of the excess demands for common goods is
positive, whereas 211(q) is negative.
We  see  that the regions P(s) with shk = 0 for some (h,k) are the
convex hull of P(s') and P(s") with sA  = -1 and sAk =  +1  whereas  s /e =
sj,t = si,t  for  all  (j,L) 0 (h,k). For instance P((-1.0.-1,+1)T) is the
convex hull of P((-1.-1-1,+1)T) and P((-1,+1.-1,+1).r). Since because  of
-    -
the  complementarity  condition for zl' z1O(q) = 0 iff zll(q) = 0, we have
that  P((-1,+1,0,0)T)  is  the  convex  hull  of P((-1,+1,-1,+1)T) and
P((-1,+1,+1.-1)T).  The  regions  P(s)  with  s  = 0 are not defined. This
because of the fact that for the international trade problem  the  comple-
mentarity condition does not hold for h = 0.
A possible collection of   dual   sets   D(s),    s E 9, where   D(s)  =
cl({q E  Slsgn(z(q)) =  s}),  is illustrated in Figure 4.2.2. The set D(s)
with shk = 0 for some (h,k) is the intersection of the two sets D(s')  and
D(s")  with s k = -1 and s k = +1 whereas sj,t = s   = s il for all (j,L) 0
(h,k). For instance D((0,+1,+1,-1)T)  is  the  intersection  of  the  sets
D((+1,+1,+1.-1)T)  and  D((-1,+1,+1.-1)T),  while  D((+1,-1,0,0)7)  is the
intersection of D((+1,-1,+1,-1)T) and D((+1,-1.-1,+1)T).
Figure  4.2.2  shows  the  "typical"  shapes of the sets D(s). For
instance consider the point q. Since q is much smaller than q and a10                         11       00
almost  equals q we  have that both n  (q) and Nol(q) are much smaller01
than "ll(q), i.e. the common goods are cheap relatively to the  non-common
good, so that we may expect that z Q(q),zo (q) > 0 and hence that zlo(q) >
0,  zll(q) <  0·  Thus,  it  is   very   reasonable   that   q   lies   in













ZO' = 0 zoo=o
Figure 4.2.2. S = Sl x Sl. The dual sets D(s). s € Y.
Starting in some point v, the process follows a path of points  in
the  intersections  of corresponding primal and dual sets until an equili-
brium point q* is found. This is  illustrated  in  Figure  4.2.3  for  the
example of Figure 4.2.2 with the starting point as chosen in Figure 4.2.1.
Since  v €  D((-1,+1,-1,+1)7)  the  process  leaves  v   along   the   ray
P((-1,+1,-1,+1)T)  tracing  a  path  of  points  q  in P((-1,+1,-1,+1)T) n
D((-1,+1.-1,+1)T) until the point q € D((-1,+1.0.0)T) is reached. Then the
process  continues  by  tracing  a  path  of points in the intersection of






V                                               ZIO =Zil =0
(e(1),e(1)) (e(2),e(1))
ZOX = 0 Foo =o
Figure 4.2.3. The path followed by the process, v E D((-1,+1.-1,+1)T).
4.3. The process
In this section we present a mathematical description of our price
adjustment process. The process can start at any vector v in S and reaches
a q* at which z(q*) = 0 via a path of vectors q in S. At a vector q on the
path the process is governed by v and  the  sign  pattern  of  z(q).  Very
roughly  speaking, a component of q is increased (decreased) when the cor-
responding component of z(q) is positive (negative), while if a  component
of  z(q) is zero then the corresponding component of q is adjusted such as
to keep that component of z(q) equal to zero. In the sequel we assume that
v lies in the interior of S, i.e. v > 0 for all (h,k) € I.hk
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The sign pattern of z(q) is represented  by  a  sign  vector  s =
T  T T T RN+3
(s ,sl's2)
in . Because of (4.1.5). the set 9 of feasible sign pat-
terns of z is restricted. For example, it is impossible  that  the  compo-
nents  of  z(q)  are  all  positive.  In  the sequel we first define 9 and
related to each element in 9 we then define a primal and a dual set,  both
being subsets of S. A primal set states conditions on the location in S of
its elements. It is here that the starting vector plays a major role.  The
corresponding  dual  set  is  induced  by the sign pattern of the function
values of its elements. The process then only considers vectors of S lying
in the intersection of a primal and its corresponding dual set.
Definition 4.3.1. A  sign  vector  s  belongs  to Y if  it  satisfies  the
following conditions:
Tl. s t 0
T2. Ii(s) = 0 iff Ih(s) = 0, h E {1,2}
T3· if sl 2 0 (sl 5 0) then sho = +1 (sho = -1) for  at  least  one  h  in
{1.2}
T4. if s = 0 then s =0. h E {1,2}.0           hO
The  conditions T2 and T3 reflect the properties of z as given in (4.1.5).
In fact. T2 reflects (4.1.5a) while T3 follows from  (4.1.5b).  Conditions
Tl,  T2  and T3 imply that there exists an h E {0,1,2} for which II(s) 0 0
and Ih(s) 0 0. Only condition T4 is imposed from outside  the  model.  The
reason  for  this  will become clear later on. Observe that we implicitely
consider only sign patterns of z(q) with z(q) 0 0 and q in the interior of
S.  For example, if q1 equals (0,1,0)7 then the corresponding sign pattern
of zl(q) equals (+1,0,+1) according to  (4.1.1.iii)  and  (4.1.5a),  which
contradicts T2. In the sequel we show that our process never reaches a q
with some component equal to zero. Confer also the remark made above
Example 4.1.1.
Related to each feasible sign vector s we define a primal set P(s).
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Definition 4.3.2. Let s E Y and q E S. Then q€ P(s) if for some b. b  and
ah' h€ {0,1,2}. q  satisfies  the  following  conditions,  where  0 S b s
bo f 1, and ah £ 1:
Pl. for h€ {1,2}, and also for h=O i f s   %0,
qhk = ahvhk if shk = +1
bvhk S qhk S ahvhk if shk= 0
bv
if Shk = -1hk =  hk
P2. if s  5 0,0
b vOk    Ok S a vOk if sok = 0
b0vOk =  Ok if sok = -1.
To  provide  a better insight we will make some remarks. If s  % 0
(Pl) then all components of a vector q in P(s) related to negative  compo-
nents of s are, relative to v, minimal, i.e. qhk/vhk =b= minIqil/vil for
all (h,k) with shk = -1. Besides, for each h the components qhk of q  with
Shk  =  +1 are, relative to v, maximal over all indices in
I(h). More pre-
cisely,  hk/vhk   =   ah   =   maxI (h) qhl/vhl  if   shk   = +1. Components   of q related
to  zero  components  of  s are allowed to vary between these bounds, i.e.
 hk/vhk E [b,ah] if shk = 0. From all  of  this  together  it  implicitely
follows that qO = vl if sok = +1 for all (O,k) E I(0). If sl 1 0 (P2) then
for all q in P(s) it holds that qok/vok = bl = minI(0) 01/vOL if sok = -1,
whereas qhk/vhk =b i f shlc = -1 and h=l o r 2, where b0 at least equal to
b. In particular. when sok = -1 for  all  k,  we  have  q  = v   and  thus
b - 1.
Now, consider an s E 9 such that for all h, shic = +1 for just  one
k, say kh' while slvt " -1 for all other (h,t) € I(h). Then the set P(s) is
the line segment from v to the vertex  w(s)  of  S  with w (s) = 1  and
hk 
wh't(s) = 0  for all 1 0  1' h € {0,1.2}. Observe that along this ray the
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ratio between prices of commodities with corresponding  negative  s-compo-
nent does not change, since all these prices are decreased from v with the
uniform factor 1-b. In fact, b decreases from 1 to zero when going from  v
to  w(s).  Of course we need not a uniform factor a  to increase the price
of   commodity   (h,k ) in order   to   keep   the   sum  of the components   of qh equal
to one. When
going  from  v to w(s), a  increases from 1 to 1/v k , h E
{0.1,2}.
For each sign vector s E Y with shk 0 0 for all (h,k) €I, P(s) is
-               -
a line segment. If s  0 0 such a ray points to a point q of S with qhk = 0
if shlc  = -1 and qhk = ahvhk if shlc = +1, where R  = (I vhk)-1
(h,k)€Ii(s)
If sQ < 0 this it still true for h € {1,2} while q  = v . Thus, the dimen-
sion  of P(s) with s such that s 0 0 for all (h,k) € I, equals 1. Inhk
general, the dimension of P(s) depends on the number of  zeros  in  s.  In
general we obtain that
dim(P(s)) =1+ I =0(|I (s)|-kh(s)),
where  k (s) = 1  if  |I (s)| = n +1  and  k (s) = 0 otherwise. The factor
kh(s) stems from the fact that qh € Snh, h E {0,1,2}, so that 911 is com-
pletely determined by nh of its components.
It can happen that the primal sets corresponding to different sign
vectors coincide. This is obvious for s and s E Y when s  >0,s o<0, and
sh = sh'  h E {1,2}.  It  also  holds  that  when   s€Y i s   such   that
sl  = +1 and  sok = 0  for all k * t, while for some h 0 0, sho = -1. Then
Pl says that for q i n P(s) there are b and  a   with  O j b S l S a Q  such
that  qol  =  a vol  and  bvok  S  qok S a0vok' k 0 1. Let Ak be such that
 Ok = Akvok and let Ar = minkAk. Then with bl = Ar   b we have that  q  is
also in P(s) with SOr = -1, Sok = 0 for all k * r, and sh = sh' h E {1,2}.
For example, in Figure 4.3.1 we have that P((0,-1,+1,-1,-1,+1)T) is  equal
to P((+1,0.+1,-1.-1,+1)T) in S = Slxslxsl.
Observe that the sets P(s) are completely determined by the start-
ing  vector  v. In Figure 4.3.1 we give an illustration of some sets P(s),
s € 9, in case S = Sl'(Sl,Sl, i.e. when there are two commonly traded goods
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Figure  4.3.1. Illustration  of  sets  P(s)  in  case S = Slxslxsl and v =
((1/2,1/2)T,(5/8,3/8)T.(2/3,1/3)T).
Next we turn to the dual sets which are related to the function z. For
each   s   E  Y we define   the dual subset   D(s)   of   S   by
D(s) = cl({q E Slsgn(z(q)) = s}).
In the sequel we assume that z is a smooth function. What about the dimen-
sion   of   D(s), s€Y? First recall that z i s a function from S to RN+3
obeying three restrictions, namely
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 h•zh( ) = 0 , h E {1,2}
q •z (q) = z1O( ) + z2O( )'
Because  of the first two restrictions we have that for h E {1,2},
the (n +1)-vector zh( ) is fully determined by n  of its components. More-
over, by  the  last restriction, we have that the value of the excess de-
mands for common goods must be equal to the sum of the  balances  of  pay-
-
ments. Hence, we can regard z as an unconstrained function z from S to the
I2= n 1-dimensional set R'l. Restricted to D(s), we then may view upon z  as
being a function from D(s) to an I2= (n.-|I (s)|+k (s))-dimensional subset
of R . denoted z(D(s)), where k (s) is defined as before. The latter  sub-
set  has  a  codimension equal to  I =I(|I (s)|-kh(s)). If z:S+R   i s
transversal to z(D(s)) then D(s) is a smooth manifold in S with a codimen-
sion  in  S equal to If=0(|I (s)1-kh(s)) (see Theorem 2.4.12). Thus,
under
fairly  general  conditions  D(s)  is  a  smooth  manifold of dimension
I =0 (nh- 1 I (s ) 1 +   kh( s) ) .
Hence, a  non-empty  intersection  PD(s) :=
P(s) n D(s) has dimension equal to    dim(P(s))+dim(D(s))-dim(S) =
1  +  4=0(|I (s)1-lch(s))   +  I =0(1111-1 I (s)1+kh(s))   -  I =onh  =  1.
Thus, for all s€9 the intersection of P(s) and  D(s)  not  being
empty  is  a  1-dimensional  smooth manifold, i.e. it consists of disjoint
paths and loops. In the rest  of  this  section  we  argue  that  the  set
Us€T  PD (s) contains under rather general conditions a piecewise smooth
path connecting v and a point q* at which  z(q*) = 0.  By  following  this
path  we  get  a process of price adjusting. Each smooth piece of the path
lies in PD(s) for some specific sign vector s and can be  written  as  the
solution curve to some system of differential equations.
For the existence of the path we assume without loss of generality
that  s  := sgn(z(v))  contains no zeros. Clearly, s  E 9, v E PD(s ), v E
0           0                    0
bd(P(s )), dim(P(s )) = 1, and dim(D(s )) = dim(S). Thus, v must be an end
0point  of  a  line segment in PD(s ). Our process starts by following this
segment from v. In general, the process follows a curve in some set PD(s).
s E 9, being a finite collection of paths and loops. Each path has two end
points. In order to guarantee that the process never enters a loop we need
that two sets PD(s), PD(s), successively met on the path, intersect trans-
versally in the interior of a facet of P(s) or P(s). Under this  condition
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the process traverses a set PD(s) on the path along a curve connecting two
points on the boundary of PD(s). We will show that an end point of a curve
in   PD(s),   s E 9, is either a zero point of z o r a n end point of exactly
one   path   in   some   PD (s) ,s t s,s€ 9. Because   of the finite cardinality
of 9 and  the  fact  that  each  PD(s) consists of only a finite number of
paths this guarantees the convergence of the process.
Let  us  become more precise. The boundary of PD(s) can be written
as
bd(PD(s)) = [bd(P(s)) n D(s)] u [P(s) n bd(D(s))].
When the process reaches a point q in P(s) n bd(D(s)), we show that  under
some  nondegeneracy  condition either z(q) = 0 or q € D(s) for some unique
2 E 9,  and that q is an end point   of   a   path   in PD(s). Similarly,   if
q € bd(P(s)),  q  will  lie  under  some transversality condition in a set
P(2), 2 € 9, with dimension equal to dim(P(s))-1 so that q is also an  end
-
point  of  a  path  in  PD(s). Note that a point in bd(PD(s)) cannot ly in
bd(S). This because q E PD(s) n bd(S) implies zhk(q) S 0 and  qhk = 0  for
some (h,k) E I which contradicts condition (4.1.1.iii).
Suppose that  the  process  in  PD(s)  reaches  a  vector  q  with
sgn(z(q)) = s.  s 0  0,  in  bd(D(s)).  It is easy to verify that assuming
nondegeneracy the following four possibilities exhaust the cases in  which
s € 9-and dim(D(s)) = dim(D(s))-1.
Nl. There is an element (O,p) € I(0) such that s = 0  while s 0 0.
OP              OP
Besides  shk = Shk  for  all  (h,k) 0 (O,p)  with at least one element
(0,1) E I(0) for which sol 0 0.
N2. There  is  an  h E {1,2}  and  just one element (h,p) E I(h) such that
shp = 0, Shp 0 0, while sj  = sj,t for all (j,1) 0 (h,p). Besides there
is a pair {(h,t),(h,r)} C I(h) such that sht = +1 and shr = -1
N3. There are an h € {0,1,2} and  two  elements  (h,t), (h,r) E I(h)  such
-       -
that  sht = Shr = 0, sht'shr = -1 while sh,t = sh,t = 0 for all 1 0 t,r,
and sjk = Sjk for all other (j,k) E I. In case h = 0, sj  = 0 for  j E
{1.2}.
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N4. There are an h E {1,2} with s 0 0 and an element (0,p) € I(0)  withh0
s0p = sh0  while sOp = sho = 0 and 901 = sol = 0 for alle L t p. 9jl =
s Q = 0 for j 0 0,h. In case shr 0 0 for exactly one  element  (h,r) 0
(h,0)  then  Shr =  0.  Furthermore,  sjk = Sjk for all other elements
(j,k) €I.
The next case occurs when 2/ 9-and z(q) 0 0.
N5· There is an element (O,p) E I(0) such that s   0 0, sO  = 0 and  sok =
0  for  all k 0 p, while slo.920 = -1. For all elements (h,k) E I with
(h,k) 0 (0.p), Ehk = shk'
In  case N5, s is not all element of f, due to condition T4. Now we
are able to clarify the reason for that extra condition. Suppose we define
P(s)  according  to  Pl-P3.  But then we have that dim (P(s)) = dim(P(s)),
-                                                                               -
with s and s as in N5. Hence PD(s) would be a 0-manifold. However, q  also
-
lies   in   a set P(s),  with s   = -s0  for some ,t ,£ p. 20 , = 0,  and shlc for
all other (h,k) € I. Because q also lies in  bd(D(s)),  the  process  con-
-
tinues from q via a path in PD(s).
Next we consider the case when the vector q in bd(PD(s)) lies  in
- A -
bd(P(s)). We already argued that q must lie in P(s), for some s in 9, with
-
dim(P(s)) = dim(P(s))-1. This is a  kind  of  a  transversality  condition
which has to  be fulfilled along the path. Also, it may not occur that a
vector in a lower dimensional face of bd(P(s)) is generated. The cases
that might occur are the reversals of those described in Nl-N4.
4.4. Economic interpretation of the adjustments
In  this  section  we  describe  how along the path the prices are
adapted in order to reach  an  equilibrium situation. Broadly  speaking,
equilibrium on the  domestic  markets  is achieved by adjustments of the
domestic prices whereas equilibrium on the common market  is  reached  via
adjustments of both the international prices and the exchange rates. Adap-
tations of the exchange rates also restore equilibrium on the balances  of
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payments.  More  precisely, an excess demand (supply) of a good induces an
increase (decrease) of its price relative  to  the  starting  price.  This
tends  to  offset  the  imbalance.  Similarly,  a surplus (deficit) on the
balance of payments leads to an appreciation (depreciation) of the curren-
cy  in  the related country. Such an appreciation (depreciation) makes for
that country the common goods less (more) costly, which has also an impact
on  the  common  market.  We remark that when we speak in the sequel about
relative prices we mean relative to their initial values. The references
Pl, Nl and so on refer to Section 4.3.
At the starting vector v we assume that no balance or market is in
equilibrium,  i.e.  all  elements  of z(v) differ from zero. From v, the
prices of goods in excess supply are decreased while prices  of  goods  in
excess demand are increased. Besides, if a country has a surplus (deficit)
on its balance of payments then  its  currency  appreciates  (depreciates)
(see Pl). In case all common goods reveal an excess supply (demand), their
prices remain unaffected (P2 respectively Pl). In that case the imbalances
are attacked by appreciation (depreciation) of the national currencies.
In general, the relative prices of domestic goods in excess demand
are maximal, whereas those of domestic goods in excess supply are minimal.
Besides, the latter relative prices are equal among the  countries.  Rela-
tive prices of goods in equilibrium vary between these bounds (Pl). All of
this also holds for the common goods prices except when no common good  is
in excess demand while at least one common good is not in equilibrium (see
P2). Although also in that case the relative prices  of  common  goods  in
excess  supply  are equal, they  might  then be larger than the relative
prices of domestic goods in excess supply. In the special  case  that  all
common goods are in excess supply, their prices equal the starting prices.
If along the path a good or balance becomes in equilibrium then it
is  kept  in equilibrium by allowing the corresponding relative price (ex-
change rate) to vary between the minimum and  the maximum. In terms  of
Section  4.3 these are the cases Nl and N2 in which the boundary of a dual
set has been reached. However, if the relative price (exchange rate) of  a
good  (balance) in equilibrium becomes equal to the relative prices of the
goods in excess demand or supply then the good (balance) is no longer kept
in equilibrium. More precisely, its relative price (rate) is kept equal to
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the relative prices of the goods in excess demand or supply and  the  good
(balance)  may  become  in  excess demand (deficit) or excess supply (sur-
plus). This case happens when the boundary of a primal set is reached.
Till  sofar  we described the basic behaviour of the price adjust-
ment process. In the sequel we treat some special cases.
Concerning country h, h E {1,2}, it can happen that along the path
two  components  of  zh  simultaneously  become  equal  to  zero  at  some
vector  q.  Under the nondegeneracy condition this can only occur when all
other components of zh(q) are zero, and hence country h becomes in equili-
brium  (N3).  Also  the reverse can occur. If a relative price (rate) in a
country in equilibrium becomes equal to the relative prices of  the  goods
in  excess  supply then the corresponding good (balance) is allowed to be-
come into excess supply (surplus), while simultaneously the good (balance)
with  the  highest  relative price (rate) is allowed to become into excess
demand (deficit). Similar cases can occur on the common markets when  both
balances  are  in  equilibrium. But on the common markets we can also have
the situation in which some goods are  in  equilibrium  while  either  all
other  common  goods  are either in excess supply (P2) or in excess demand
(Pl). In the latter case the adaptations are standard. In the former  case
the  relative prices of the common goods in excess supply are less than or
equal to the relative prices of the common goods in equilibrium, but  they
may  be  higher  than  the relative prices of the domestic goods in excess
supply. If the relative prices of the common goods in excess supply become
equal  to  the  relative  prices of the non-common goods in excess supply,
then the former relative prices are kept equal to  the  latter  while  the
common  good  having  the highest relative price is allowed to become into
excess demand (change from P2 to Pl). Of  course  the  opposite  situation
occurs  when  the last common good in excess demand becomes in equilibrium
(Nl).
Next, we  have to consider the cases in which, due to the connec-
tions between the common markets and the balances of the countries
(4.1.5b),  simultaneously  changes can occur at the common markets and the
balances. First, it can happen that the last common good and the last  ba-
lance  not  being in equilibrium both become in equilibrium (N4). Then the
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corresponding price and rate are adjusted such as to keep them in  equili-
brium.  Of course, also the opposite case is possible. In that case a rate
becomes equal to the relative prices  of  the  domestic  goods  in  excess
supply  (demand).  Then  the rate is kept equal to this relative price and
the balance may reveal a surplus  (deficit).  Simultaneously,  the  common
good  with  the  lowest  (highest)  relative  price may become into excess
supply (demand). Finally, it can occur that the last common good not being
in  equilibrium,  becomes  in  equilibrium  while both balances are not in
equilibrium, i.e. there is a balance revealing a surplus while  the  other
is  in  deficit (N5). When that common good was in excess supply (demand),
the process continues  by  allowing  the  common  good  with  the  highest
(lowest) relative price to become into excess demand (supply).
This completes the economic interpretation of  the  price  adjust-
ments  made  by our process. The most remarkable feature of the process in
relation to other price adjustment processes is that it focusses on  rela-
tive  prices, i.e. prices relative to the starting price system. In this
way the starting vector plays a very important role. At  any  point  along
the  path  the  process  keeps  track of its position with respect to that
starting vector. If necessary, this leads to disturbances of partial equi-
libria. The advantage resulting from this is that the process converges to
an equilibrium under rather general conditions. Furthermore, it appears
that  it  describes  price  adjustments  for  an international trade model
including adjustments of the exchange rates.
4.5. Numerical illustration
We consider a simple international trade model with two countries,
1  and 2. The consumers in each country are represented by one single con-
sumer. Furthermore, each country has one domestic good, indexed (1,1)  and
(2,1) respectively, and there are two commonly traded goods, indexed (0,0)
and (0,1). The representative consumer in  country  1  maximizes  a  Cobb-
OC       OC       0(
Douglas utility function ul(x  ,xol,xll) = x00 1xol 2xll 3, with o:i   0,
i E {1,2,3}, and 01+Q2+03 = 1. Here x  ,xol and x11 denote the  quantities
consumed.  Similarly,  we  have  a  utility  function  for the consumer in
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Bl   B2   Blcountry 2. u2(x
00'x01,x21 ) = x    xol  x21  ' with Pi £  0·  i €  {1,2,3},
and  Bl+B2+B3 =  1.  The  budget  constraints  are  induced by the initial
1
endowments of the countries. For  country  1  we  have  endowments  w  =
1 1 222
(w00,wol,wll)T,  and  for country 2. w  = (wll,wol,w21)7. In our numerical
example   we   take  gi   =B i= 1/3 .i E{1,2,3} .   Note   that the excess demand   is
not  defined  for  zero  prices. In that case the demands become infinite.
This does not matter because our process never reaches  zero prices (see
Section 4.3).
On this model we perform two experiments. In  the  first  we  con-
sider  the  way  in  which  our process restores the equilibrium after the
occurrence of a shock. We start the process in the old  equilibrium  price
vector  and consider the adaptations leading to the new equilibrium. After
that we observ the consequences of the reversed shock. The most  important
issue  is  then  the question whether the process follows the same path in
reverse order.
1
The  starting  situation  of  the  economy  is  the  one with w  =
(100.60.80)r and w2 = (0.40.20)T.  The  corresponding  equilibrium  vector
q* = ((q3O·q 1)-r. (qto.q;1)' ·(q o·q 1)-r) equals ((1/2,1/2)T,(2/3.1/3)T.
(2/3,1/3)T). Now, a shock takes place  in  this  economy  resulting  in  a
change  in  the  initial endowments. More concrete, wl becomes (0,60,180)7
whereas w2 becomes (50.40,50)T. Straightforward  computation  yields  that
the  equilibrium  vector q corresponding to this new situation is equal to
6 - ((2/3,1/3)7.(18/19,1/19)T,(15/22,7/22)T).  How  does  our   adjustment
process  bring  the  economy  from  q* to q? The process starts in the old
equilibrium q*. The excess demand vector  z(q )  after  the  shock  equals
fzoo(q.)1201(q*)·
210( *)'zll< *)'z2O(q*)•221(q*))T = (76.54,26.54,49.92.-99.84,1.62,
-3.24)T.  At the start, both common goods are in excess demand, the balan-
ces are in deficit and the domestic goods are in excess supply. Thus, the
process  leaves  q*  by devaluating the domestic currencies and decreasing
equally the domestic goods prices while the international  prices  of  the
common  goods  are  kept  fixed.  The adjustment process continues in this
manner till the vector ((0.5,0.5)T, (0.689,0.311)T, (0.689,0.311)T) is
reached  at  which country 2 becomes in equilibrium. The latter means that
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both the domestic market of country 2 and its balance become  in  equilib-
rium. From  that  vector on, country 2 is kept in equilibrium whereas the
other  adaptations  are  continued  as before. Then, at the vector
((0.5,0.5)T, (0.774,0.226)T. (0.689,0.311)T),  the second common good market
becomes in equilibrium. The market for the first common good still reveals
a  surplus. Now, the process proceeds while also keeping the second common
good in equilibrium and increasing the price  of  the  first  common  good
above  the  price  of  the second one till the new equilibrium vector q is
reached. At q also country 1 becomes in  equilibrium  which  also  induces
equilibrium on the first common market.
Next we consider the reverse case. We start from the situation
with wl = (0.60.180)7, w2 = (50.40.50)7, and corresponding equilibrium q =
((2/3.1/3)T, (18/19,1/19)T, (15/22,7/22)T)  and assume a  shock on this
economy  changing  the  endowments  back  to  wl =  (100.60.80)T  and w2 =
(0,40,20)T. How does our process adjust q  to  the  new  equilibrium  q* =
((1/2,1/2)7,(2/3,1/3)T, (2/3.1/3)7)?  The  excess  demand vector at q after
the shock equals 1(a)  =  (-43.17.13.66.-25.99.467.76.1.76.-3.78)T.  Thus,
the  shock  results  for  country  1  in an excess demand situation on its
domestic market whereas its balance turns into surplus. In country  2  the
opposite occurs,  i.e. its balance runs into deficit whereas the domestic
market becomes in excess supply. Furthermore, the  market  for  the  first
common good is in excess supply while the other common market is in excess
demand. The process leaves q by proportionally decreasing the first common
good  price  and the domestic price in country 2 while relatively revalua-
ting the currency of country 1 with the same factor. These adaptations are
continued  till  country  2  becomes  in  equilibrium  at the price vector
((0.599.0.401)T, (O.852,0.148)7,(0.714,0.286).r). From that vector on, coun-
try  2  is kept in equilibrium by adjusting the ratio between the price of
the domestic good and its exchange rate whereas the other adjustments  are
continued as before. Next, the process reaches the vector ((0.585,0,415)T,
(0.832,0.168)T, (0.705,0.295)T) at which the market for the  second  common
good  reveals  an  equilibrium.  By  keeping  this market and country 2 in
equilibrium, increasing the first common good price relatively  above  the
exchange  rate  in  country  1, and simultaneously continuing the previous
adaptations the new equilibrium q* is reached. At the latter  vector  also
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country  1  becomes in equilibrium and henceforth the market for the first
common good.
It  is  interesting  to observe from the experiment above that the
path traced by the process from the second to the first equilibrium is not
the  reverse of the path followed from the first to the second equilibrium
situation. This appears to be a general feature  of  our process. It is
mainly  due  to  the  fact that the price decreases are, relatively to the
starting vector, equal among the markets. The differences occur  therefore
because  of  the different starting vectors. Another fundamental reason is
that the process leaves the starting vector along a ray whereas the  equi-
librium vector is reached via a curve.
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CHAPTER 5
An adjustment process for an exchange economy with
linear production technologies
In  this  chapter we propose a process that reaches an equilibrium
in an exchange economy with linear production via  adaptations  of  prices
and  activity  levels. The process we consider here is a generalization of
the sign process for a pure exchange economy (see van der Laan and  Talman
[19878] and Section 3.1 of Chapter 3). It is a generalization in the sense
that for the special case of an exchange economy without  production  both
processes are the same.
This chapter consists of four sections. In Section 5.1 we  present
a  model  of  an  exchange economy with linear production technologies and
introduce the process. In Section 5.2 we give the mathematical description
of  the  path  followed by the process and prove its existence and conver-
gence. The economic interpretation of the path is given  in  Section  5.3.
Finally, in Section 5.4 we consider two examples. This chapter is based on
van den Elzen, van der Laan, and Talman [1990].
5.1. The model
We consider a standard model of an exchange  economy  with  linear
production technologies. There are a finite number of consumers, m produc-
tion activities, also called firms, and n+1 commodities. The firms are
indexed  by  i,  i €  {1,...,m},  and  the  commodities or goods by j, j E
{1....,n+1}. Consumers are assumed to be endowed with some of  the  goods,
such  as  labour  and capital. More precisely, the nonnegative vector w in
n+1
R    denotes the (aggregated) initial endowments of the consumers, with w.
3
the  amount  of  commodity  j,  j € {1,...,n+1}.  At  a  price vector p in
.n+1
K   \{0}, the (n+1)-vector d(p) denotes the aggregate demand of  the  con-
sumers for the commodities. We assume that demand is homogeneous of degree
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zero in the prices and that it satisfies Walras' law,  i.e.  d(Ap) = d(p)
for all X>0 and p.d(p) = p.w, respectively, for every price vector p. We
.n+1
also assume that the function d is smooth on K and continuous on++
bd(Rn+1)1{0 '
An activity of a firm is  represented  by  an  (n+1)-vector  whose
negative components correspond to the inputs and whose positive components
to outputs. More precisely, the (n+1)-vector ai denotes the activity  vec-
tor of firm i, i € Im' with a    0 the (net) amount of output of commodity
j and -a  &0 the amount of input  of  commodity  j, j€I when  then+1'
activity level is equal to one. A vector y in R  denotes an activity level
vector with Yi the activity level of firm i, i € Im. So, the  (n+1)-vector
Ay,  with  A  the  ((n+1)xm)-matrix with i-th column ai for i E Im' is the
aggregate net input-output vector for activity level vector y.  We  assume
that there can be no production without input, i.e. Ay   0 and y   0 imply
Y = 0.
The  m-vector  ATp is the unit level profit vector at price vector
p, with (ATp)i the profit of firm i when it operates  at  unit  level.  We
call a price vector p* and an activity level vector y* an equilibrium if
for each commodity demand is at most equal to endowment plus  net  produc-
tion and if no activity makes profit.
+1
Definition 5.1.1. A pair (p*,y*) E (R   \{0}) * R  is an equilibrium if
i)      d(p*) - Ay* j w
ii) ATP* 5 0.
From  the definition and Walras' law we can derive some properties
holding at an equilibrium. Multiplying i) with p* and ii) with  y*  yields
-p*•Ay*    0  and p*•Ay* S 0, respectively. Thus, p*•Ay* = 0 and therefore
with Walras' law also  p*.(d(p*) - Ay* - w) =  0.  Because  ATp. S  0  and
y* 2 0,  p*·Ay* = 0 means that in equilibrium a firm can only operate at a
positive production level if it makes zero profit, i.e.  if  y* >  0  then1
CA p*). =  0.  Similarly,  because  d(p*) - Ay* -w f O holds, p*·(d(p*) -1
Ay* - w) = 0 means  that  in  equilibrium  the  consumers'  demand  for  a
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commodity  can only be less than its endowments plus net production if the
price of that commodity is equal to zero.
Due  to the homogeneity of degree zero of the demand function d we
have that if (p* ,y*) is an equilibrium, then (Ap*,y*)  is  an  equilibrium
for  any  A > O.  This  allows us to normalize the price vectors to the n-
dimensional unit simplex Sn. Because d is a smooth function on  the  inte-
rior  of  Sn and continuous on bd(Sn), it is well-known from a fixed-point
argument that an equilibrium  always  exists  in  S 1'(R   (see  e.g.  Scarf
[1973])·  Since  at an equilibrium (pi,y*) E S *RT it holds that A'.p. S 0.
p* lies in S , where S  := {p E S IATP   0}. To find an equilibrium vector
pair  (p*,y*)  in  S *R .  we  propose  to follow a piecewise smooth path,
denoted P, in S )(R . Let p  be an arbitrarily chosen point in the interior
0  i
of S , i.e. p  > 0 for all j and p •a  < 0 for all i. According to Farkas'
lemma the relative interior of S  is  nonempty,  since  Ay   0  and  y   0
0
imply  y = 0.  The  path  connects the pair (p ,0) and an equilibrium pair
(p*,y*). The  path  can  be  interpreted  as  the  path  generated  by  an
adjustment  process  in  which  prices  and activity levels simultaneously
adjust. All points (p,y) along   the  path P i n St"R satisfy   for   j€In+1
Pi /4   - minhpl'/PO if dj(p) - (Ay)j < wj.
minhph/PO   s   pi/pj   S •axhph/PO if d (p) - (Ay)  =w,j               j      j
pi /4   - maxh,11/P if d.(p) - (Ay). > w..3                 33
and for i€I (5.1.1)m
Yi =
0 if p•ai < 0
Yi 2
0 if p•al = 0.
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5.2, Existence of the path
An arbitrary price vector p  in int(S ) can be determined by  sol-
ving the Linear Programming Problem (LPP)
c = min(Pl + ··· + Pn+1 
n+1
such that ATP 5 -em and p 2 e
-                      -
Clearly, this LPP has a solution p. After dividing p by c. the sum of  its
0components, a price vector p  in the interior of Sn is obtained.
Given PO. the set of points (p.y) E S R  Asatisfying  (5.1.1)  is
denoted by B, i.e. B is the set of points (p,y) in S XR  such that
i)      for j€In+1'
Pj/P   = minhph/P if dj(p) - (Ay)j < wj
and
Pi/4 = max"ph/4 if d (p) - (Ay).> w ,j               J      j
ii) Vi =
0 ifp•ai<0.   i€I.
m
0
Clearly, the  point (p ,0) satisfies i) and ii) with both the minimum and
the maximum equal to one. Also. all equilibria lie in the set  B.  We  now
show  that  under standard nondegeneracy and transversality conditions the
set B consists of piecewise smooth paths and loops. One of these paths  is
0the path P, connecting (p .0) and an equilibrium (p*,y*).
Observe that at all (p,y) € B condition ii) of Definition 5.1.1 is
fulfilled.  If  also  d(p) -A y-w S O then (p,y) is an equilibrium. Fur-
thermore, for all (p,y) E B we have  because  yi =  0  if  p•ai <  0,  i E
{1....,m}, that p•Ay = 0 and hence according to Walras' law that p. (d(p) -
Ay - w) = 0. Suppose now that there exists an index j  for  which  d (p) -
(Ay)  -  w  >  0.  Since  (p,y) E B then p  = p .max ph/  3 0. Therefore.
d(p) - Ay - w must also contain at least one negative component with  cor-
responding price positive.   In the sequel  of this chapter s denotes   a  sign
-n+1
vector in K . If s contains at least one +1 and one -1 we say that s  is
a feasible sign vector.
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Let U be a subset of Im. We  want  to  split  up  B  into  subsets
related  to  a  feasible  sign  vector s and a subset U. For that we first
define A(s,U) by
A(s,U) = {(p.y) E St*R lai.P = 0 for i E U, yi = 0 for i < U,
pi /PO   = mir'hph/PO
when s. = -1
3
pj/p   .  maxhph/4       when sj  =  +1}.
Note that there are n-1-|I (s)|+|U| constraints on p € S  and  m-|U|  con-
straints  on y. Thus, if |I (s)| = |U|, there are n-1 constraints on p and
because dim(S ) equals n, one degree of freedom is left.  Indeed,  the  p-
components  in  a nonempty A(s,U) then form a line segment and so a set of
dimension 1. Clearly, if |U| > |I (s)|+1 there are more than n constraints
on  p and no price vector in S  satisfies all conditions, i.e. A(s,U) = 0.
If |Ul S |I (s)|+1, a nonempty set A(s,U) is well-defined and  its  dimen-
sion is equal to |I (s)|+1.
We now consider the set of points (p,y) satisfying (p,y) €  A(s,U)
for  s =  sgn(d(p) - Ay - w). We denote the closure of this set by B(s,U).
Clearly, every point (p,y) satisfying (5.1.1) lies  in  some  set  B(s,U).
More  precisely, B is the union of B(s,U) over all feasible sign vectors s
and subsets U of Im with |Ul S |I (s)|+1. In particular the point  (pl,0)
0            0          0lies  in A(s ,0), where s  = sgn(d(p ) - w). Without loss of generality we
0assume that the excess demand vector  d(p ) -  w  does  not  contain  zero
0
components  so that the dimension of A(s ,0) equals 1. Observe that in the
definition  of  each  B(s,U)  one  degree  of  freedom  is left because
dim(A(s,U)) =  |I (s)|+1 whereas the condition that sgn(d(p) - Ay - w) = s
imposes   I (s) | conditions on (p,y) . Thus, assuming standard nondegeneracy
and  transversality  conditions,  a  nonempty B(s,U) forms a collection of
disjoint smooth paths and loops. An end point (p,y) of a path in B(s,U) is
characterized by one of the following cases:
0)      (p.y) . (po.0);
i)      minhph/  = 0;
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ii)     p /p  = min ph/  for some j € I0(s);
iii)      pj/p   = max Ph/4 for some j  € I (s); (5.2.1)
iv) ai.P = 0 for some i i U;
v)      yi = 0 for some i E U;
vi)     d (p)-(Ay)  = w  for some j < IO(s).
We  argue  that  an  end point of a path in B(s,U) is either (p ,0), or an
equilibrium, or an end point of a unique path in some other set B(s,0), so
that  the  paths  in different sets B(s,U) can be linked to form piecewise
smooth paths and loops.
0Suppose  that  case  0)  occurs. Since d(p ) -w i s assumed not to
contain zeros and (ATPO)i < 0 for all i. s must be equal to s  and  U = 0.
Thus, (p ,0) is only an end point of one path in B(s ,0).
In case i) we must have that p  = 0 for all j for  which  s. = -1.3
Hence, d (p)-(Ay)j S wj for all indices j for which pj = 0, whereas d (p)-
(Ay)    w   whenever  p  > 0.   Since,   p•(d(p) - Ay - w) = 0   for   all
(p,y) E B,  this implies d (p)-(Ay)  = w  if p  > 0. Therefore (p,y) is an
equilibrium.
Next  suppose that case ii) or case iii) holds. Then (p,y) must be
also an end point of a path in B(E,U) where  sh =s h  for  all  h *j  and
-                               -
s. = -1  in case ii), s. = +1 in case iii). Clearly, this path is uniquely
3                               3
determined.
In  case  iv)  the  point  (p,y) is also an end point of a path in
B(s,U u {i}) and in case v) of a path in B(s,U\{i}). In both  cases  these
paths are uniquely determined.
Finally, we consider case vi). If s. = +1 (-1) and s has no  other
3
positive  (negative) components, then according to the fact that p•(d(p) -
Ay - w) = 0, (p,y) must be an equilibrium. Otherwise (p,y) is also an  end
point  of a path in B(s',U) where s  = 0 and sA = sh for all h t j. Again,
this path is uniquely determined.
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Consequently,  for different s and U, the paths in the sets B(s,U)
can be linked to form disjoint piecewise smooth paths and  loops.  Exactly
0
one path P has (p ,0) as an end point. All other end points of these paths
are equilibria. To prove that the path P has another end point, which must
be  then an equilibrium, we show in the next lemma that the set B is boun-
ded.
Lemma 5.2.1. The set B is bounded.
Proof. Suppose that the set B is unbounded. Then without loss of generali-
ty  there  is  some feasible sign vector s and set U such that B(s,U) con-
tains a sequence {(Pk,yk)) =1, with some  of  the  components  of  (Plc.yk)
going tc infinity. Since   SA is compact the sequence {pk}k=lkis bounded   and
has a cluster point, B. Hence, some of the components of  y   must  go  to
infinity.  Because  (Plc,yk) E  B(s,U)  for  each  k.  there  exist 4   O,
h < II(s), such that
d(p k)     -        I        aiyk    -            I       4she (h)     =    w.
i€U S 00h
k                                  -
Since p  converges to p and d is continuous, the latter  system  can  only
have a solution for all k if the homogeneous system of linear equations
i
I  a Yi +   I  Ahshe(h) = 0 (5.2.2)
iEU S 00
h
has  a  nonzero  solution Yi £0 for i€U and   2 0 for h< I (s). Since(pk,yk) € B(s,U) n S: for all k, there exist a number b, 0<b<1, and  a11
vector q€ R +1  with  a  >O i f s  = +1, q. 2 0 i f s. .0, Md q. =O i f
-     61                 i J-       J           A  i
s. = -1 such that p=b p  + q. Clearly, q•a  >0 for i€U since  p•a  =03
and PO•ai < 0 for i E U. Premultiplying (5.2.2) with qT yields
I (q•ai)yi +   I   Rhqh = 0'
i€U
sh=+1
Since  q•ai >0  for i€U and qh >0 for sh = +1, this can only hold when
all the yi's and all X 's for which sh = +1 are equal to  zero.  But  then
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according  to  (5.2.2)  all  other K 's must also be equal to zero. Hence,
system (5.2.2) has no nonzero nonnegative solution,  which  completes  the
proof.
0
Lemma  5.2.1  implies that the path P is bounded and therefore has another
end point which must be an equilibrium. The adjustment path  can  be  fol-
lowed  arbitrarily  close  by  a  simplicial algorithm operating on S . An
appropriate algorithm can be found in Talman and Yamamoto [1989].
5.3. The adjustment process
In this section we  provide  an  economic  interpretation  of  the
adjustments  of  prices and activity levels along the path P as defined in
Section 5.2. The references made in the text are to the  cases  listed  in
(5.2.1).  In  the  sequel we mean p /p . j €I when we speak about then+1'
price ratio of commodity j at a price vector p. Further, we use the follo-
wing notation.  By  z(p)  we denote the consumers' excess demand at price
vector p, i.e. z(p) := d(p) - w, whereas F(p,y) denotes the (total) excess
demand  at  price  vector  p  and  activity level vector y, i.e. S(p,y) :=
z(p) - Ay.
000    0
The  process  starts  in (p ,y ) with y  =0 and a price vector p
such that all prices are positive and all activities  make losses. More-
over,  at  p , the excess demand S(p ,0) is equal to the consumers' excess
0demand z(p ) and is assumed not to contain zeros. Now, the process  leaves
(p ,0)  by  increasing  proportionally  the  prices  of the commodities in
0
excess demand (z.(p ) > 0) and decreasing proportionally the prices of the
J                               0
commodities  in  excess supply (z.(p ) < 0). The process continues in this
3
way until a price vector p is reached at which either a price becomes zero
(case  i))  or one of the goods becomes in equilibrium, i.e. z.(p) = 0 for
3
isome j (case vi)). or one of the activities makes zero profit, i.e. p.a  =
0  for  some  i (case iv)). In case i) an equilibrium has been reached be-
cause in this case all the prices of the goods in excess supply  have  be-
come  zero simultaneously. Walras' law then implies that there cannot be a
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good in excess demand anymore. In case vi) the process continues by  keep-
ing the price ratios of the goods in excess demand (excess supply) maximal
(minimal) while the good j is kept in equilibrium  by  varying  its  price
ratio.  Finally,  in  case  iv) the activity level Yi of activity i is in-
creased from zero. This activity level is increased until the  excess  de-
mand  or  supply  of some commodity becomes zero. Lemma 5.2.1, saying that
the set of points (p,y) in B is bounded, guarantees that this  will  occur
00as can also be seen as follows. Let s  = sgn(z(p )) then also at p we must
have sgn(z(p)) = sl. Since p•ai , 0, PO.ai < 0, pj > p  if  s  =  +1,  and
p  <  p  if s  = -1, there exists at least one index j such that sgn(a ) =
s . From this it immediately follows that d (P) - 4yi -  wh  must  go  to
zero for at least one index h if Yi is increased from zero. n
In general, the process generates a path of price vectors p in  SA
and  activity  level  vectors  y in R . At such pair (p,y) the price ratio
p /p  of a good in excess demand (S (p,y) > 0) is maximal  and  the  price
ratio of a good in excess supply (S (p,y) < 0) is minimal. The price ratio
of a good in equilibrium (S (p,y) = 0) lies between this minimum and maxi-
mum.  An activity level can only be positive (yi > 0) if the corresponding
i
activity makes zero profit (p•a  = 0). Finally, an activity not  operating
(yi = 0) makes negative or zero profit (p•ai S 0).
As soon as a pair (p,y) is reached at  which  a  good  becomes  in
equilibrium, that  good is kept in equilibrium and its price ratio is al-
lowed to vary between the minimal and maximal price ratios. On the other
hand, if  the  price  ratio of a good in equilibrium becomes equal to the
maximal (or minimal) price ratio, then it is kept  equal  to  the  maximal
(minimal)  price  ratio and the good becomes in excess demand (excess sup-
Ply).
When  a  pair  (p,y) is reached at which an activity not producing
makes zero profit, then the activity level of this activity is allowed  to
become  positive and its profit is kept equal to zero. Also, when the pro-
cess reaches a (p,y) at which the level of an activity making zero  profit
becomes zero, then  the process continues by keeping this activity level
equal to zero while the price adaptations are allowed to bring this  acti-
vity into a loss situation.
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The process stops as soon as each market is in equilibrium  or  in
excess supply. Lemma 5.2.1 guarantees that the process indeed will reach
an equilibrium.
In  the  interpretation given above, the adaptations of prices and
activity levels were treated more or less separately. In fact, they adjust
simultaneously.  Changes  in  activity  levels do have an impact on excess
demands, whereas changes in price levels influence  both  all  the  excess
demands  and  profits. We illustrate this with a general example. The path
generated by the process is depicted in Figure 5.3.1.  This  figure  shows
the  projection  of the path on the price space. The reader should keep in
mind that the process adjusts prices as well as  activity  levels  and  in
fact operates in SAXR  and not in SA.
e(3)
Z 3( P)  = 0
Z tcp, =0
V                     II




 0   3  Ill* / Z2< p) = 04P           Bp
I
2               P----+S                         +   0A                        q*  \4
e(1) e(2)
I                            f
Figure 5.3.1. Exchange  economy  with three goods and two activities. At
prices p in  region  I,  sgn(z(p)) =  (-1,+1,+1)7.  For  region  II  holds
sgn(z(p)) = (-1,+1.-1)T.
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We consider an economy with three goods and  two  activities.  All
relevant  information of the economy is given in Figure 5.3.1. The simplex
is the price set. Activity 1 uses the first commodity as input whereas the
other  goods  are  outputs. We denote this as al = (-,+,+)T. Similarly, we
have a2 = (-,+,-)T. The line segments [v,f] and [L,r] denote the price
vectors  at  which  the profit of activity 1 and 2, respectively, is zero.
Because at p = e(1) both activities make losses the set S2 is  the  convex
hull  of  e(1),  v, p* and 1. Also drawn are the curves {p|z (p) = 0}, j E
{1,2,3}. We assume that z (p) is  positive  whenever  p  = 0.  Because  of
Walras'  law  the curves {p|z (p) = 0} and {p|zh(P) = 0}• j t h, meet each
other on the edge {p|p. = 0, i 0 j,h}. Moreover, the three  curves  inter-1
sect  each  other in q* which is the equilibrium of the corresponding pure
exchange economy. Note that q* lies outside the region  S2,  so  that  the
economy  with  production  activities has no equilibrium for zero activity
levels.
Let  us  consider  now  what happens along the path of the process
starting from (p ,0). Since p  lies in the interior of S2 both  activities
0
make  losses.  At (p ,0) commodity 1 is in excess supply, and the commodi-
0ties 2 and 3 are in excess demand. The process leaves (p ,0) by proportio-
nally  increasing  the prices of goods 2 and 3 and decreasing the price of
0good 1. Thus, the path of prices leaves p  in the  direction  opposite  to
e(1). Meanwhile, the activity levels remain zero.
1
At (p ,0) the profit of activity 1 becomes zero and  its  activity
level yl is increased. Because sgn(S(pl,0)) = sgn(z(pl)) = (-1,+1.+1)T and
1
a  = (_,+,+) r, this increase tends to offset the imbalances  on  all  mar-
kets.  The  level Yl is increased till say Yl, at which one of the markets
becomes in equilibrium. In case commodity 1 would  become  in  equilibrium
the other markets  must  then  also  be in equilibrium and hence  (pl, (91·0)T)
is an equilibrium. This because p.2(p,y) = 0 for all  (p,y)  on  the  path
whereas 22(pl,0)   0   d  (pl,0) 3  0. If commodity 2 would become in
equilibrium, i.e. 22(P ,(yl,0) ) = 0, then the prices and yl are  adjusted
simultaneously such that commodity 2 is kept in equilibrium, the profit of
activity 1 remains zero, and the price ratio of commodity 2  lies  between
the  minimum  price  ratio (pi/P ) and the maximum price ratio (I>3/P ) . In
the figure the path of prices would then move in the direction  of  v.  It
can be shown   that then there would  be an equilibrium   (B, (91,0)T)   with  B  on
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1the line  segment  [p .v].  The  more  complicated  case  occurs  when  at
< 1 ( 1,0)T) commodity 3 becomes in equilibrium (z3(pl,(91,0).r) = 0). Then
the prices and the activity level Yl are adjusted simultaneously  such  as
to  keep  commodity  3  in  equilibrium  whereas  the profit of activity 1
remains zero and the price ratio of good 3 1,3/4) varies between  the
minimum price ratio   (pl/PT)  and the maximum price ra io  (p2jp )·  In the
figure the path of prices moves towards f. If between p  and p  the market
of  commodity 1 would become in equilibrium then also the market of commo-
dity 2 must become in equilibrium and an equilibrium  of  the  economy  is
reached. Again this is due to the fact that p•z(p,y) = 0 along the path.
12Suppose there is no equilibrium between p  and p . Then  the  pro-
cess  reaches p2 where, because z3(p2) = 0. the level of activity 1 needed
to keep commodity 3 in equilibrium becomes zero. Now, Yl is  fixed  at  0,
prices  are allowed to bring activity 1 into a loss situation whereas good
3 is still kept in equilibrium. Thus, the process follows a path  of  vec-
tors  (p,0)  with  p in int(S2) and 23(P) , 0. In the figure this piece of
23the path is represented by the curve connecting p  and p .
Then,  at  p3 the price ratio of commodity 3 (p3/pO) becomes equal
to the minimum pri e ratio (p /p0). This because P3 lies on3the line  seg-
ment  connecting p  and e(2). The process continues from (p ,0) by keeping
the price ratios of commodities 1 and  3  equal  to  each  other  (P3/PJ =
pl/p )  whereas  commodity  3  is allowed to become into excess supply. In
Figure 5.3.1, the path of prices enters region  II  in  the  direction  of
e(2).
4
At (p ,0) the profit of activity 2 becomes zero and  its  activity
level  Y2 -islt increased. This situation i  similar to that at (pl,0). Be-
cause sgn(z(p .0)) = (-1,+1,-1)T whereas a  = (-,+,-)T, the increase of Y2
diminishes  both  the  excess demand for good 2 and the excess supplies of
commodities 1 and 3. Thus, there is a level Y2 at which one of the  commo-
dities  becomes  in  equilibrium.  If 22(p4,(0.Y2)T) = 0 then (p4,(0.y2)T)
would be an equilibrium because of Walras' law. In case zl(p4,(0,92)7) = 0
then  prices  and  Y2  would  be adjusted such that commodity 1 is kept in
equilibrium, the profit of activity 2 remains zero whereas the price ratio
pl/P  varies between the maximum price ratio (P2/P ) and the minimum price
ratio (P3/P ). The corresponding path of prices in Figure 5.3.1  would  go
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in  the direction of L. We argue that in that case there would be an equi-
librium on the open segment (p4'p). Assume the contrary. Then the  process
would reach p with corresponding y2 such that El(P'(0'y2)T) = 0. Note that
y2 > 0 because zl(B) < 0. However, because %3(B) = 0, we  then  have  that
S3( '(0' 2).r) >  0.  Thus,  the sign of S3 changes from -1 at (p4.(0.92)r)
into +1 at (p, (0,92)T). But then there must be a  point  (p, (0,3'2)T)  with
p E   (pli,B),  at  which  z3(P•(0•Y2)T) =  Sl(P•(0•Y2)7) =  0,  and  hence
 2(P, (O,Y2)T) = 0, i.e. (p,(O,Y2)T) would be an equilibrium.  Finally,  we
consider the case when at (p4.(0.&2)7) commodity 3 becomes in equilibrium.
Then the process keeps commodity 3 in equilibrium and fixes the profit  of
activity  2  at  zero while varying the price ratio of commodity 3 between
the minimum price ratio (pl/p?)  and the maximum price ratio
(P2 P ) ,   In
Figure  5.3.1  the path projected on the price space moves from p  towards
4
r. If the process reaches a price vector p in (p ,p*]  with  corresponding
activity    level   y2   such   that z3(P'(0'Y2)T
) = 0 while besides
zl(P'(0·y2)T) , 0 then, due to Walras' law,  also  22(P'(0'y2)7) =  0  and
(P,(0'y2)r)  is  an  equilibrium. Otherwise, the process reaches the price
vector p* with corresponding activity level vector F = (O,92)T being  such
-     -
that  z3(P*•Y) = 0 whereas 21(P*•F) < 0 and 22(P#,F) > 0. At p* also acti-
vity 1 makes zero profit, so that its  activity  level  Yl  is  increased.
Since  commodity  3  is an input for activity 2 whereas it is an output of
activity 1, an increase in Yl must be matched by an increase in Y2 to keep
commodity 3 in equilibrium. Lemma 5.2.1 then guarantees that Yl eventually
reaches a level y; with corresponding y3 such that commodity 1 or commodi-
ty  2  becomes in equilibrium. But then all markets are in equilibrium and
CP•,Cy;,y;) )   is an equilibrium.
5.4. Examples
In this section we apply the adjustment process to  two  specific
examples. In both examples we consider an economy with three goods and two
activities.
Example  5.4.1. We  assume  that  the  consumers can be represented by one
consumer having a Cobb-Douglas utility function
u(xl'X2'x3) =
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xl/10.2/5"i/2 , with  xi the amount of good i consumed. The initial endow-
ments   are w= (1,1,1)7. Straightforward calculations yield   that the consu-
mer excess demand at  price  p  equals z(p) =((1/10Pl) - 1,(2/5P2) - 1,
(1/2PJ) - 1)T. The activity vectors are given by al , (-3/2,1,1)T and 82 =
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Figure 5.4.1. The set S2 for the economy of Example  5.4.1.  For  a  price
vector  p  in  region I holds that sgn(z(p)) = (-1,+1,+1)7. For region II,
sgtl(z(p)) = (-1,+1.-1)T.
Observe that {plzj(p) = 0} = {p E S21pj = aj} with al = 1/10, 02 =
2/5,   03   =   1/2
the budget shares   of the consumer. We remark     that      this
economy  does  not  satisfy  the  conditions  stated  in Section 5.2. This
because d is not continuous on bd(Sn). However  an  equilibrium  for  this
economy  exists  because  the  conditions of Eaves [1987] are met. Another
approach would be to cut off the boundary of the price space. This because
n
near  bd(S ) the  demand  for  at least one good approaches infinity. Our
process never reaches this boundary because at the path a very small price
corresponds to a negative excess demand.
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Again, the equilibrium price vector q* =  (1/10,2/5.1/2)7  of  the
corresponding  pure  exchange  economy  lies  outside the set S2 being the
convex hull of the vectors l, q, f and e(1). Thus,  in  the  economy  with
production  there is no equilibrium with zero activity levels. We consider
00
how the process reaches an equilibrium when starting from (p ,0) with p  =
(1/2,1/20,9/20)7.  The  excess  demand  vector  at  p  is equal to z(pO) =
(-4/5,7,1/9)T. Thus, initially commodity 1 is in  excess  supply,  whereas
the  goods  2 and 3 are in excess demand. Besides, activity 1 makes a loss
0of 1/4 whereas activity 2 makes a loss of 5/54. The process leaves  (p ,0)
by  proportionally  increasing the prices of goods 2 and 3, decreasing the
price of good 1, and keeping both activity levels equal to  zero.  In  the
0price set the process goes from p  into the direction opposite of e(1). At
(pl,0), with pl = (22/49,27/490,243/490)T, the profit of  activity  2  be-
comes zero. Then the activity level Y2 of activity 2 is increased until at
y2 = 2/297 commodity 3 becomes in equilibrium, i.e. S3(pl.(0.2/297)T) = 0.
Then  the  process continues by keeping commodity 3 in equilibrium and the
profit of activity 2 equal to zero, whereas the price ratio of commodity 3
varies  between  the minimum price ratio p1/P  and the maximum price ratio
P2/P ·  In  the   figure   the   process   goes   towards   r.   At   p2 =
(11/25,3/50.1/2)7,  z3(p2) = 0 and hence the level of activity 2 needed to
keep commodity 3 in equilibrium becomes zero. Then the  process  continues
by keeping Y2 equal to zero and commodity 3 still in equilibrium. Activity
2 is allowed to become in a deficit situation. Thus, the process generates
points  (p,0)  with  p  going  from  p2 towards q* such that sgn(S(p,0)) =
sgn(z(p)) = (-1,+1,0)T and  p•ai < 0,  i E  {1,2}.  At  (p3.0)  with  p3 =
(2/5,1/10,1/2)7,  activity 1 makes zero profit. Then the process increases
yl. Without simultaneously changing the prices this would give  an  excess
supply  on the market for commodity 3. Thus, the process has to adjust the
prices such that the consumer excess demand for commodity 3 becomes  posi-
tive. Projected on the price set, the process goes from p3 towards f, i.e.
4
it generates price vectors p at which  p.al = 0  and  23(P) > 0.  At  p  =
(2/5,6/25,9/25)T  the corresponding activity level vector is y = (7/18,0)T
with 9(p4.y) = (-1/6,5/18,0)T. Observe that at p4 the price ratio of  com-
4  0
modity  3  is  equal to the minimum price ratio, i.e. P3/P3 = P /P' = 4/5.
Then, the adjustment process keeps both price  ratios  equal  and  minimal
while  bringing  commodity 3 in excess supply by a further increase of yl·
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At yl = 1/2 commodity 1 becomes in equilibrium (z(p4.(1/2,0)T) =
(0,1/6.-1/9)r) .  Thus, at p4. the adaptation of the activity level changes
sgn(S) from (-1,+1,0)T into (0,+1.-1)7.  Then the process continues by
adjusting  the  prices  and Yl such as to keep commodity 1 in equilibrium,
while the profit of activity 1 is still equal to zero. The price ratio  of
good  1 is allowed to vary between the minimal price
ratio P)/P  and the
maximal price ratio P2/P . In the figure the process moves from p  towards
f.  At  p* =  (2/5,4/15,1/3)T the corresponding activity level vector y* =
(1/2,0)T is such that S(p*,y*) = 0. Hence (p*,y*)  is  an  equilibrium  of
this economy.
Example 5.4.2. In this example the excess  demand  function  is  based  on
Scarf  [1960]  and is given by z(p) = (P2-P3'P3-pl'pl-P2)7. The activities
are al = (-3/2.1,1)T and a2 = (-1.-1,3/2)7. All information is graphically
presented in Figure  5.4.2.  The  unique equilibrium price vector of the
related pure exchange economy is q* = (1/3,1/3,1/3)T. Also in this example
q* lies outside S2 being the convex hull of the vectors L,p*,f and e(1).
Now, let the process start at (p ,0), with  p  =  (1/2,2/5,1/10)T.
The  excess  demand at that price vector equals z(p ) = (3/10,-2/5.1/10)T.
Thus, commodity 2 is in excess supply while the goods 1 and 3 are  in  ex-
0
cess  demand.  The  process leaves (p ,0) by proportionally increasing the
prices of the commodities 1 and 3, whereas the price of  2  is  decreased.
The  activity  levels  remain zero because the process generates prices in
int(S2), i.e. the profits are negative. Projected on the  price  set,  the
0
process moves from p in  the  direction  opposite of e(2) (see Figure
5.4.2).
At  (pl,0), with pl = (5/7,1/7,1/7)T, the market of good 1 becomes
in equilibrium (z(pl) = (0.-4/7,4/7)T). Now, the process adapts the prices
such  that  the  market  of  good 1 remains in equilibrium while the price
ratio of good 1 is allowed to var  between the minimum price  ratio  p2/p 
and  the maximum price ratio P3/P3' In the figure the process goes from p
into  the  direction  of  q*.  At  p2 =  (2/5,3/10,3/10)T  where   z(p2) =
(0,-1/10,1/10)T,  activity  1 makes zero profit so that its activity level
yl is increased from zero. However, an increase of Yl at  constant  prices
immediately  yields  an  excess  demand situation on the market for good 1
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Figure 5.4.2. The set S2 for the economy of Example  5.4.2.  For  a  price
vector  in  region  I,  II the sign of the vector z(p) equals (-1,-1,+1)T,
(+1,-1,+1)T, respectively.
equilibrium  the prices have to be adjusted simultaneously making the con-
sumers' excess demand for good 1 negative. Thus, projected on S2 the  pro-
2
cess moves from p towards v keeping the profit of activity 1 equal to
zero. At p* = (2/5,1/5,2/5)T the  consumers  excess  demand  z(p*)  equals
(-1/5,0,1/5)T and the level yl making Sl<P*'(yl,0)T) = 0 is equal to 2/15.
It holds that S(p*,(;1·0)T) = (0,-2/15,1/15)T. Besides, at p*  the  profit
level  of activity 2 becomes zero so that the activity level y2 is increa-
sed from zero. Because good 1 is an input for both activities, an increase
in  Y2 must be met by a decrease in Yl to keep commodity 1 in equilibrium.
Furthermore, it cannot happen that Yl becomes zero. This because  then  y2
must  be  equal  to  1/5  in  order  to keep good 1 in equilibrium whereas
7(p*.(0,1/5)T) = (0.1/5.-1/10).r. Thus, when going from y = (2/15.0)T  to
y =  (0,1/5)T  the market for good 2 turns from an excess supply situation
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into an excess demand. The opposite occurs for good 3. Thus, the  increase
in  Y2 leads to a decrease in Yl but before Yl becomes zero the market for
good 2 becomes in equilibrium at y* = (2/25,2/25)T. But then also  good  3
must be in equilibrium and (p*,y*) is an equilibrium of this economy.
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CHAFIER 6
Finding Nash equilibria in noncooperative games
In this chapter we consider the problem of finding Nash equilibria
in  mixed  strategies  for  noncooperative games, in which the payoffs are
listed in matrices or more generally in tensors. The  main  part  of  this
chapter  deals  with bi-matrix games. Such a game is a noncooperative two-
person game with a finite set of actions for each player. The  Nash  equi-
librilim      is the standard equilibrium concept   for a noncooperative game.    It
states that a strategy is an equilibrium when no player can  improve  upon
his  situation by deviating from his strategy while all other players keep
on playing their strategies.
The  standard method for solving a bi-matrix game is the method of
Lemke and Howson [1964]. That method finds a Nash equilibrium by solving a
related  linear  complementarity problem (LCP). This LCP is not defined on
the space of strategies but on a nonnegative orthant. Each solution of the
LCP uniquely determines an equilibrium on the strategy space.
The method proposed in this chapter finds a  Nash  equilibrium  by
solving  a  stationary  point  problem  (SPP) on the strategy space. Thus,
contrary to the Lemke-Howson procedure it directly operates on the  strat-
egy space. Both methods are complementary pivoting algorithms and there-
fore find under some nondegeneracy assumption a negatively  indexed  equi-
librium  (see Shapley [1974]). However, because the choice of the starting
vector for the Lemke-Howson procedure is restricted, that method may  fail
to  reach  certain negatively indexed equilibria. In our method the choice
of the starting vector is free and therefore we can find in principle  all
negatively  indexed  equilibria by a repeated application of the algorithm
from different starting vectors. We also show how the algorithm  can  find
positively  indexed  equilibria  by  restarting it from negatively indexed
equilibria already being found. Our method  can  be  seen  as  a  strategy
adjustment  process  having an appealing game-theoretic interpretation. In
this respect it is also interesting that the  algorithm  finds  a  perfect
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equilibrium  whenever  the  starting  vector  lies  in the interior of the
strategy space, i.e. when at the start all actions are  played  with  some
positive probability.
There is also a third complementary pivoting procedure for solving
a bi-matrix game, namely the Rhomb-Path method, which is due to Bastian
and informally discussed in Todd [1978]. This method is more general  than
the  Lemke-Howson  method and will be discussed briefly further on in this
chapter (Section 6.5). But also that method suffers from  the  same  draw-
backs as the Lemke-Howson method does. We remark that there are also algo-
rithms that find all Nash equilibria with certainty. We mention the  algo-
rithms  of  Vorob'ev  [1958]. Kuhn [1961]. Mangasarian [1964], and Winkels
[1979]. Their methods are in principle equivalent. First the set of  equi-
libria  is  characterized  by  a number of convex compact sets. The latter
sets are localized by a procedure for finding extreme points of such sets.
These  methods  do  not have a game-theoretic interpretation and cannot be
generalized to solve games with more than two players. How  to  generalize
our algorithm to these games is illustrated at the end of this chapter.
The organization of the chapter is as follows. In Section  6.1  we
show that the  set of Nash equilibria in a bi-matrix game can be seen as
the solution set of a stationary point problem. Furthermore, we give  some
intuition about how the algorithm operates. The formal steps of the proce-
dure are presented in Section 6.2. Besides, in that section we  state  the
nondegeneracy  conditions under which the algorithm converges and we prove
the perfectness of the equilibrium found by the  procedure  when  starting
from  a  strategy vector in the interior of the strategy space. In Section
6.3 we give some examples and provide a game-theoretic  interpretation  of
the  method.  In  Section 6.4 we show how the algorithm can be utilized to
find positively indexed equilibria. In Section 6.5 we give a  game-theore-
tic interpretation of the Lemke-Howson method and show how this method can
be extended to find all equilibria in a bi-matrix  game  with  one  player
having  only  two actions. Finally, Section 6.6 deals with the generaliza-
tion of our method to games with more than two players.
The  Sections  6.2,  6.3  and  6.4  are based on van den Elzen and
Talman [19918]. Section 6.5 on van den Elzen [1990]. and  Section  6.6  on
van den Elzen and Talman [199lb].
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6.1. Solving the bi-matrix game as a stationary point problem
A  noncooperative  bi-matrix  game consists of two persons, called
players, each having a finite number of actions and a payoff matrix  indi-
cating the payoff to that player when a certain pair of actions is played.
Therefore, a bi-matrix game is a tuple (nl'n2'A,B), where  nl(n2)  denotes
the  number  of  actions  of player 1(2), while A(B) is the (nlxn2)-payoff
matrix of player 1(2). More precisely. an element a i(bhi) of  the  matrix
A(B)  gives the payoff  to  player 1(2) when player 1 plays action h and
player 2 plays action i. Action k of player j is indicated by  (j,k),  j €
{1,2}.  A  bi-matrix game in which player 1(2) has nl(n2) actions is often
called an (nlxn2) bi-matrix  game.
A strategy of player j, j € {1,2}, is represented by a vector x  =n.-1
(xjl'...,xjn.)T in S J  . The number xjk'  k E  {1.....n },  is  then  the
J
probability  with  which  player  j  plays his k-th action at strategy xj.
Since the components   of  x    are all nonnegative a d_lum   up   to     one,      x.      is
indeed  a  vector  of probabilities. We call S the strategy space of
j
player j. In case actions are played with probability one we  speak  about
pure  strategies. They correspond to the vertices of the strategy space of
a player.
The  strategy  space  of  the game is the simplotope S obtained by
taking the cartesian product of the strategy spaces of both players,  i.e.
nl-1  n2-1
S =  S XS . An element x = (xl'x2) in S denotes a strategy vector of
the game with x. the strategy played by player j. The vertices of  S  cor-
3
respond  to  the  pure  strategy vectors at which both players play a pure
strategy.
The expected payoff  to  player 1(2) at strategy vector x equals
xl,Ax2 (x2oBTxl). At a Nash equilibrium (NE) no player  can  improve  upon
his situation by unilaterally deviating from his strategy.
Definition 6.1.1. A Nash equilibrium of the bi-matrix game (nl'n2'A,B)  is
n -1
a  strategy  vector  x* = (x;,x;) at which x;•Ax; = max{xl.Ax;Ixl E s l  }
n -1
and    x . B.rx;    =    max{x20 B·rx;  I x2    E    S    2        }.
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We now show that the set of Nash equilibria is equal to the set of
solutions to a stationary point problem (SPP) on S with  respect  to  some
nl  n2function  z:  S-D R  XR  .  For  each  x  in S the vector z(x) = (zl(x),n n
z2(x)), with zl(x) €R l and 22(x) E R 2.i s given by
Zl(x) = Ax2 and z2(x) = BTxl· (6.1.1)
We call z the marginal payoff function. A component zjk(x) denotes
the  payoff at x to player j when he plays his k-th action while the other
player i plays strategy xi· Therefore, the expected payoff to player j  at
x can be written as x •z (x). Thus, x* is an NE if and only if
n.-1
x •z (x*) S x •zj(x*)    .x j E S J  .j€ {1,2}. (6.1.2)
Therefore  the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium is equivalent
to finding a stationary point of z on S as defined  in  Definition  2.2.1.
This  follows  from  the proof of Theorem 2.2.4 and the subsequent remark.
Because of the linearity of x.•z.(x*) in x  we only have to check  (6.1.2)
n.-13   3
for  the  vertices  of  S J  ,  j E {1,2}. Thus, x* is an NE iff zjk(x*)  
x*·z.(x*) for all (j,k) € I. From this it  is  straightforward  to  derive3    3
that x* is an NE if and only if
zjk(x.) = max zjh(x*) when x;k > 0, (j•k) E I. (6.1.3)
We  say that an action k of player j is optimal at strategy x when
zjk(x) = maxhzjh(x) and that at x player j is in equilibrium if at  x  all
nonoptimal  actions of j are played with probability zero. The interpreta-
tion of (6.1.3) is that at a Nash equilibrium  the  actions  being  played
with  positive  probability are all optimal and hence that all players are
in equilibrium.
The  algorithm  searches for a Nash equilibrium by solving the SPP
as given in (6.1.3). Starting from an arbitrarily chosen  strategy  vector
v = (vl'v2)  in  S.  the  algorithm  generates  a piecewise linear path of
points in S leading from v to a Nash equilibrium. More  precisely,  points
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x = (xl'x2) E S  on  the  path generated by the algorithm satisfy the fol-
lowing conditions. For k E {1....,nl ,
*lk - b(x,v)vllc if zlk(x) < max zlh(x)
xlk > b(x,v)vlk if zlk(x) = max zlh(x).
and for k E {1....,n2}• (6.1.4)
x2k = b(x,v)v2k if z2k(x) < max z2h(x)
x2k Z b(x,v)v2k if z2k(x) = max z2h(x).
where 0 5 b(x,v) := min<j,h){xjh/vjhlvjh > 0} 5 1
Observe  that  x  =v satisfies (6.1.4) with b(x,v) =1. Also each
Nash equilibrium x* satisfies (6.1.4) with b(x*,v) = 0 or with v = 0 for
jk
all (j,k) for which zjk(x*) < max_zjh(x*). In the latter case the nonopti-
mal actions are already played with probability zero at the start. In both
cases,  x k  = b(x*,v).vjk is equal to zero when at x* action (j,k) is not
optimal. Under some nondegeneracy condition the set of  points  satisfying
(6.1.4) contains a piecewise linear path, P, from v to a Nash equilibrium.
This path will be followed by the algorithm. The notion  of  nondegeneracy
will  be  made  precise further on, but it is for example required that at
x = v both maxkzlk(x) and max 221(x) are  attained  for  a  unique  index.
Thus,  at  the starting strategy vector v each player has only one optimal
action. Suppose these maxima are  attained  for  the  actions  (l,kl)  and
(2,k2)'  respectively. Clearly, from v, along P, b(x,v) must decrease from
1. Thus, according to (6.1.4), initially vectors x in S are generated such
that all the x k # kl' and x2k' k * k2' are relatively decreased (xik =lk'
b(x,v).vik for (i,k) < {(1,kl)•(2.k2)})· while  both
x and x are
lk 2k12
n -1 n -1
1                     2
increased  in order to keep x1 in S and x2 in
S . This is continued
till either b(x,v) becomes 0 and a  Nash  equilibrium  is reached, or a
strategy vector x is reached at which zjk(x) = zjk.(x) for some (j,k), k 0
3
k.. Then x.. is also relatively increased. In general, the algorithm gene-J        Jk
rates strategy vectors x such that all the xjk/vjk' related to the indices
(j.k) for which zjk(x) < max zjh(x). are minimal.  i.e.  equal  to  b(x.v)
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(xjk  =  0  if  vjk  = 0). As soon as one of these components of z(x), say
zj,t(x),  becomes equal to max zjh(x) . then x  /vj,t is increased from b(x,v)
(xjl  is increased from zero if vjl = 0), while keeping z  (x) maximal for
j. On the other hand, if a vector x is generated  such  that  x. /v. for
3r Jr
some  (j,r) with z. (x) = max z  (x) becomes minimal, i.e. equal to b(x,v)Jr          jh
(x.  becomes 0 if v.  = 0), then vectors y are generated with y.  equal toJr ar Jr
b(y,v).vjr while zjr(y) is decreased from max zjh(Y).
To illustrate the foregoing we conclude this section with an example.
Example  6.1.1. Consider  the  bi-matrix game (nl'n2'A,B) with nl = n2 = 2
and
-            -                        -
4 0 4    -3
A= B=
.-1 3- _2      4_
In this game each player has two actions. If player 1 plays action  2  and
player  2 action 1 then player 1 gets a payoff of -1 and player 2 a payoff
of 2. The marginal payoff function zl of player  1  is  given  by  zl(x) =
(4x21'-*21+3x22)T.  Similarly,  z2(x) = (4x11+2x12'-3x11+4x12) . This game
has three Nash equilibria: ((1,0)T,(1,0)T), ((O,1)T, (0,1)T). and
((2/9,7/9)r, (3/8.5/8)T).  The  first two equilibria are pure Nash equilib-
ria. For ease of notation we denote in the remaining  of  this  chapter  a
vector  x = ((xll'x12)T. (x21'x22)T) by
((xll'x12)'(x21'K 2));
The strategy
space for this game is equal  to  S = Sl)(Sl =  {x €  R+XR Ixll+x12 =  1,
x21+X22 = 1}, and is displayed in Figure 6.1.1.
Consider the starting  point  v  =  ((1/8,7/8),(1/2,1/2)).  It  is
straightforward  to  verify  that  z(v)  = ((2,1),(9/4,25/8)). Thus at v,
Zll(v) is maximal for j=1 and 222(v) for j=2. So, the algorithm leaves
v  in the direction of ((1,0),(0,1)), i.e and x are both increased., xll      22
The algorithm continues in this  way  till  the  vector  a = ((2/9.7/9)·
(4/9.5/9))  is  reached at which z(a) = ((16/9,11/9),(22/9,22/9)), i.e. at
x = a, z21(x) has become equal to z22(x). Observe that along  the  segment









Figure  6.1.1. The  path  P  of points satisfying (6.1.4) from v to a Nash
equilibrium.
continues,  according  to  (6.1.4), by increasing x relatively away from
21
xl 2 while keeping z21(x) equal to z22(x) . It is easy to  verify  that  the
latter holds along the line segment [a,c]. In fact, z21(X) = Z22(x) = 22/9
if x = 2/9.  At  c = ((2/9,7/9).(5/9.4/9)) with   z(c) = ((20/9,7/9).11
(22/9,22/9))  we  still  have  z21(c)  =  z22(c)  and zll(c) > z12(c). But
observe that at x = c, x22/v22 has become equal to b(x,v) = x12/v12 = 8/9.
When  keeping  z22(x) equal to z21(x) beyond x=c one would have to gene-
rate points x with x22/v22 < x12/v12 which violates (6.1.4). In that  case
one  would  leave S at the vector ((2/9,7/9),(1,0)). But instead the algo-
rithm continues from x=c b y keeping x22 relatively minimal, i.e. x22/v22
is kept equal to
x12/v while, according to (6.1.4), z22(x) is decreased12'
from maxhz2h(x) = z21(x). In this way the  algorithm  reaches  the  vertex
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((1,0),(1,0))  which  is  a  pure  Nash  equilibrium with z((1,0),(1,0)) =
((4.-1).(4.-3)).
The idea behind the procedure is to generate a sequence of vectors
x along which the set T of actions (j,k) for  which  zjk(x)  =  maxhzjh(x)
grows  while the probabilities related to all the other actions are driven
down to zero, since if they are zero a Nash equilibrium is found  as  fol-
lows  from (6.1.3). However, the set T does not need to grow monotonically
(cf. point c in the foregoing example). This guarantees the convergence of
the algorithm to a Nash equilibrium.
6.2. The procedure
The algorithm is a  complementary pivoting procedure. To implement
it we first rewrite (6.1.4) into a system of linear equations. By  substi-
tuting  (6.1.1) we obtain that the process generates from v the (piecewise
linear) path P o f strategy vectors x E S satisfying for k€ {1,...,nl ,
k
xlk =
bv if A x2<Bl1k
Xlk  bvlk if Akx2 = Bl'
and for k E
{1,...,n2} (6.2.1)
X2k = bv2k if xl'Bk < B2
x2k Z bv2k if xl'Bk = B2'
where b := b(x,v), Ck and Ck respectively being  the  k-th  row  and  k-th
column of a matrix C and where Al = maxkAkx2' and B2 = maxkxl'Bk
For each x i n S satisfying (6.2.1) there is at least one set T  C  I  such
that  x.   Z  bvjk and zjk(x) = B  for all (j,k) € T while zih(x)   Bi andJk
xih = bvih for all (i,h) < T. From this observation  we  obtain  that  the
procedure generates for a sequence of subsets T of I with T  := T n I(j) 0
0, starting from x = v, strategy vectors x in S such that
Xlk =
bv
and  Akx2 S Bl   if (1.k) < T1k
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Xlk 2 bvlk   and  Akx2 = Bl   if (1.k) € T.
and (6.2.2)
x2k = bv2k   and  x10Bk S B2   if (2,k) < T
x2k £ bv2k   and  xl Bk = /32   if (2,k) E T.
We now show how the path P can be followed by a sequence  of  linear  pro-
gramming  (1.p.) pivot steps in a system of linear equations obtained from
(6.2.2). Denote the set of points x in  S  satisfying  (6.2.2)  for  given
T C I  by  B(T). Assuming nondegeneracy as given below, each nonempty B(T)
is a line segment in S. Thus, the algorithm reaches a Nash equilibrium via
a  (finite)  sequence  of  sets B(T),TCI. We need only one l.p. step to
traverse such a B(T). The system of linear equations  in  which  the  l.p.
pivot step is made is obtained from (6.2.2) by introducing slack variables
for each inequality. The slack variables for the inequalities Ahx2  j  Bl'
(1.h) < T, are denoted by Klh and those for xl,Bh i B2' (2,h) 1 T, by A2h
The slack variables for the inequalities xjk 2 bvjk, (j,k) E  T,  are  de-
noted  by  Ajk. Adding these slacks to (6.2.2) we obtain that x belongs to
B(T) iff there exists O s b s l and for j E {1.2} there exist Ajk   0  for
(j.k) E T, >0 for (j,k) <T.P E R such that for j E {1,2}Xjk =                   j
n
x  =bv +I A     (k) with I





Ax2  + I(1.h)/T Alhe 1(h) = e 1B1
and (6.2.4)
n n
T     „             2        2
B xl + 2(2.h)<T K2he  (h) = e  B2'
In  the  sequel of this chapter we use the following simplifying notation.
n                                              n.
The vector e  (h), j € {1,2}, is denoted by e (h) and similarly e J by e .
Substituting (6.2.3) in (6.2.4) gives the system of linear equations
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Av                 -0                                - 12                            Ak             e (h)
b Brvl  + I(l,k)ET Alk Bk  +
I A O +I
(2,k)ET  2k
- (1,h)/T Alh  9
1                            1                           0                              0
1 -0- -1 - .0-
.
0         -ef Q      Q
* 52(2•h)01' 312h e2(h)  -B l  Q   -P 2 e 2  = 0. (6.2.5)
0 0 0 1
0-      .0.      .0 -    .1-
where B  denotes the k-th column of the matrix B'..
In  the  system  (6.2.5)  there  are nl+n2+2 equations and nl+n2+3
variables. The last two equations of (6.2.5)  reflect  the  property  that
2(j,k)ET.Ajk =  1-b,  j E  {1.2}.  These  equations  can  be eliminated by
substituting for j € {1,2} one of the Ajk's, say Ajkj, by
A    =1-b-I        A                                   (6.2.6)
jkj            (j,k)€T  jk'j
ktk
j
Let Tl, j E {1,2}, be the set of indices defined by Tl = T \{(j,kj)},  and
let  Tl = Tl u Tl. All of this together and the substitution of b by 1-b',
gives the following system of equations
. .
A   - Av2                      0k                                  -                            Ak - Ak
2                                                                  2
b'             +I                       +I         A






1 o ] r
     (1,h)<T  Ulhl    Q     J   +   I(2,h)<T  2h lez (h) J   -  Bil.Q  J
fo 1    f-Av  1
- "le,1 = 1-,T ,1'                                (6.2.7,
The latter system has only nl+n2  equations  and  nl+n2+1  variables.  Its
variables  must  satisfy  Ajk  £  0 for (j,k) E Tl, I A.6 < b'for
(j,k) erl       J..    =
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j E {1,2}, 0 S b' S 1, Kih Z 0 for (i,h) < T. A solution to this system is
denoted  by
(b',Al'X2'Kl'K2'Bl'B2 ) and corresponds to a point x = (xl'x2)
in B(T) as defined in (6.2.3). An L.p. pivot step of the algorithm is made
in system (6.2.7).
Before stating the formal steps of the algorithm we  give  a non-
degeneracy  condition  that  guarantees  the convergence of the procedure.
This condition is explained in more detail after the  description  of  the
algorithm.
Assumption 6.2.1. (nondegeneracy assumption). At each solution  (b'.Al'A2'
Al'K2'Bl,B2) of (6.2.7) at most one of the constraints 0 5 b' S 1. Ajk 2 0
for (j,k
) E Tl. b' 2 I(j.k) Ajlc' ilih 2 0 for
(i.h) 4  T, is binding,
unless b' = 1 or v = 0 for all (i,h) < T.ih
Step 0 [Initializationl.
Choose  an  arbitrary  vector  v in S. If v is a Nash equilibrium then the
algorithm stops. Else calculate the (unique) indices (l,kl) and (2,k2) for
k
1
which A  v2 = maxkAkv2  and  vl,Bk2 = maxkvl•Bk. Furthermore, set Tl = 0,
b' = 0• Bl = Aklv2 '  B2 = vl 'Bk2'  Alh = Bl-Allv2  for  h 0 kl•  and  K2h "
B2-vlBh   for   h   0 k2. Increase   b'    from   0   in    (6.2.7)    and   go   to   Step   1.
Step 1.
a. If  b' becomes 1 then let the solution of (6.2.7) be (1.A;,A3,A* R* B.
B ). The vector x* - (x;,x;), with x; = I(j,k)erjA;ke (k).  j El'{1.2}.
is a Nash equilibrium and the algorithm stops.
b. If Ajk becomes 0 for some (j,k) E Tl then Tl becomes Tl\{(j,k)} and  go
to Step 2a.
c. If I 1 Ajk becomes equal to b' for some j € {1,2} then, according
(j,k)eT.
3
to (6.2.6)- A becomes 0. Go to Step 2b.
jkj
d. If K becomes zero for some (i,h) l T then go to Step 3.ih
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Step 2.
a. Increase the complementary variable K from  zero  by  pivoting  into1 T 734system  (6.2.7) the column (e (k) .Q )  if j = 1, and (9.r,e2(k)T)T if j
= 2. Return to Step 1.
b. Substitute the largest Ajk, say AjL, by b'- I< ,11)€TjAjh. Increase Ajk
htk   ,1j
from zero by pivoting the related column into system  (6.2.7).  Tl  be-
comes Tl\{(j,L)}, kj becomes L. and return to Step 1.
Step 3.
If  additionally v =0 for all (j,k) l T u {(i,h)} then let the solutionjk
be (b'*, A;, A;,Al;,il;,B;,B;). The vector x* = (x;,x3)· with x: = (1-b'*)v. +
IC j,k) erj  A;ke.1(k),  j  E  {1.2}, is a Nash equilibrium and the algorithm
stops. Else increase the complementary variable Aih from zero by  pivoting
11its related column into system (6.2.7). T  becomes T  u {(i,h)} and return
to Step 1.
Let us make a few remarks. The algorithm starts with increasing b'
from zero. From (6.2.6) we derive that this implies  that  both A and1k
1
X2k2  are increased from zero. In Step lc, the variable Ajk. becomes zero.
3
Then we have to adapt system (6.2.7) by eliminating another A to take
jk
over  the role of Ajk.' In principle any A.., (j,k) E Tl, can be taken. WeJK          J
suggest to take the largest one, say Ajl. This substitution can easily be
performed  in  (6.2.7)  by  adding the column related to Aj  to the column
related to b' and subtracting the same column from the columns related  to
Ajh' h 0 1.
Assumption 6.2.1 is standard in  linear  programming  and  assures
that  all  steps  of  the  algorithm are unique. More precisely, when this
nondegeneracy condition holds it cannot occur  that  more  than  one  con-
straint  in  Step  1  becomes binding simultaneously. This is only allowed
when the algorithm stops. Assumption 6.2.1 also guarantees the  uniqueness
of  the  indices  (l,kl)  and  (2,k2) in Step 0. To see this, suppose that
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/  lv2 = max Akv2 = A1v2 for some L t kl. But then All =  0  and  two  con-
straints  (the  other  one  concerns b' = 0) are binding. This is the only
restriction on the choice of the starting vector.
The  nondegeneracy  condition  guarantees  the  convergence of the
algorithm . First, observe that the solution set of (6.2.7) is bounded  for
given  T.  Since B  = max zjk(x) and z is a linear function on the compact
set S, B  must be finite and therefore also the Kih's with (i,h) / T. This
together with Assumption 6.2.1 implies that for each T the solution set of
(6.2.7) and hence also B(T) is either empty or a line segment with two end
points.  The  algorithm  starts  by  traversing  B(T ). with T  = {(1.kl).
(2, k2)}'    If the algorithm operates   in  some  B(T)   and Ajk becomes      zero      for
some  (j.k)  €  T then the algorithm continues in B(T\{(j,k)}). Similarly,
the algorithm continues in B(T u {(i,h)}) if K becomes zero for someih
(i,h) K T  and  not  a Nash equilibrium has been reached. Assumption 6.2.1
guarantees that these transitions are unique so that no cycling can occur.
Because there are only a finite number of possible subsets T the algorithm
must reach a Nash equilibrium within a finite number of 1.p. steps.
What  about  the  relation between our nondegeneracy condition and
the nondegeneracy condition on games  of  Lemke-Howson  [1964]  (see  also
Shapley  [1974]).  Our condition is weaker. We only need this condition to
hold along the path generated by the algorithm. The last pivot step  might
be degenerated. In other words, it is possible to apply our procedure to
games that are degenerated in the sense of Lemke-Howson. In the next  sec-
tion we give an example.
At the end of this section we discuss  whether  something  can  be
said  about game-theoretic properties holding for the equilibrium found by
our algorithm. More concrete, we would like to know whether  the  equilib-
rium  found  is isolated, quasi-strong, regular, essential, perfect, or
proper. The precise definition of these concepts can be found for  example
in van Damme [1983]. It turns out that our algorithm finds a perfect equi-
librium whenever it starts from an interior strategy vector. This is inte-
resting the more because for bi-matrix games an equilibrium is perfect iff
it is undominated (see Theorem 3.2.2 in van Damme [1983]).  Other  proper-
ties  may  not  hold for the equilibrium reached by our procedure. This is
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due to the fact that the algorithm can successfully be  applied  to  games
having not such equilibria.
Thus, the positive result is that our algorithm  finds  a  perfect
equilibrium  whenever the starting point v is in the inner of the strategy
space, i.e. when v > 0 for all (j,k) E I. To prove the statement  it  is
jk
most  convenient  to  define  a  perfect equilibrium as a limit point of a
sequence of €-perfect equilibria.
Definition  6.2.2. For E > 0, the strategy vector x(e) E S is an €-perfect
equi Zibrium if it is completely mixed and satisfies for j € {1,2}
if zjk(x(€)) < zjl(x(E)) then x  (E) < 6, vk,1.jk    =
The strategy vector x* E S is a perfect equilibrium if x* E  lim61O{x(€)},
with for all E > 0, x(€) an E-perfect equilibrium.
Observe that an E-perfect equilibrium does not need to be  a  Nash
equilibrium.  The  concept  only  states  that all actions are played with
positive probability while nonoptimal actions are played with a very small
probability.  The perfectness concept gives a stability requirement to the
equilibrium. In case players make small mistakes, i.e. they play  nonopti-
mal  strategies  with  a  small but nonzero probability, an equilibrium is
perfect if these mistakes give no incentive  to  any  of  the  players  to
deviate  from the equilibrium strategy. Another characterization of a per-
fect equilibrium x* in a bi-matrix game is that an equilibrium is  perfect
if  it is undominated. The latter means that each player j has no strategy
Aj such that Rj is at least as good as x  against all possible  strategies
of  the  other  player while it is better against at least one strategy of
the opponent. Finally, observe from Definition 6.2.2 that every completely
mixed Nash equilibrium is perfect. This because then all actions are opti-
mal and so for the sequence of €-perfect equilibria we can take a  repeti-
tion  of  the  equilibrium itself. In the next section we illustrate the
concept in an example.
That  the process indeed finds a perfect equilibrium when starting
in the inner of the strategy space is stated in the theorem below.
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Theorem 6.2.3. If the starting vector v lies in the interior of S then the
algorithm finds a perfect Nash equilibrium.
Proof.  From (6.1.4) we know that the process generates a path of strategy
vectors x in S satisfying
xjk = b(x.v).vjk if zjk(x) < maxlzjl(x)
(6.2.8)
xjlc 2 b(x,v).vjk if zjk(x) = maxlzjl(x),
where 0 S b(x,v) = min(i,h){xih/vihlvih   0} S 1. We already  argued  that
all  Nash  equilibria in the interior of S are perfect. Therefore, suppose
the algorithm finds an NE x* on the boundary. Then. because  vjk >  0  for
all  (j,k) E  I, b(x,v) decreases in the last iteration down to zero. More
precisely, b(x,v) decreases along a line segment from say  y  to  x*  from
b(y,v)  to b(x*,v) = 0. Let I(x*) := {(j,k) E I|x;k = 0} and let (r.,t) be
an index for which yrl = max(i,p)EI(x*)yip.  It  is  easily  checked  from
(6.2.8)  that each vector x on [y,x*) is an E-perfect equilibrium with E =
x  . The limit point x* of the  sequence  {x(e)}61   is  then  perfect  by
definition.                                                               0
Note that we proved above that the  algorithm  not  only  finds  a
perfect  equilibrium  when starting in the interior but also that the last
linear piece generated consists of E-perfect equilibria. We emphasize that
the result above is not trivial. This because the algorithm can be applied
to games which are degenerated in the  sense  of Lemke-Howson. For such
games  not  all equilibria are perfect. However, our procedure succeeds to
find one when being started in the interior  of  the  strategy  space.  In
Section 6.3 we illustrate this with an example.
What about the game-theoretical worth of the  perfectness  of  the
equilibrium  found?  First of all, it has some interest of its own because
within the set of Nash equilibria an equilibrium is selected satisfying  a
reasonable  stability requirement. However, the worth is even greater when
we view upon a bi-matrix game as being a 2-person noncooperative  game  in
normal form. Of practical importance are Nash equilibria of games in ex-
tensive form. In such a game all the relevant  information  of  the  game,
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such as choices, information and payoffs, is described. Now, corresponding
to each game in extensive form there exists a game in  normal  form.  Fur-
thermore, each NE in the normal form game corresponds to an equilibrium in
the related extensive form game. Unfortunately, an NE being perfect in the
normal form game needs not to be perfect in its extensive counterpart (see
van Damme [1983, P. 128]). However, perfectness goes through  if  we  con-
sider the agent normal form of an extensive game (see Selten [1975]). This
normal form corresponds to the interpretation of Kuhn  [1953]  of  how  an
extensive form game is played. He regards a player that moves twice in the
game as being two different players. Thus, we may conclude that our  algo-
rithm  is able to find a perfect NE in an extensive form game. For that we
first have to rewrite the game in its agent normal form and then apply our
algorithm. Next, we translate back the equilibrium found into the exten-
sive form game.
6.3. Game-theoretic interpretation
In this section we want to explain  how  the  algorithm  works  in
terms of strategies and payoffs. Technically speaking the algorithm rough-
ly operates as follows. From the start, the variable b' is increased from
zero.  Recall from (6.2.6) that an increase of b' means that both A and
1k
1
A2k  are increased and that b is decreased (from 1). As soon  as  Kjk  for
2
some  (j,k) < T  becomes zero, its complementary variable A is increased
jk
from zero and vice versa. From (6.2.3) we deduce that a positive X means
jk
that  the relative probability with which player j uses his k-th action is
larger than the relative minimum (xjk > bvjk)' whereas  Ajk = 0  indicates
that xjk = bvjk. Similarly, from (6.2.4) we infer that Kjk > 0 corresponds
to action (j,k) being nonoptimal for player j.  i.e.  zjk(x) < maxhzjh(x),
whereas  Kjk = 0 means that action (j,k) is optimal for player j. With all
of this together it is straightforward to derive the game-theoretic inter-
pretation of the adjustments made by the algorithm.
Initially the probabilities related to the unique optimal  actions
of  both  players  are increased, whereas the probabilities related to all
other actions are proportionally decreased. If  the  latter  probabilities
all  become zero then a Nash equilibrium is reached. This because then all
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nonoptimal actions are played with zero probability. Else. the  algorithm
eventually  generates  a strategy vector at which for some player a second
action becomes optimal. Then the procedure continues by keeping  that  ac-
tion  optimal  whereas  the  corresponding  probability  is relatively in-
creased. In general, the algorithm generates strategy vectors at which the
nonoptimal  actions  are  played with probabilities all being, relative to
the starting probabilities, equal to each  other  and  smaller  than  each
probability  with which an optimal action is played. As soon as a nonopti-
mal action becomes optimal, its relative probability is increased from the
probabilities  related  to the nonoptimal actions. On the other hand, if a
probability with which an optimal  action  is  played  becomes  relatively
equal to the probabilities of the nonoptimal actions then it is kept equal
to those and the algorithm continues by making the related action nonopti-
mal.  When the probabilities of the nonoptimal actions for all players are
zero a Nash equilibrium has been found.
For  a  more  specific  illustration we apply the algorithm to the
example  presented  earlier (see Figure 6.1.1). For the solution
(b'.Al•J12'Bl'B2)  of  (6.2.7)  at  v it holds that Bl = (Av2)1 = 2. B2 =
(B vl)2 = 25/8, A12 = Bl-(Av2)2 = 2-1 = 1, A21 = B2-(Brvl)1 =  25/8-9/4  =
7/8, while b' = 0. The algorithm leaves v by increasing b' from zero, i.e.
All and X22 are increased (Step 0). At the vector a, the variable K has21
become zero (Step ld) whereas b' = 1/9, Bl = (Aa2)1 = 16/9, B2 = (BTal)2 =
22/9, A12 = 5/9. Thus, the algorithm continues from a  by  increasing  A
21
from  zero  (Step  3).  The  solution  at  c  is  Bl = (Ac2)1 = 20/9, B2 =
(B cl)1 = (BTcl)2 = 22/9,  A12 = Al-(Ac2)2 = 13/9,  X21 = b' = 1/9.  Thus,
A22 has become zero (Step lc). In system (6.2.7), (2.k2) becomes (2,1) and
the algorithm continues by increasing K from zero (Step 2b). In the next22
step  the  algorithm  reaches  the Nash equilibrium ((1,0),(1,0)) at which
b' = 1 (Step la).
The  game-theoretic  interpretation  of  the adjustments along the
latter path is as follows. At v, action (1,1) is optimal for player 1  and
action  (2,2)  is optimal for player 2. Now the algorithm increases from v
the probabilities with which these actions are played and  decreases  with
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the same rate the probabilities of all other actions. The algorithm conti-
nues in this way till it generates the strategy vector a at which player 2
becomes in equilibrium   ( z21 (a)   =  z22( a)) .   From  a the algorithm generates
strategy vectors x by relatively increasing probability x away from  x21             12
while  keeping player 2 in equilibrium. At strategy vector c the probabil-
ity with which player 2 plays his  second  action  has  become  relatively
equal to the probability related to the only nonoptimal action (1,2). Then
the algorithm distorts the equilibrium situation of player 2. It continues
by generating vectors x at which for player 2 the action (2,2) is nonopti-
mal, i.e. z22(x) is made smaller than z21(x). Meanwhile, the probabilities
xl2  and  x22 are kept relatively equal to each other but smaller than x11
and x21. In this way the Nash equilibrium ((1,0),(1,0)) is reached.
We conclude this section with an application of our algorithm to a
bi-matrix game which is degenerated in the sense  of  Lemke-Howson  [1964]
(see  also  Shapley  [1974]).  The  algorithm can not only be successfully
applied to this game but it also finds a perfect Nash equilibrium whenever
it  starts in the interior, although there are an infinite number of equi-
libria not being perfect. The game we consider is the bi-matrix game  with
payoff matrices
4 1- 2    1
A= and     B =
0 1 1      2
This  game  is graphically represented in Figure 6.3.1. The piece-
wise linear curve heavily drawn denotes the set of optimal  strategies  of
1
player  1 against player 2, also called the best reply set R  of player 1.
We see that player 1 plays action (1,1) with probability one  against  all
strategies  of  player  2,  except  when  player 2 plays action (2,2) with
probability one. In that case player 1 is indifferent between his actions.
2
Similarly, one can derive the best reply set R  of player 2, indicated in
the figure by the dashed  piecewise  linear  curve.  The  Nash  equilibria
coincide  with the intersections of Rl and R2. In the figure {(1,1),(2,1)}
indicates that in the corresponding subset of  S  the actions (1,1)  and






Ce(1),e(1))  1 Z   t\                      (e(2),e(1))
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R
Figure 6.3.1. The set of Nash equilibria consists of  the  unique  perfect
Nash equilibrium ((1,0),(1,0)) and the set {x € S|xll 1 1/2, x2 = (0,1)}.
When the algorithm starts in the interior of S it always finds the perfect
equilibrium ((1,0),(1,0)). We have given two possible paths in the figure.
Observe that all Nash equilibria except ((1,0),(1,0)) fail to be  perfect.
Consider  for  example  the equilibrium ((0,1),(0,1)). If player 2 makes a
small mistake and plays his first action with arbitrary small  probability
then     player   1 immediately plays his first action. Hence, this equilibrium
is unstable against small mistakes.
6.4. How to find more equilibria
As already mentioned, like other pivoting procedures, the  algo-
rithm always finds a negatively indexed equilibrium, where the sign of the
index is the sign of the determinant of a certain matrix related  to  that
equilibrium.  For  more details we refer to Shapley [1974]. Equilibria can
have positive or negative indices. In general, a bi-matrix game  possesses
an  odd  number  of  isolated equilibria of which the number of equilibria
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being negatively indexed is one more than the number  of  equilibria  with
positive  index.  To  become more precise concerning the generality of the
statement, observe that an (nlxn2) bi-matrix game can be viewed upon as an
2nl'n2
element in R . Then, the set of bi-matrix games satisfying the state-
2nl'n2
ment above is dense and open in R . It is for this large set that the
following is of interest.
Again consider   (6.1.4)    for a given bi-matrix     game .      The      set     of
strategy  vectors  obeying  (6.1.4) is determined by the specific starting
point v. Let us therefore denote the set of such vectors by Sv· We already
argued  that S contains  a piecewise linear path connecting v and an NE.V
However, in general this set is larger. When a bi-matrix game has  an  odd
number of isolated equilibria then S  contains besides the path connecting
v and a negatively indexed NE, a set of disjoint  piecewise  linear  loops
and paths, each  path  connecting  a positively indexed and a negatively
indexed equilibrium. We provide some intuition for this fact. Recall that
for  each strategy vector x obeying (6.1.4) there is a set T C I such that
x satisfies (6.2.2). Let B(T) be the set of all strategy vectors  satisfy-
ing  (6.2.2)  for a given T C I. As in Chapter 3, B(T) is the intersection
of subsets A(T) and C(T) defined as A(T) = 0 when vjk = 0 for all (j,k)  <
T, while otherwise
ACT) = {x € Slxjk = b(x,v).vjk• (j•k) 0 T} (6.4.2)
and
C(T) = {x E Slzjk(x) = maxhzjh(x), (j,k) E T}.
The  dimension  of a nonempty A(T) equals |T|-1 whereas generically either
C(T) = 0 or dim(C(T)) = nl+n2-|T|. Thus, for T C I. either B(T)  is  empty
or its dimension is equal to 1. It is straightforward to show now that S ,
V
being the union of all the subsets B(T), is a set of  1-dimensional  paths
and loops. Each path and loop is piecewise linear because of the linearity
of z. Clearly, the end points of a path not being  equal  to  v  are  Nash
equilibria  according to (6.1.4). Moreover, each linear piece of a path or
loop corresponds to some B(T) and can therefore be generated  by  a  pivot
step  in  (6.2.7).  Finally,  the end points of a path connecting two Nash
equilibria are differently indexed. As an illustration serves Figure 6.4.1
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in  which  for  the  game  of Example 6.1.1 the set S has been drawn with
V
v = ((1/8.7/8).( 1/2,1/2)) (see also Figure 6.1.1).
A {(1,1),(2,2)})      A( (1,1),(1,2),(2,2)})














Figure 6.4.1. The set Sv consists of a piecewise linear path connecting  v
and  the  negatively  indexed  equilibrium  ((1,0),(1,0))  and a piecewise
linear path linking the negatively indexed NE ((0,1),(0,1)) and the  posi-
tively  indexed NE x*. The regions I, II, III, IV denote C({(1,1),(2,1)}),
C({(1,1),(2,2)}), C({(1,2),(2,1)}), C({(1,2),(2,2)}), respectively.
In this figure we also depict all sets A(T) and C(T). Observe that
the subsets A(T). |T| = 3, constitute a subdivision of S. We  remark  that
Lemke  and  Howson  [1964] already proved the existence of a complementary
path between a starting vector and an NE and of paths connecting pairs  of
Nash equilibria. However, as we will see in the next section, the Lemke-
Howson procedure may not be able to reach certain paths.
Now  we  are ready to explain how to find more equilibria with the
procedure. First we apply the algorithm several times, each time  starting
from a different starting vector. In this way we find say k different Nash
equilibria. Then we pick a starting vector, say v, from which we found one
of these equilibria. Next, we  initialize the algorithm at each of the
other k-1 equilibria. Each time the  algorithm  then  traces  a  piecewise
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linear  path in Sv from a negatively indexed to a positively indexed equi-
librium. In this way we find 2k-1 equilibria.  We  illustrate  this  along
with  the  Example  6.1.1.  To follow the description below let us turn to
Figure 6.4.2, where we again depict the set S  related to v =  ((1/8,7/8),







Figure 6.4.2. The set Sv and the path of the algorithm starting from G.
To find all three Nash equilibria we  first  apply  the  algorithm
from v and find ((1,0),(1,0)). Next, we try other starting vectors till we
find one from which we reach another NE. For example we find v with  rela-
ted  equilibrium ((0,1),(0,1)). To find the third, positively oriented, NE
we restart the algorithm in ((0,1),(0,1)) and traverse in fv the piecewise
linear  path  from ((0,1),(0,1)) to x* in two pivoting steps. To carry out
the latter we have to substitute v for v in the final linear system  rela-
ted  to  the algorithm having been started at v. We leave ((0,1),(0,1)) by
decreasing b' from 1. That the algorithm can be applied is due to the fact
that all  vectors  on  the  piecewise  linear  path  connecting  x*  and
((0.1).(0.1)) satisfy (6.1.4) and therefore lie in B(T) for T C I.
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Recall  that  the  algorithm  converges to a negatively indexed NE
when starting from almost any strategy vector. We also stated that  almost
any  bi-matrix  game possesses an odd number of equilibria. Besides, these
equilibria are perfect. Now, to each of these  equilibria  corresponds  a,
relative to S, open set of strategy vectors in the sense that whenever the
algorithm starts from a vector in this  set  the  related  equilibrium  is
reached. The  set  is  called the attraction set of that equilibrium. The
sets are open relative to S because a small  distortion  of  the  starting
vector  leads  to  small (continuous) changes in the path generated by the
algorithm and the equilibrium reached is the same. Because  the  algorithm
only  fails  to  reach an equilibrium when starting from a vector lying in
some lower dimensional set, the closures of the  attraction sets form  a
subdivision of the strategy space. The faces of an attraction set are
polyhedra because of the linearity of z and the fact that the subsets A(T)
form a subdivision. In Figure 6.4.3 this is illustrated for Example 6.1.1.
a
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Figure  6.4.3. The two attraction sets belonging to the negatively indexed
equilibria.   The set below the segments  [a,x*]  and  [x*,b]   is  the set corre-
sponding to the equilibrium ((1,0),(1,0)) and above to ((0,1),(0.1)).
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Observe that when in the example the algorithm is started  from  a
vector  lying  in the intersection of the closures of the attraction sets,
i.e. on [a,x*]  or  [x*,b],  the  positively  indexed  equilibrium  x*  is
reached.
To conclude this section we repeat that  our  algorithm  may  find
more  than  one equilibrium. However, we can not directly deduce when we
have found all equilibria. But with some additional theory on  topological
degree we can. We return to this point at the end of the next section.
6.5. Interpretation and generalization of the Lemke-Howson algorithm
The  standard  method  for  finding  an  NE  in  a  bi-matrix game
(nl,n2'A,B) is the procedure of Lemke-Howson [1964]. Like our method it is
a  complementary  pivoting procedure. However, our method solves the equi-
librium problem as a stationary point problem (SPP) on  S  whereas  Lemke-
nl  n2
Howson  solves  a linear complementarity problem (LCP) on R+ XR* . Because
the latter method does not operate on the strategy space its  game-theore-
tic  interpretation is not immediately clear. Therefore we discuss how the
Lemke-Howson method can be interpreted also as a strategy adjustment  pro-
cedure  operating  on S. From this interpretation the differences with our
method become obvious.
Let us start reviewing the Lemke-Howson method (L-H). This exposi-
tion is based on Garcia and Zangwill [1981].  As  already  indicated,  L-H
finds  an NE in the bi-matrix game (nl'n2'A,B) by solving a related LCP on
nl n2 nl  n2
R  *R  . More precisely, it searches for a vector  y =  (yl'y2) €  R+ xR+
such that
1
w       -e       0   -A  Yl1
:=       +               Z 0, wl'Yl = 0, w2,y2 = 0.   (6.5.1)
w   -2  --BT 0722
It  is  assumed  that A,B < 0 in (6.5.1). This can be done without loss of
generality because decreasing each payoff element  with  the  same  amount
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does  not  change  the  equilibria. Now, the set of Nash equilibria corre-
-
sponds to the set of solutions to (6.5.1). More  concretely,  y =  (yl,y2)
solves  the  LCP (6.5.1) if and only if x = (Al'x2) with x  = (e •y )-lyj,
j E {1,2}, is an NE (see Garcia and Zangwill [1981],  ch. 19).  First  ob-
serve  that the LCP above is equivalent to the problem of finding a vector
n n
y = (yl'y2) € R+1*R+2 such that
Fjk(y) := min{y } =0,     (j,k) E I. (6.5.2)jk•wjk
We call (yjk'wjk) a pair of complementary variables. Now, the method gene-
nl  n2
rates a path of vectors y in R  *R   satisfying Fll(y)   0 and Fjk(Y) = 0,
(j,k) 0 (1,1), till it finds a vector ;  with  Fll( ) =  0.  The  starting
vector  is  the vector y for which y = -1/b (> 0). with b11       ls              ls = maxjblj,
and 928 = -1/ars (  0), with ars = maxiais' whereas all its  other  compo-
nents are zero. Observe from (6.5.1) that at F it holds that w2s = Wlr = 0
while wjk 2 0 for (j,k) 1 {(2.s),(1.r)}. Thus, 9  solves  (6.5.2)  if  and
only if r = 1. If not, the method starts by increasing y away from zero,1r
whereas the other  zero  variables  are  kept zero. Notice that at  y,
(ylr,wlr)  is  the only pair of complementary variables that are both zero
and observe from (6.5.1) that an increase of y affects w and v Thelr         2       11
latter because w is kept equal to zero. Now. two things can occur. If
2s
Yii becomes zero, the algorithm stops with a solution  y  at  which  ylr =
-1/b and v =  -1/a  . Else a variable w k * s, becomes zero. Thenrs v2s rs 2k'
the method continues by increasing its  complementary  variable  y2k  from
zero. In general, if yjk(wjk) becomes zero then wjk<yjk) is increased from
zero. The algorithm stops as soon as y or w becomes zero.11     11
We remark that along the path traced by the Lemke-Howson procedure
there is exactly one pair of complementary variables that  are  both  non-
zero, namely (Yll,wll). In fact, this corresponds to the fact that the L-H
method searches for an equilibrium by tracing a path along the edges of  a
certain  polytope  related  to the payoff matrices. The Rhomb-Path method,
which has already been mentioned in the introduction, is  similar  to  the
Lemke-Howson  method  but  then  there are at most two of such pairs. That
method searches along two-dimensional faces of the same polytope. For more
details we refer to Todd [1978].
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Example 6.5.1. Consider the game (nl'n2'A,B) with nl = 2, n2 = 3,
1   -2 5 -2    4    3
A= B=
3 2 4_ -5   -2    1-
To apply L-H we first subtract 6 from each matrix element to make A and  B
negative. System (6.5.1) then becomes
w         -1-    -0   0    5    8    1--Yii11
W
12     -1     0   0   3   4   2 y12 Yl'Y2 £ 0
w21  =  -1  +  8   1   0   0   0  y21  2 0, wl'yl =0' w2'y2 =0
w       -1     2   8   0   0   0  y22 22
w23-            --1-            _3          5          0          0          0_   Y23-
At the start we have that Yii = 1/2, s = 2, y22 = 1/4, and r = 2. Then the
algorithm increases y from 0 while keeping w = 0. It is  easily  veri-12                       22
fied  that  w23  becomes  zero when y12 equals 1/14 (Yll = 3/14). Then the
method continues by increasing y from zero. This leads to a decrease of
23
y22  because w12 is kept equal to zero. If Y23 becomes 1/3 then y22 equals
1/12 and w11 equals zero. L-H stops  with  the  vector  y =  ((3/14,1/14),
(0.1/12,1/3)). The corresponding NE equals x' - ((3/4,1/4),(0.1/5.4/5)).
We now give a game-theoretic interpretation of the path  generated
by  the  Lemke-Howson  algorithm. We do this by transforming the vectors y
and w into strategy vectors and marginal payoffs. Again consider  (6.5.1).
From  this system we deduce that wlk = 0 (w2k = 0) if and only if (Ay2)k =
maxj(AYZ)j ((BTyl)k = maxj(BTyl)j)· Recalling (6.5.1) we see that each
vector  y generated by L-H uniquely corresponds to the strategy vector x =
i    -1
(xl.x2) with x  = (e"•y )  y , j E {1,2}, and so  zjk(x) =  maxlz  (x)  if
and  only  if wjk = 0. In particular, the starting vector y corresponds to
the pure strategy vector at which player 1 (2) plays (1,1) ((2,s)), where-
as  action (l,r) is optimal for player 1 and (2,s) for player 2. Thus, L-H
starts with player 1 playing his first action while  player  2  plays  his
best reply against (1,1). This is action (2,s), with bls = max blj. In the
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case that (1,1) is the best reply of player 1 against (2,s), the  starting
vector  is  also an NE. This corresponds to r = 1. If not, then L-H leaves
the starting strategy vector by increasing from zero the probability  with
which player 1 plays his best reply to (2,s). As soon as some action (j,k)
becomes optimal (w becomes zero) then the corresponding  probability  is
jk
increased (y is increased). On the other hand, if the probability with
jk
which an optimal action (j,k) is played becomes zero (y becomes  zero),
jk
then  the  related action is made nonoptimal (w is increased from zero).
jk
The process stops as soon as action (1,1) becomes optimal or if the proba-
bility  with  which  this action is played becomes zero. At that point all
actions played are optimal (cf. (6.1.3)). We again  illustrate  this  with
the previous example.
Example 6.5.1 (continued). The strategy space S = SlxS2 for this  game  is
given in Figure 6.5.1. Here, the rectangular CDEF represents the strategy
vectors x at which for  player  1  both  his  actions  are  optimal,  i.e.
Zll(x) = z12(x). These vectors are characterized by x22 = -1+3x23/2. Above
that plane action (1,1) is optimal for player 1 and below the plane action
(1,2)  is  optimal  for  him.  The  bold piecewise linear curve connecting
((1,0),(0,1,0)) and 2 = ((0,1),(1.0.0)) denotes the best  reply  curve  of
player  2.  A vector x = (xl'x2) on that curve indicates that x2 is a best
reply against strategy x1 of player  1.  For  player  2  action  (2,2)  is
optimal  if  x11 2  3/4,  action  (2,3) if 4/9 5 x11 5 3/4, whereas action
(2,1) is optimal whenever x11 S 4/9. Now, L-H starts with player 1 playing
(1,1)  and  player  2  playing  his  best reply (2,2). The best reply of 1
against (2,2) is his action (1,2) and hence the probability with  which  1
plays  (1,2)  is  increased from 0 (x is decreased from 1). For player 211
action (2,2) is optimal to play till x becomes  1/4.  At  that  vector12
player  2  becomes  indifferent  between playing (2,2) and (2,3). Then the
probability with which he plays action (2,3),  i.e        is  increased.
X23
Finally,  at  x* , ((3/4.1/4),(0,1/5,4/5)) player 1 becomes in equilibrium










(e(1),e(3)) ./'   x**
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Figure  6.5.1. Illustration of the Lemke-Howson algorithm projected on the
strategy space.
Note  that  we do not need to make the payoff matrices negative in
order to apply Lemke-Howson on the strategy space. On S we  only  have  to
take  account for optimal actions. In the original L-H algorithm the nega-
tiveness is needed for the choice of the starting vector. Because we  have
now  put  both our process and Lemke-Howson in a unifying framework we are
able to compare them. But before doing that we first give a  complementary
pivoting  algorithm  by  which  we  can generate the projected path of the
Lemke-Howson procedure. We saw that the Lemke-Howson method in fact  gene-
rates  a  path of strategy vectors x E S, starting from v with vll = v2s =
1, characterized by
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xll Z 0 and zll(x) S maxlzll(x)
(6.5.3)
Xjk = 0 or  zjk(x) = maxLz £(x), (j,k) 0 (1,1).
Denoting the set of optimal actions by T and using the same notation as in
(6.2.5) we obtain that each vector x on the path has to satisfy the system
0 -              -0 -               -Ak-                -el(h)-
"ll BI + I xlk Bk  +I       x    0 +I Alh   22k-
(1,k)ET (2,k)€T (1,h)tr
1                      1                         0                         0
-0- _0_ - 1- _0_
g e g g1
2                      2+I th e (h)  -B l 9   -B 2 e   =   9 , (6.5.4)
(2,h)fr
0 0 0 1
0  - .0- .0-  -1-
where all variables except Bl  and  B2  are  nonnegative.  A  solution  to
(6.5.4) is denoted by (xl'x2,Al,K2'Bl•B2 . The final system is then ob-
tained by substituting x11 =1- Itylxlk and *23 =1-I . This sys-k12sx2k
tem  consists  of  nl+n2  equations with nl+n2+1 unknowns. At the start we
have that T = {(2.s)}, x11 = x2s = 1, Bl = zlr(v), B2 = z2s(v), and  Kjk =
Bj-zjk(v),  (j,k) /  T.  If  All = 0, then the starting vector v is an NE.
Else jilr =0 for some r 0 1 and xlr is increased from zero, i.e. T becomes
{(1,r),(2,s)}.  In  general,  this  algorithm  operates similar to the one
described in Section 6.2. If x becomes zero then T becomes T\{(j,k)} andjk
the algorithm continues by increasing A from zero. On the other hand, if
jk
u   becomes zero then T becomes T u {(j,k)}  and x is increased from
-j k                                                 jk
zero.  The  algorithm  stops whenever x or A becomes zero. The case in11     11
which x becomes zero is similar to the situation in which A becomes2s                                                      jkj
zero  in the algorithm described in Section 6.2. For the algorithm to work
we need a nondegeneracy condition similar to Condition 6.2.1. For example,
at  the  start  each  player should have a unique optimal action. For com-
pleteness we also apply this algorithm to Example 6.5.1.
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Example  6.5.1  (continued).  At  v = ((1,0),(0,1,0)) we have T = {(2,2)},
Kll = x22 = 1. Bl = z12(v) = 2. B2 = 222(v) = 4,  All =  4.  A21 =  6  and
A23 =  1.  All  other  variables  are  zero. The algorithm leaves v by in-
creasing x from 0. If x becomes 1/4 u becomes zero. Then the  algo-12          12         ' -23
rithm  proceeds  by  increasing x from  0 till the NE x* = ((3/4,1/4).
23
(0,1/5,4/5)) is reached at which K becomes 0.11
When  we compare the Lemke-Howson procedure with our method we see
some remarkable differences. First of all, the  choice  of  the  starting
vector  is arbitrary for our algorithm whereas the starting vector is con-
structed in the L-H method. Next, computational experiments give arguments
for  the idea that our method works fast for games of large dimension with
both players having more or less an equal number of actions. L-H  performs
better  for  other  games. The third and most important difference lies in
the game-theoretic interpretation of the paths  generated  by  both  algo-
rithms. Let us now discuss in more detail the points mentioned.
A very important feature of our procedure is  the  fact  that  the
starting  vector  can be chosen arbitrarily. In the Lemke-Howson procedure
the construction of the starting vector  is  part  of  the  algorithm.  It
chooses a starting vector at which player 1 plays his first action whereas
player 2 plays his best reply upon that action. By renumbering actions and
players  there are at most nl+n2 different starting vectors from which the
L-H method can start. To illustrate this we again  consider  the  game  of
Example 6.5.1.
Example 6.5.1 (continued). We applied L-H to this game when starting  from
the  vector  ((1,0),(0,1,0)). Renumbering the strategies of player 1 gives
the starting vector ((0,1),(1,0,0)) which is an NE. By  interchanging  the
players  we  obtain  two more starting vectors, namely ((0,1),(0,1,0)) and
((1,0),(0,0,1)). Starting from the first one, L-H reaches ((0,1), (1,0,0))
via  one  pivot  step,  whereas  it reaches ((3/4,1/4),(0,1/5.4/5)) in two
pivot steps when it starts from the second one. All  possible  paths  are
illustrated in Figure 6.5.1.
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Because L-H can only start from a limited number of strategy  vec-
tors  it can occur that this method cannot find certain negatively indexed
Nash equilibria. Consider for example the game given  in  Shapley  [1974].
This  concerns  a  bi-matrix game in which both players have three actions
with payoff matrices
030 023
A= 2 2   0    and   B=3   2   0.
_3 0 1_ .0 0 1_
To solve this game L-H can start in only three vectors, ((1,0,0),(0,0,1)),
((0,1,0),(1.0,0)).  and  ((0,0.1).(0,0.1)).  Note  that  interchanging the
players gives no additional starting vectors because the payoff structures
of  the  players  are  identical.  Starting from these vectors, L-H always
finds the NE ((0,0,1),(0,0,1)). However, this game possesses a  second
negatively  indexed equilibrium. x* = ((1/3.2/3.0).(1/3.2/3.0)). Our algo-
rithm finds this equilibrium if it starts for  example  in  v = ((0,1,0).
(0,1,0)).  At  that vector the actions (1,1) and (2,1) are optimal for the
two players. By increasing the related probabilities, x* is reached in one
step.  Note  that the probabilities related to actions (1,3) and (2,3) re-
main zero. We refer to the article of Todd [1978] for more  details  about
the  structure  of this kind of examples. In that article the structure of
games that give problems for the Rhomb-Path method is also sketched.
When  dealing with algorithms, an important issue is of course the
computational speed. Therefore we did some computational experiments  with
both  algorithms. For that purpose we considered bi-matrix games of diffe-
rent dimension with randomly generated payoff elements and determined  the
number  of pivot steps needed to reach an NE. Of course, for our algorithm
this number in principle depends upon the starting  vector selected. For
that  reason  we applied our algorithm three times to each game. First, we
started from the barycentre, being the vector at which each  player  plays
all  actions  with  equal  probability. Next, we took as starting vector a
vector at which both players play a rationalizable strategy (see  Bernheim
[1984]  and  Pearce [1984]). At such a vector only actions are played that
are a better reply against an action played with positive  probability  by
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the  other  player. Finally, we considered the case in which our procedure
starts from the vector at which both players only play their first action.
The  latter  choice  represents  the  case in which the starting vector is
chosen without prior knowledge. It turns out that our  algorithm  performs
better  for  games of relatively large size in which the players have more
or less an equal number of actions. L-H performs better  in  other  cases.
Concerning  the  choice  of  the  starting vector it makes overall seen no
difference whether one starts from the barycentre or from a rationalizable
strategy  vector. However, starting from an arbitrary pure strategy vector
gives definitely worse results.
The  major  differences  between both algorithms concern the game-
theoretic interpretation of the path they generate. As can  be seen from
(6.5.3), L-H generates from the starting vector a path of strategy vectors
at which player 2 is in equilibrium, i.e. he  plays  optimal  against  the
strategy  of  player 1. In other words, L-H operates on the best reply set
of player 2 which is defined by
n -1
R2 = <(xl'x2) E Slx2.BTxl Z x2.BTxl, x2 E S 2  }
The strategies of player 1 are such that all actions played with  positive
probabilities  except  (1,1) are optimal. Now, L-H generates the piecewise
linear curve in R2 originating at vl = el(1) by first increasing the  pro-
bability with which player 1 plays his optimal action against the reply of
player 2. In our procedure both players are  at  the  start  typically  in
disequilibrium.  Throughout  the  algorithm  nonoptimal actions are played
with a relatively low but nonzero probability. The relativeness is  deter-
mined  by  the  starting vector. When a player becomes in equilibrium it
stays so in principle. However, such a partial  equilibrium  can  be  dis-
turbed later on.
From  the  interpretation  of  the  L-H  algorithm  it  is  rather
straightforward  to  extend this algorithm in order to find all Nash equi-
libria in a bi-matrix game with one player, say player 1, having only  two
actions.  Like  for  the  search for positively indexed equilibria we only
consider bi-matrix games having an odd  number  of  Nash  equilibria.  Two
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arguments  are of importance in this respect. First the fact that all Nash
2
equilibria lie in R , the best reply set of player 2. The second  observa-
2tion  is that in case player 1 has only two actions, R  itself is a piece-
wise linear path. More precisely, it can be parametrized by the  probabil-
ity with which player 1 plays action (1,1). We get R2 = ux  €[0 1]R2(xll)'
11   '
where
R2(xll) := {x E R2'x11 = xll)'
Now, for any x11 E  0'1], R2(xll) is either a point or a line segment.  In
the  first  case player 2 has one optimal action against *1 = (xll,1-xll)'
in the latter case two of his actions are optimal. Remark that we have
excluded cases in which more than two actions are optimal for player 2.
2
In its standard form L-H traces R  starting from x = 1  till  an11
2NE  is  found. Now, we extend L-H such that it continues along R  after an
NE has been found, until x becomes 0. In this way it finds all Nash11
equilibria. To  implement this consider the algorithm operating on system
(6.5.4). Recall that this pivoting algorithm is equivalent to  L-H  except
that  it operates on S. An NE is found as soon as x or iA becomes zero.11     11
2
In the first case L-H followed the whole R  to find the unique NE at which
xl =  (0,1).  In the second case the algorithm is continued by letting ac-
tion (1,2) play the role of (1,1). Note that before All became  zero,  x11
was positive whereas (1.2) was optimal for player 1. We continue the algo-
rithm after All has become zero by increasing  K12  from  zero.  Then  the
algorithm  generates  strategy  vectors x at which x is positive whereas12
(1,2) is not optimal. The next NE is reached when A becomes zero. Then12
All is increased, and so on. We illustrate this again with Example 6.5.1.
Example 6.5.1 (continued). Consider Figure 6.5.1 and system  (6.5.4).  L-H
starts  from  ((1,0),(0,1,0))  and reaches x* = ((3/4,1/4),(0,1/5,4/5)) in
two steps. At x* for the solution to the other  variables  in  (6.5.4)  it
holds  that  Bl = zll(x*) = 212(x*) = 18/5, B2 = z22(x*) = z23(x*) = 10/4,
and K21 = 11/4. We now continue by increasing  K12  from  zero.  When  K12
becomes  1, x22 becomes zero. Then K22 is increased till K22 becomes 11/9.
At that point K becomes zero and the algorithm continues  by  increasing21
x21  till  R12 becomes zero at the NE x = ((4/9,5/9),(1/3,0,2/3)). We then
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have that K = 6/9. The procedure leaves x by increasing A from zero.22                                                 11
As soon as All becomes 2, x23 becomes zero. Then K23 is increased till x11
becomes zero at the NE x = ((0,1),(1,0,0)) and the extended L-H  algorithm
stops.
Thus, in the special case of a (2xm) bi-matrix game  we  can  also
find  the  negatively indexed Nash equilibria in a straightforward manner.
For example, the strategy vector x in Figure 6.5.1 is positively  indexed.
Let  us  view  upon  the  extended version of L-H in another way. Consider
again Figure 6.5.1. The best reply set  of  player  1  consists  of  three
parts; the triangle with vertices C,D, ((1,0),(0,0,1)), the set CDEF, and
-
the polytope with vertices F,E, ((0,1),(0,1,0)), x.  The  Nash  equilibria
are  the  intersection points of Rl and R2. Starting from ((1,0), (0,1,0))
1                                                     -
we first intersect R  from below at x*, next from above at x, and  finally
at  x.  Below CDEF action (1,2) is optimal for player 1 (&411   0)' whereas
K12 > 0 above that plane. Thus, when the algorithm reaches x* it is  quite
natural to continue by increasing K from zero.12
Another method for finding all Nash  equilibria  in  a  (2xm)  bi-
matrix  game  is  a  geometric  combinatorial  method  developed  by Borm,
Gijsberts, and Tijs [1989]. The advantage of their method is that they not
only  find all Nash equilibria but they can also distinguish Nash equilib-
ria according to their type (perfect, proper and so  on).  However,  their
method  merely gives characterizations of Nash equilibria of certain type.
It seems rather difficult to implement their method for  calculation  pur-
poses, especially when m is large.
Finally, we return to the remark made at the end  of  Section  6.4
concerning the problem that in general it is never sure that our algorithm
has found all equilibria. Here, theory developed in Le  Van  [1982]  sheds
light. Le Van considers the set of solutions to system (6.5.1) and gives a
method to find the exact number of Nash solutions. First, he gives a boun-
ded  region  in  which  all solutions lie. Then, that region is subdivided
into subregions and the topological degree of a suitable mapping  in  each
subregion is calculated. From that it becomes clear if such a subregion
contains a Nash equilibrium. By projecting that  region  on  the  strategy
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space  we  get information about the location of a Nash equilibrium in the
strategy space. Thus, by his method we can determine the approximate loca-
tion of all equilibria whereas by our method we can find their exact loca-
tion. However, for practical purposes  this  combined  procedure  will  be
costly  because  for  example  the  calculation of a topological degree is
rather complex.
6.6. Computing Nash equilibria in noncooperative more-person games
In this section we show how to compute  Nash  equilibria  in  non-
cooperative  games  played  by  more  than two players. More precisely, we
consider games with N players, indexed by j € {1,...,N}, player  j  having
n   actions.  The  payoffs  to  player  j  are  listed in a tensor A , j E
{1,...,N}. The payoff to player j in case each player i € IN plays  action
(i,li) is denoted by A (,tl'LZ•,0 •lj-1.Lj.Lj+1·····411). The marginaln.-1
payoff function z is now a function from S to I .with S = WN  S Jj.,R.1            j.,     '
defined by z(x) = (zl(x)....,ZN(x)), with
n
zjk(x) = Ill=1...Ii   =16L    1"'  N=l    1' "' j-1' '
j - 1        pnj + 1                    I N        Aj  ('t                       Z              k
j-1 j+1.
1
.LN)N (j,k) € I(j), j E IN,j+1.... i0jxiti'
Similar to a bi-matrix game (cf. (6.1.2)), a strategy vector x*  in  S  is
defined to be an NE if
n.-1
x •z (x*) S x;•zj(x*)  .x j E S J  .j€ IN. (6.6.1)
The  most well-known methods for finding an NE in an N-person game
are the simplicial algorithms. For an exposition  and  some  computational
results we refer to Doup and Talman [1987]. At the end of this section we
compare the results obtained with the simplicial methods and  the  results
we obtained with the procedure discussed here. Concerning other methods we
refer to the articles of Rosenmaller [1971] and Wilson [1971].  They  both
pretend to present an algorithm. However, both articles are theoretical of
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nature and of hardly any use  for  practical  implementation.  Rosenmuller
argues  that  each  nondegenerated N-person game has an odd number of iso-
lated Nash equilibria. The reasoning is similar to that in Lemke and
Howson  [1964]  for  bi-matrix  games; there is a path connecting the con-
structed starting vector and an NE whereas the other Nash  equilibria  are
pairwise  connected by paths. However, he gives no procedure how to follow
these paths. The latter is crucial because these paths are in general  not
linear.  Wilson  [1971] proves the existence of a path leading to an NE in
an N-person game. This path finds in succession an equilibrium for each of
certain  related  k-person games for k increasing from 1 to N. An equilib-
rium for the k-person game is then the starting point of a path leading to
an  NE  of  a  (k+1)-person  game and so on. However, also here merely the
existence of the path is proved and no method is given to follow it.
The  method  we  present here is a generalization of the algorithm
for solving bi-matrix games that has been discussed in Section 6.2.  Again
we can rewrite (6.6.1) to obtain that x* is an NE iff
zjk(x.) = max- zjh(x*) when x;k > 0,  (j•k) € I. (6.6.2)
Expression  (6.6.2) is equivalent to (6.1.3). However, contrary to
the function z for a bi-matrix game, the marginal payoff function  is  not
linear in the more general case. In fact z is multilinear. It appears that
we can use the algorithm of Section 6.2 in an indirect manner. The general
idea is the following. First, we choose an arbitrary starting strategy
vector v in S. Next, we linearize the marginal payoff function z around  v
by  a  first-order Taylor expansion. We then extend that function on S and
apply a slightly more general version of the algorithm of Section  6.2  to
find  a  stationary  point  of that function. We then repeat the procedure
starting from the vector obtained in this way. Thus. we  now  linearize  z
around  that  vector, extend the linear function to S, and again apply our
procedure. We continue till a certain accuracy  of  approximation  is  ob-
tained. Two  remarks  are  of importance here. First, we cannot guarantee
that this procedure converges towards  a  Nash equilibrium. Although  it
holds  that  the  algorithm  of  Section 6.2 converges for each linearized
version of z, the global convergence of the whole procedure  is  question-
able. The second point is that we can only approximate an NE here, whereas
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we obtained an exact solution in case of a bi-matrix game. Again, in  each
round  we  obtain  an  exact  stationary point for the linearized marginal
payoff function. But this is only an approximate stationary point for  the
marginal  payoff function itself. In this way we approximate an NE by sol-
ving a sequence of linear stationary point problems.  Therefore  we  some-
times refer to our method as the SLSPP-method (sequence of linear statio-
nary point problems). This procedure  has  been  motivated  by  Mathiessen
[1983]  who solves an NLCP by a sequence of LCP's. In practice this method
works quite satisfactory, although global convergence is  not  guaranteed.
Contrary  to  our  method, his procedure may even fail to solve a specific
LCP (see Mathiessen [1985]).
We remark that in some sense the method sketched above works simi-
lar as a simplicial algorithm. Such a method finds in each round an  exact
solution  for  a  piecewise linear approximation of the original function.
Thus, then the function is linearized on each simplex of  some  simplicial
subdivision, whereas here we take a linear approximation on the whole set.
The advantage of simplicial algorithms is that their global convergence is
guaranteed. However, especially in the later rounds simplicial algorithms
may need more pivot steps to reach a solution. In practice it  seems  best
to  combine  both  methods  by  applying a simplicial algorithm during the
first rounds, and later on the method discussed here.
We  now  review  our  procedure  in more detail. Let us denote the
total number of actions by n, i.e., n = I =lnj. First we choose  an  arbi-
trary  starting  vector  v  in the interior of the strategy space. Then we
n
linearize z around v to obtain the function zv : S -* F =lR
j defined by
zv(x) = z(v) + Dz(v)(x - v), (6.6.3)
where Dz(v) is the (nxn)-matrix of derivatives of z at v. More  precisely,
the  (p.q - h  element  of Dz(v) equals 6zjk(v)/6xih' where p = Ii=int + k
and q = Il=inl + h. Observe that this element is zero if (i,h) E I(j). Now
we  apply  the algorithm of Section 6.2 to zv. Of course, we need to gene-
ralize that algorithm for application to problems on a simplotope  instead
of the product of two simplices. Analogous to Section 6.2 we follow a path
of strategy vectors x i n S such that for some T C I
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x = bv + I(j,k)€TAjke(j,k).
and
zjk(x) = max(j,L)€I(j)zlt(x) = Bj for (j.k) € T.
(6.6.4)
with I A   = 1-b for j E IN' Ajk 2 0 for (j,k) E T, and b € [0,1].(j,k)ET, jk
3
Combining (6.6.3) and (6.6.4) gives the following linear system  of  equa-
tions
bDz(v)v + I(j,k)erAjkDjkz(v) + I(i,h)/rlihe(i,h) - Ij€INBjej =
Dz(v)v - z(v)
(6.6.5)
b+ I(j,k)€TjAjk -1.j€ IN.
where Djkz(v) denotes the (Ii= nt + k)-th column of Dz(v) and e denotes a
.j-1
vector  in Rn with ones on the places Lt=ln  + k, k E {1,...,n }, and zero
elsewhere. Note, that this system is  analogous  to  (6.2.5).  Similar  to
Section  6.2  we  obtain the final system by substituting b' = 1-b and for
j € IN, Ajk. by b' - Ik0kjAjk where kj is
an index
for  which  zjkj(v) =
maxlzjl(v).  In this way, we obtain a system of n equations with n+1 vari-
ables. More precise, we get (cf. (6.2.7))
jk. jk.




+ I(i,h)<TAihe(i.h) - Ij€INBjoj = -z(v), (6.6.6)
with  additional  restrictions Ajk £ 0 for (j,k) E Tj\{(j,kj)}, Ik0k.Ajk S
3
b' for j € IN' 0 S b' S 1, and Kih Z 0 for (i,h) 1 T. Observe that (6.6.6)
is equivalent to (6.2.7) in case N=2 because in that case
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0     A
Dz(v) = , v   €   S.T
BO
The  working of the algorithm for the N-person game is essentially identi-
cal to that of Section 6.2. For convenience we list below without  further
comments  the  nondegeneracy  assumption needed and the steps of the algo-
rithm.  Here  by  A  and  K  we  denote  the  n-vectors  (Al'...,AN)   and
(Wl'...'AN)'  respectively,  and  by B we denote the N-vector (B '····AN).
The other notation used is similar to that one in Section 6.2.
Assumption 6.6.1 (nondegeneracy assumption).  At each solution (b' ,A,K,B)
of (6.6.6) at most one of the constraints 0 5 b' < 1,
A. k £ 0 for  (j,k) E
1
=       J
T ,  b' £ I 1 Ajk' Kih £ 0 for (i,h) 1 T, is binding, unless b' = 1
(j,k)ET.
3
or v , 0 for all (i,h) < T.ih
Step 0 [Initializationl.
Choose an arbitrary vector v in S. If v is a  Nash  equilibrium  then  the
algorithm  stops.  Else choose a measure of inaccuracy 6, a maximum number
of rounds E, and set t equal to 1.
Step 1.
If t>t then the algorithm stops. No  approximate  Nash  equilibrium  has
been  found  within t rounds. Else construct the first-order Taylor expan-
sion zv of z at v as in (6.6.3). Calculate for j E  IN  the  unique  index
(j,k )  for  which  zjk (v) = max zjh(v). Furthermore, set Tl = 0, b' = 0,
j
Bj = zjkj(v) for j E IN' Kih = Bi - zih(v) for h t ki and i E IN. Increase
b' from 0 in (6.6.6) and go to Step 2.
Step 2.
a. If b'  becomes 1 then let the solution of (6.6.6) be (1,A*,A*,B*). The
vector x*, with x* = I(j,k)erA;ke(j,k) is a solution to the SPP  of  zv
on S. If max(j,k)(zjk(x*)-x;•zj(x*)) < 6 then x* is an approximate Nash
equilibrium and the algorithm stops after round t. Else t  becomes  t+1
and return to Step 1 with v equal to x*.
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b. If Ajk becomes 0 for some (j,k) E Tl then Tl becomes Tl\{(j,k)} and  go
to SteP 3a,
c. If I 1 A,k becomes equal to b' for some j € IN then Ajk.  becomes
(j.k)€T   j                                               J
j
0. Go to Step 3b.
d. If K becomes zero for some (i,h) / T then go to Step 4.ih
Ste
a. Increase the complementary variable A from  zero  by  pivoting  into
jk
system (6.6.6) the column e(j.k). Return to Step 2.
b. Substitute the largest Ajk, say A L, by b'-I<  h)er,Ajh. Increase  Kjk
htk.,1 J
3
from  zero  by  pivoting  the  column  e(j,kj)  into system (6.6.6). T
1
becomes Tl\{(j,l)}, k  becomes 1, and return to Step 2.
Step 4.
a. If additionally vjk =0 for all (j,k) /T u {(i,h)} then let the  solu-
tion be (b'*,A*,A*,B*). The vector x* = (1-b'*)v + E(j,k)er A;ke(j,k)
V
is a solution to the SPP of z on S. If max(j,k)(zjk(x*)-x;.zj(x*)) < 6
then  x*  is  an  approximate  Nash equilibrium and the algorithm stops
after round t, else t becomes t+1, and return to Step 1 with v equal to
X*.
b. Otherwise increase the complementary variable A from zero by pivotingih
its  related  column  into  system (6.6.6). Tl becomes Tl u {(i,h)} and
return to Step 2.
We illustrate the working of the procedure by an example.
137
Example 6.6.1. We consider a noncooperative 3-person game, in  which  each
player has two actions. The payoffs are listed below.
(1.1) (1,2)
(2.1) (2,2) (2,1) (2,2)
(3.1) (1.3.-2) (2,1,4) (3.1) (1.-3.2) (1,1.-3)
(3.2) (-1.-2,3) (4.5.-6) (3.2) (1.-3.4) (-5,1,-2)
The left matrix entails the payoffs in case player 1 plays his  first  ac-
tion, the  right matrix corresponds to strategy vectors at which player 1
plays his second action. Each entry in the matrix consists of  three  ele-
ments corresponding to the payoffs for each player. For example, if player
1 plays (1,2), player 2 plays (2,2) and 3 plays (3,1) then player 1 and  2
get a payoff of 1 whereas player 3 gets -3.
Let us apply our algorithm starting from v= ( (1/2,1/2), (1/2.1/2).
(1/2,1/2)).  Linearizing the marginal payoff function z around v gives the
function zv defined by zv(x) = z(v) + Dz(v).(x - v)
1.5 --    --0      0 0
3                1.5             1.5-     -x i l-0.5
-0.3 0             0           1 -2 1     -2     x12-0'5
=  -1.25  +   0.5   -3 0 0     0     -2.5   x21-0 5
2 3 1 0 0     1      3     X22-0'5
0.25 1     -0.5 0 0.5 0
0     x31-0·5
-0.25     -1.5    1     3.5   -4 0
0  - -x32-0·5-        -      -
At  x = v, zv(x) equals z(v) and the optimal action for player 1 is (1,1),
for player 2 action (2,2), for player 3 action (3,1). Thus. from the start
the  related  probabilities are increased by increasing b' from zero (Step
1). After one step a stationary point for zv is found because b' becomes 1
(Step 2a). It is easily checked that the vector x = ((1,0),(0,1),(1,0)) is
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indeed an NE related to the marginal  payoff  function  zv.  However  z(x)
equals  ((2.1).(3.1).(4.-6)).  i.e.  x  is not an NE for the original game
because player 2 is not in equilibrium  at  x.  In the second round we
-                             -
linearize z around x and obtain with v=x that
2      0    0    1    2   2    4- -x  -1
11
1      0    0    1    1   1   -5   X12
V   3-3003-2Xz (x) = z(v) + Dz(v).(x-v) = 3+ 21
1      1    1    0    0   1    5   X  -122
4      4   -3   -2    4   0    0   x31-1
-6     -6   -2    3   -6   0    0
-- - -  -X32
At the start we have that Bl = zll(v) =  2,  B2 =  z21(v) =  3,  and  B3 =
231(v) =  4.  Furthermore  K12 =  1, A22 = 2, and K32 = 10. Then b' is in-
creased from 0 (Step 1). If b' becomes 2/3 then K becomes 0  (Step  2d).
32
For  the  solution  to  (6.6.6)  it  further  holds  that B = (Bl'B2'B3) =
(4/3.3,0), KI.2 = 1/3, A22 = 2. Thus, now A32 is increased   (Step   4)   till
2/9  when A becomes zero (Step 2d). For the solution to (6.6.6) we have22
B = (16/9,17/9.0) = 19/9, A =  2/9,  b' =  2/3  with  corresponding· A12          32
vector x* = ((1,0), (2/3.1/3).(7/9.2/9)). Since v = 0 for all (j,k) such
jk
that Ajk > 0, x* is an equilibrium for zv (Step 4a). It is easily verified
that x* is also an NE for the original game.
Finally we compare the speed  of  our  algorithm  with  simplicial
algorithms. We applied our algorithm to the three games given in Doup and
Talman [1987] and compared the results with those  given  in  Doup  [1988,
ch. 11].  These  three  different simplicial algorithms are applied to the
games. In Table 6.6.1 we compare our results with  the  best  results  ob-
tained by the simplicial algorithms. It turns out that our algorithm is at
least as good.
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Game Simplicial algorithms SLSPP algorithm
LP                          11                   Lp             v
1       35            4         28      4
2       14            1          6      2
3       14             3         14      3
Table 6.6.1. Computational results obtained for noncooperative more-person
games. LP denotes the number of linear programming pivoting steps whereas
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Dit  proefschrift handelt omtrent aanpassingsprocessen in ruilecono-
mieen en niet-co6peratieve spelen. Een ruileconomie is  een  model  van  een
economie  waarin consumenten hun voorraad aan goederen ruilen tegen goederen
van anderen. Deze ruil gebeurt zodanig dat het nut  van  de  consument  toe-
neemt.  Een  evenwicht  is  bereikt als de prijzen (ruilverhoudingen) van de
goederen zodanig zijn dat elke consument een maximaal nut heeft  terwijl  de
vraag  naar elk goed gelijk is aan het aanbod van het goed. Neem nu aan dat
een ruileconomie in evenwicht is. Als er een externe schok OP de economie
plaatsvindt  wordt  het evenwicht verstoord. De geldende prijzen kunnen niet
langer voor evenwicht zorgen. De economie past zich aan aan de schok  en  er
komt een nieuw evenwicht tot stand. De wijze waarop de economie zich aanpast
wordt beschreven middels een aanpassingsproces, meer  specifiek  een  prijs-
aanpassingsproces.  Aanpassingsprocessen  voor niet-coOperatieve spelen zijn
stategie-aanpassingsprocessen. Een niet-cooperatief spel is een spel waarbij
de  spelers  niet  mogen samenwerken. Het zogenaamde Nash evenwicht is het
standaard evenwichtsconcept in zo'n spel. Het evenwicht bestaat Uit een
stategie  voor  elke  speler  die  zodanig  is dat deze stategie optimaal is
gegeven de strategie van de andere spelers. Een  stategie-aanpassingsproces
baschrijft  hoe  de  spelers  via  aanpassingen van hun strategie vanuit een
willekeurige startsituatie komen tot een Nash evenwicht.
Laten  we  nu  eerst de aanpassingsprocessen voor ruileconomieen wat
nader bekijken. In de loop van de tijd zijn er al heel wat processen gedefi-
nieerd. Het  startpunt  was  de  zogenaamde wet van vraag en aanbod voor de
markt van 66n enkel goed. De wet geeft aan dat de prijs van een goed  stijgt
als  de  vraag naar dat goed groter is dan het aanbod ervan. Een prijsdaling
resulteert in het tegengestelde geval. Door deze aanpassingen  komt  er  een
evenwicht  op de markt tot stand. Walras [1874] generaliseerde deze wet voor
een situatie met meerdere markten. Eerst wordt, door  prijsaanpassingen  als
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beschreven  in  de wet van vraag en aanbod, de eerste markt in evenwicht ge-
bracht, daarna de tweede markt, etc. Het nadeel van dit proces  is  dat  het
lang  niet  altijd naar een evenwicht convergeert. Het kan voorkomen dat een
evenwicht wat bereikt is op een markt wordt  verstoord  als  je  een  andere
markt  in  evenwicht probeert te brengen. Het meest beroemde proces werd ge-
formuleerd door Samuelson [1947].  Via  dit  Walrasiaanse  aanpassingsproces
worden  op  alle  markten gelijktijdig de wet van vraag en aanbod toegepast.
Echter, om de convergentie van dit proces te garanderen moet de ruileconomie
aan zware restricties voldoen. Een  voldoende  conditie is bijv. dat een
prijsstijging van aan goed leidt tot een  toename  in  de  vraag  naar  alle
andere  goederen.  Dit  is lang niet altijd reeel. Zo zal een prijsverhoging
van shag ook een terugval in de vraag naar  vloeitjes geven. Het  is  vrij
eenvoudig  om economiedn te vinden waarin het Walrasiaanse aanpassingsproces
niet convergeert ( Scarf [1960]). Later zijn er  verschillende  varianten  op
het  Walrasiaanse proces gedefinieerd. Het belangrijkste proces is de Newton
methode van Smale [1976]. In dat proces worden de prijzen  van  de  goederen
zodanig aangepast dat de overschotten en tekorten op alle markten gelijktij-
dig verminderen. Ook dit proces convergeert lang niet altijd. Convergentie
naar  een  evenwicht is enkel gegarandeerd voor een bepaalde verzameling van
prijsvectoren vanwaaruit je start.
De  prijs-aanpassingsprocessen  die in deze monografie gepresenteerd
worden convergeren bijna altijd. Het cruciale van deze processen is  dat  de
uitgangsprijzen  ten alle tijden een rol spelen bij de aanpassingen. Niet de
absolute prijzen worden aangepast maar de relatieve prijzen. Meer precies de
prijzen gerelateerd aan de startprijzen. Een ander voordeel van onze proces-
sen is dat ze makkelijk zijn aan te passen  voor  andere  modellen.  In  dit
proefschrift worden twee toepassingen gegeven. Bovendien hebben onze aanpas-
singsprocessen een aantrekkelijke economische interpretatie. Zo worden in de
uitgangssituatie  de  prijzen  van goederen met een vraagoverschot verhoogd,
terwijl de prijzen van goederen met aanbodoverschot  worden verlaagd. Voor
prijsvectoren  die gegenereerd worden gedurende de aanpassingen geldt dat de
verhouding tussen prijs en startprijs minimaal  is  voor  goederen  met  een
vraagtekort  en  maximaal  voor goederen met een vraagoverschot. Zo gauw een
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markt voor een bepaald goed in evenwicht is,  d.w.z.  vraag  is  gelijk  aan
aanbod,  dan  wordt  de  markt door prijsaanpassingen in evenwicht gehouden.
Zo'n evenwicht wordt echter verstoord als de relatieve  prijsverhouding  van
dat  goed minimaal of maximaal wordt. In het eerste geval wordt de prijsver-
houding minimaal gehouden en komt er een aanbodoverschot op  die  markt.  In
het tweede geval wordt de relatieve prijs maximaal gehouden en komt de markt
in een situatie van vraagoverschot.
Vervolgens  evalueren we de contributie van dit proefschrift met be-
trekking tot niet-coOperatieve spelen. We hebben een rekenprocedure  ontwik-
keld waarmee we een Nash evenwicht kunnen vinden voor niet-coaperatieve spe-
len met een willekeurig aantal deelnemers. Voor het speciale geval  van  een
spel  met  twee  spelers is het algoritme te interpreteren als een stategie-
aanpassingsproces. In de startsituatie spelen  beide  spelers  een  bepaalde
strategie. Een strategie van een speler is een vector van kansen waarmee hij
de acties die hij heeft speelt. Vanuit de start verhoogt  het  algoritme  de
kansen  waarmee  de beste acties van de spelers worden gespeeld terwijl alle
andere kansen relatief (t.o.v. de start) gelijk worden verlaagd. In het  al-
gemeen  worden  strategiean  gegenereerd  waarbij  de kansen gerelateerd aan
niet-optimale acties relatief gelijk en minimaal zijn. Zo gauw een actie die
voorheen  niet-optimaal  was, optimaal wordt voor de betreffende speler, dan
wordt de bijbehorende relatieve kans verhoogd vanaf het minimum.  Omgekeerd,
als de relatieve kans waarmee een optimale actie wordt gespeeld gelijk wordt
aan het minimum, dan wordt de kans relatief gelijk gehouden aan dat  minimum
en wordt de betreffende actie niet-optimaal gemaakt.
Een andere karakteristiek van het algoritme bij toepassing op  niet-
coOperatieve  spelen  met  twee  spelers  is dat we er in principe alle Nash
evenwichten mee kunnen vinden. Door toepassing van de procedure vanuit  ver-
schillende  start-strategiean kunnen verschillende evenwichten gevonden wor-
den. De rest van de evenwichten kunnen worden gevonden door te starten  van-
uit  evenwichten die je voorheen al gevonden hebt. Dit is een groot voordeel
t.o.v. het standaard algoritme voor niet-cooperatieve spelen met  twee  spe-
lers,  t.w.  de  Lemke-Howson  methode. Die methode heeft sterke beperkingen
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m.b.t. de keus van de start-strategieen. Vandaar  dat  sommige  evenwichten
niet met Lemke-Howson gevonden kunnen worden.
Een andere karakteristiek van ons algoritme toegepast op niet-coape-
ratieve  spelen is dat het evenwicht wat gevonden wordt als in de startsitu-
atie alle kansen positief zijn, mooie eigenschappen bezit.
In het geval van een niet-coOperatief spel met meer dan twee spelers
wordt het probleem van het vinden van een evenwicht niet-lineair. Eerst  li-
nearizeren  we het probleem. Technisch gezien gebeurt dat door het nemen van
een eerste-orde Taylor benadering. Dit lineaire probleem lossen we  op  mid-
dels  een  procedure  die een generalisatie is van het algoritme voor spelen
met twee spelers. Zo vinden we een benadering van een  Nash  evenwicht  voor
het  oorspronkelijke  spel. Als de benadering niet goed genoeg is herstarten
we de procedure vanuit het benaderende evenwicht. We stoppen als de  benade-
ring  goed genoeg is. Echter, er is geen garantie dat deze procedure conver-
geert naar een evenwicht. In de praktijk blijkt de methode  echter  goed  te
werken. De idee van deze methode is geinspireerd door Mathiessen [19858] die
een niet-lineair complementariteitsprobleem oplost via het oplossen van  een
reeks  van  lineaire complementariteitsproblemen. Naast het feit dat ook bij
zijn methode de convergentie niet gegarandeerd is, is  het  tevens  mogelijk
dat een bepaald lineair probleem onoplosbaar blijkt. Bij onze methode is dat
niet het geval.
Een  andere  klasse  van  algoritmes  om een Nash evenwicht voor een
niet-coaoperatief spel met een willekeurig aantal deelnemers te vinden  zijn
de  simpliciale algoritmes. Hierbij wordt de verzameling van mogelijke stra-
tegie vectoren opgedeeld in simplices. De niet-lineaire functie wordt stuks-
gewijs  lineair gemaakt door de functie te linearizeren op elke simplex. Ook
dit algoritme wordt meerdere malen toegepast. Elke keer vindt het  algoritme
een  simplex waarin een benaderend Nash evenwicht zit. De nauwkeurigheid van
benadering is gerelateerd aan de grootte van de simplices. Als de benadering
niet  goed  genoeg is wordt de procedure herstart vanuit de strategie vector
die in de vorige ronde gevonden is. Daarbij wordt  de  simpliciale  opdeling
fijner en fijner gemaakt wat de mate van benadering doet toenemen. Het grote
voordeel van simpliciale algoritmes is dat ze gegarandeerd convergeren. Ech-
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ter, vooral in latere rondes kan het simpliciaal algoritme er relatief lang
over doen. In de praktijk lijkt het  aan  te  bevelen  om  beide  algoritmes
gecombineerd  te  gebruiken; eerst een paar ronden een simpliciaal algoritme
en daarna het algoritme dat in deze monografie wordt gepresenteerd.
De opzet van dit proefschrift is als volgt. In hoofdstuk 1 wordt het
belang  van deze monografie aangegeven en worden de aanpassingsprocessen ge-
illustreerd. Hoofdstuk 2 bevat een overzicht van notationele conventies die
in  dit proefschrift gehanteerd worden. Verder worden er een aantal stellin-
gen uit verschillende gebieden van de wiskunde opgesomd die we verderop  be-
nodigen. In hoofdstuk 3 worden voorwaarden geformuleerd waaronder onze pro-
cessen convergeren. Tevens wordt daar een ander aanpassingsproces  voor  een
ruileconomie  gegeven.  Voor  prijsvectoren  die door dat proces gegenereerd
worden geldt dat op elke markt het vraagoverschot  positief  gerelateerd  is
aan  het  verschil  tussen de geldende marktprijs en de startprijs. Dus, een
prijs van een goed is hoger dan de startprijs  als  er  sprake  is  van  een
vraagoverschot op de markt. Het omgekeerde geldt i.g.v. een aanbodoverschot.
Een en ander beantwoordt aan de economische intuitie. De hoofdstukken 4 en 5
bevatten toepassingen van het basisproces op wat meer ingewikkelde modellen.
In hoofdstuk 4 bekijken we een model waarin sprake is van  twee  landen  met
zowel  goederen  voor  de  thuismarkt als voor de internationale handel. Het
proces past niet alleen prijzen aan alnaargelang de situatie op  de  betref-
fende  markt, maar ook past het wisselkoersen aan in relatie tot de situatie
op de betalingsbalans. Als er een overschot (tekort) is op  de  betalingsba-
lans  wordt de betreffende munt gerevalueerd (gedevalueerd). Hoofdstuk 5 be-
handelt een standaard ruileconomie met productie. Het totale aanbod van
goederen  ligt  nu niet a-priori vast maar fluctueert alnaargelang de omvang
van de productie. Het proces past nu naast prijzen  ook  de  omvang  van  de
productie aan. Een  bepaalde  productie-wijze wordt ingesteld zo gauw deze
methode tegen de geldende prijzen geen verlies maakt.
De  hoofdstukken  3,4 en 5 behandelen aanpassingsprocessen in econo-
mieen en vormen het eerste deel van dit proefschrift. In het tweede  deel  -
hoofdstuk  6-  worden  strategie-aanpassingsprocessen voor niet-cooperatieve
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spelen beschouwd. Allereerst wordt het algoritme gepresenteerd  bij  toepas-
sing op spelen met twee spelers. Geillustreerd wordt tevens hoe het algorit-
me meerdere evenwichten vindt. Vervolgens wordt het  Lemke-Howson  algoritme
herschreven 'tot een strategie-aanpassingsproces. Dit maakt een goede verge-
lijking met ons algoritme mogelijk. Tot slot wordt het algoritme voor  niet-
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